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Federal Labor Rights and Access to
Private Property: The NLRB and
the Right to Exclude
Dianne Averyt
Conflicts between property rights and federal labor rights have long
been a source of controversy and litigation for employers and unions. In its
1986 Fairmont Hotel decision, the National Labor Relations Board refor-
mulated its approach to resolving access disputes. In the following year, as
the Board applied the Fairmont "balancing" test to a wide range of new
situations, many troublesome substantive and procedural issues were re-
vealed. By the fall of 1988, in Jean Country, the Board had signaled a
retreat from a mechanistic approach to the Fairmont test, but had failed,
nevertheless, to undertake a thorough reexamination of its premises. Nor
did the Board consider the interrelationship of its access cases with preemp-
tion doctrine, state labor laws, and state constitutional rights offree speech.
The consequence is a body of contradictory rules and procedures which
significantly limit the collective rights of workers and suggest the need for a
fundamental restructuring of the laws governing access disputes.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1982, three Teamsters officials were threatened with arrest when
they attempted to distribute union.handbills to guests entering the luxuri-
ous San Francisco landmark, the Fairmont Hotel. The hotel did not
quarrel with the content of the handbill, which urged the public not to
patronize the Fairmont so long as it did business with a particular non-
union baker whose wages were below the Teamsters' area standards.
Rather the hotel objected to the location of the handbilling, on the "pri-
vately owned" driveway next to the "privately owned" steps leading to
the main entrance of the hotel. When a hotel security official ordered the
union officers to move to the public sidewalk, they found that they could
not reach hotel customers and abandoned their handbilling entirely.
Nevertheless, believing that the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA")' gave them a right to engage in peaceful handbilling at the
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
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hotel's "privately owned" entrance, the union filed an unfair labor prac-
tice charge with the National Labor Relations Board. Thus began the
access dispute that, more than four years later, resulted in the Board's
Fairmont Hotel decision.2
The Teamsters lost the decision before the Board. The Board con-
cluded that the Fairmont Hotel's interests in its private entranceway
were, on balance, more significant than the union's statutory rights to
communicate information regarding its labor dispute. The decision
reveals the Board's attitude toward the value of property rights and fed-
eral rights of employees. But Fairmont has more important implications.
The decision effectively broke a logjam of unresolved property access
cases that had been pending before the Board for a number of years.
The Board used Fairmont as an opportunity to articulate a new test for
resolving access disputes, a test that explicitly repudiated principles as-
serted in several 1979 Board decisions4 and affirmed assumptions ex-
pressed, though in dictum, by the Supreme Court in its 1978 decision of
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District Council of
Carpenters.' The Board and the Supreme Court, in attempting to weigh
"rights" in access disputes, have created an analytical framework that
incorporates assumptions about social and market relations, and the ap-
propriate roles of workers and property owners. These assumptions,
however, skew the debate about access: the right answers are given to
the wrong questions.
The Fairmont test analyzed access disputes by weighing property
rights of employers against federal statutory rights of employees.6 If the
property rights outweighed the statutory rights, the Board could deny
access without considering whether the persons exercising section 7
rights had reasonable alternative means of communication. 7 In Fair-
mont, the Board suggested how property rights should be valued and
affirmed the notion that there is a hierarchy of section 7 rights. The
consequence was a test that tended to value more highly the property
rights of employers, while devaluing the statutory rights of employees.
2. 282 N.L.R.B. No. 27, 123 L.R.R.M. 1257 (1986). Fairmont is discussed infra Part I, pp.
150-61.
3. In one instance, the delay between a property access dispute and Board decision was over
nine years. See Schwab Foods, Inc., 284 N.L.R.B. No. 120, 125 L.R.R.M. 1225 (1987), enforced,
129 L.R.R.M. 2601 (7th Cir. 1988).
4. For a discussion of these principles, see infra text accompanying notes 19-23.
5. 436 U.S. 180.
6. The federal statutory rights in question are those granted under § 7 of the NLRA, namely
that "[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organiza-
tions, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." 29
U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
7. This test was subsequently overruled by Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. No. 4, 129 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1201 (1988). See infra Section ILE, pp. 205-08.
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After Fairmont, the Board decided fifteen "Fairmont" cases in less
than a year.8 These fifteen cases reveal the difficulties that the Board
experienced in attempting to apply the new Fairmont test to a myriad of
factual circumstances involving different types of property and statutory
rights. Each of the Board members deciding the post-Fairmont cases
adopted a different, idiosyncratic approach to Fairmont's "balancing" of
property rights and section 7 rights.9 Fairmont created far more
problems than i(solved. What was presented in Fairmont as a fair and
objective method of resolving access disputes has turned out, not surpris-
ingly, to be subjective and indeterminate. The problems posed by the
access cases are not readily amenable to per se rules or further refine-
ments of the factors to be considered in a "balancing" test. Moreover,
the inordinate delays of the Board in deciding the Fairmont cases essen-
tially determined the outcome of the access disputes because, even when
the access claim was meritorious, access delayed was, for all practical
purposes, access denied.
The present "balancing" of section 7 rights and property rights in
the Fairmont cases serves only to defeat the policies of the federal labor
laws in an increasing number of employment contexts. In a period when
many employers are relocating their businesses in suburbs, shopping
malls, urban arcades, or industrial parks, the section 7 rights of employ-
ees are often defeated by private property. The Board, the federal courts,
and ultimately the Supreme Court, must confront the contradictions in-
herent in their analyses of property rights and section 7 rights. Other-
wise, the Act's policies of encouraging union organization and collective
bargaining will continue to be undermined by lawful corporate decisions
to invest in physical space and barriers that insulate company employees
and customers from labor activity.
In Part I of this Article, I discuss the Fairmont decision, its factual
and legal context, and the doctrinal significance of its new test for accom-
modating property rights and federal labor rights. In applying this new
test to the facts of the Fairmont dispute, however, the Board incorporates
class-based assumptions about the uses of property and the risks of labor
activity. The end result is a rule with "corollaries," not explicitly ac-
knowledged by the Board, which legitimate the continued use of prop-
erty interests to control the assertion of employees' rights.
In Part II, I analyze the "progeny" of Fairmont-the Board deci-
sions issued in 1987 and 1988 that involved application of the new Fair-
mont test to access disputes. First, I discuss the effects of delays in Board
unfair labor practice proceedings on the fifteen 1987 Fairmont cases. Ac-
cess disputes, like discharge cases, may not be amenable to fair resolution
8. See cases listed infra note 77.
9. See infra Section II.B, pp. 169-74.
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under existing Board procedures and practices, even when they are expe-
ditiously pursued. But the data on the 1987 Fairmont cases indicates
that these access cases present a particularly egregious example of the
current failings of Board processes.
I then explore the contradictory and confusing analysis in the post-
Fairmont cases created by the fact that each of the 1987 Board Members
adopted an idiosyncratic version of the Fairmont test. Fairmont and
eleven of the fifteen 1987 post-Fairmont cases deal with access disputes
involving retail or service facilities. I use these retail/service facility
cases to demonstrate both the analytical incoherence of the Board's new
Fairmont test and its reliance on a largely unexamined scheme of social
values. In dicta in Fairmont, the Board reasoned that access rights de-
pend, in part, on whether a retail facility is a single, free-standing store or
is located in a large shopping mall. I illustrate that this dichotomy be-
tween the single store and the large shopping mall, which the Board
adopted from free speech cases, is inapposite in cases dealing with federal
statutory labor rights. Then, proceeding through the various categories
of retail/service facilities, I show how the Board has struggled to make
its own doctrine-the Fairmont test and "large shopping mall/single
store" rules-fit with its ideas about the importance of protecting an em-
ployer's investment in the accouterments of class and status.
The next Section of Part II deals with the Board's acceptance in
Fairmont of the notion that section 7 rights can be ordered in a hierarchy
according to the Board's valuation of the importance of each right. In
discussing four categories of section 7 rights-(l) primary economic ac-
tivity, (2) union organizing, (3) unfair labor practice activity, and (4) area
standards activity-I show how the Board, in the 1987 Fairmont cases,
has evaluated these section 7 rights in specialized work environments, as
well as in retail and service facilities. I argue that the Board's ideas about
the hierarchy of section 7 rights-ideas consistent with Supreme Court
holdings and dictum-do not necessarily reflect the value that unions
and employees place on federal labor law protection of various types of
communicative activity. The Board's approach to a hierarchy of labor
rights imposes significant burdens on unions.
In the final Section of Part II, I discuss the significance of the
Board's 1988 decision, Jean Country,1" which overruled part of the Fair-
mont test. In Jean Country, the Board attempted to simplify the Fair-
mont test and make it more responsive to union needs for effective means
of communication regarding labor disputes. I demonstrate, however,
that Jean Country fails to alter Fairmont's indeterminate balancing ap-
proach in access disputes. Consequently, Jean Country is only a clarifica-
tion of Fairmont, not a reworking of its fundamental principles.
10. 291 N.L.R.B. No. 4, 129 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1201.
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In Part III, I discuss the relationship between the Fairmont cases
and doctrinal developments in federal labor preemption, state anti-in-
junction statutes, and state constitutional rights of free speech. The
Board's decisions in the Fairmont disputes have far-reaching implications
for state court adjudication of labor trespass disputes. The incoherent
body of Board law regarding access rights can only compound the confu-
sion for state courts required to deal with complex questions of federal
preemption. Furthermore, a few states have labor statutes and constitu-
tional provisions that are more protective of peaceful labor activity on
private property than is federal law under the Fairmont test. The result
is a contested terrain of jurisdiction and legal rules that underscores the
need for uniform labor access rights.
Finally, in Part IV, I use my critique of the Fairmont cases to show
how the Board has enhanced property rights by refusing to recognize a
statutory right of access in many circumstances. I suggest that the legal
construct of "trespass to land" is used in these access disputes, not to
protect businesses from threats to possessory interests in land, but to pro-
tect businesses from loss of goodwill and from interruptions in service or
production. In conclusion, I criticize the conception of property rights
that denies unions the ability to reach their audiences in face-to-face
communication at the pedestrian entrances to each workplace.
I
THE FAIRMONT HOTEL DECISION
A. The Context.- Prior Decisions and Contemporary Politics
In Fairmont, the Board attempted to simplify the federal law gov-
erning access disputes by providing a reinterpretation of the Supreme
Court's analysis in NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. " In Babcock, the
Supreme Court articulated the Board's mandate: "to accommodate" em-
ployees' statutory rights under the Act with employers' property rights
with "as little destruction of one as is consistent with the maintenance of
the other."12 Babcock held that an employer does not violate the Act
when it refuses to permit nonemployee union organizers to distribute
union literature in the parking lot of the employer's plant, unless the
union has no other reasonable means of communicating with the employ-
ees.I3 The Board's varied readings of Babcock, however, in more than
thirty years of Board decisions "accommodating" section 7 rights and
11. 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
12. Id. at 112.
13. [A]n employer may validly post his property against nonemployee distribution of
union literature if reasonable efforts by the union through other available channels of com-
munication will enable it to reach the employees with its message and if the employer's
notice or order does not discriminate against the union by allowing other distribution.
LABOR ACCESS TO PRIVATE PROPERTY
property rights, casts doubt on the wisdom and utility of the original
Babcock formulation.
Babcock also played a key role in the development of federal labor
preemption doctrine in trespass disputes. In its Sears decision, the
Supreme Court for the first time permitted state courts to assert jurisdic-
tion over peaceful trespassory labor picketing which was arguably subject
to the exclusive primary jurisdiction of the Board. 4 In doctrinal terms,
Sears marked a significant change in the Supreme Court's analysis of fed-
eral labor law preemption. 5 In practical terms, the decision opened the
way for increased use of state court injunctions to regulate peaceful labor
activity on private property.
As important as the doctrinal and practical consequences of Sears,
however, were the stated and unstated assumptions underlying the
Court's analysis that reaffirmed the primacy of property rights when they
conflict with section 7 rights under the Act. In Sears, the Court in dic-
tum 6 asserted that "while there are unquestionably examples of trespas-
sory union activity in which the question whether it is protected is fairly
debatable, experience under the Act teaches that such situations are rare
and that a trespass is far more likely to be unprotected than protected." 7
At least for the first few years after Sears, however, the Board tended to
permit nonemployee access to private property in a variety of
circumstances. 
1 8
Beginning in 1979, several key Board decisions found section 8(a)(1)
violations of the Act' 9 when property owners denied nonemployee union
representatives access to property for picketing or handbilling.2 ° For ex-
ample, in Giant Food Markets, the Board found that nonemployees con-
14. Sears, 436 U.S. 180.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 289-98.
16. See Sears, 436 U.S. at 211 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 231-32 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
17. Id. at 205.
18. See generally Note, Accommodating Nonemployees: NLRA Protection of Concerted Union
Conduct in the Wake of Sears, 29 CATH. U.L. REV. 185 (1979) (discussing Board decisions, both
before and after Sears, in which nonemployee access to private property for picketing, handbilling,
or solicitation was found to be protected section 7 activity). The Board's willingness to protect
peaceful trespassory collective activity in the immediate post-Sears period was a cause of concern to
some management attorneys. See, for example, the observation of one commentator that "a narrow
exception to the general rule of nonaccess has been eroded by the Board and applied to areas not
contemplated by the courts. It has been construed by the Board to justify every conceivable form of
nonemployee access." Spelfogel, Private Property Picketing, 33 LAB. L.J. 659, 667 (1982).
19. Section 8(a)(1) states: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7." 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(1) (1982).
20. See Willis, A Survey of Recent Retail Facilities Nonemployee Access Decisions, 32 MERCER
L. REV. 797 (1981); Lubbers, Report on Case-Handling Developments at the NLRB, Lab. Rel. Rep.
(BNA) No. 106, at 201 (Mar. 16, 1981); see also Montgomery Ward & Co., 265 N.L.R.B. 60 (1982),
discussed infra note 22.
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ducting area standards picketing on the sidewalk of a supermarket were
engaged in protected activity.2' In that case, the supermarket and an
adjoining discount store were surrounded by a parking lot on property
owned by a third party. After Giant Food, the Board found in several
cases that employers violated section 8(a)(1) of the Act by denying non-
employees access to private property for purposes of peaceful picketing
or handbilling.22 In concluding that there was, in effect, a statutory
"right of access" that outweighed the employer's "right to exclude," the
Board was applying the Babcock balancing test. Thus, in the immediate
aftermath of Sears, the Board interpreted the Babcock test expansively to
permit nonemployee access to property for peaceful section 7 communi-
cative activity where other means of communication were not practicable
or effective. The result, for a short time, was to "open the doors" to
employers' property and to allow unions to reach employees and con-
sumers in face-to-face encounters at the entrances to the workplace.23
When the Board's 1979 access decisions came before the circuit
courts, however, it became clear that the Board's view of the proper ac-
commodation between property rights and section 7 rights would not
easily survive appellate review.24 This tension between expansive Board
decisions and more restrictive court decisions regarding permissible stat-
utory incursions on property rights had its roots in Babcock and became
evident as Board access orders were denied enforcement over the years.25
21. 241 N.L.R.B. 727, enforcement denied, 633 F.2d 18 (6th Cir. 1980). For a discussion of
the impact of Sears and its preemption analysis on the state court litigation that arose out of the
Giant Food Market dispute, see Comment, Labor Law Preemption after Sears-Problems in Concur-
rent Jurisdiction-Wiggins & Co. v. Retail Clerks Local 1557, 47 TENN. L. REV. 373 (1980).
22. In Seattle-First National Bank, the Board ordered the owner of a fifty-story office building
to permit union picketing and handbilling in the foyer at the entrance to a restaurant on the forty-
sixth floor. 243 N.L.R.B. 898 (1979), remanded for modification, 651 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1980), as
modified, 258 N.L.R.B. 1222 (1981). In another case the Board found that the owner of a free-
standing store violated 8(a)(1) by excluding union representatives attempting to engage in organiza-
tional handbilling at the store's employee entrance which was located below the street level. Hutzler
Bros., 241 N.L.R.B. 914 (1979), enforcement denied, 630 F.2d 1012 (4th Cir. 1980). Finally, in
1982, in Montgomery Ward, striking employees of a manufacturer of sporting goods attempted to
promote a consumer boycott of the "struck products" by handbilling at the entrances to a "single
structure" department store "on its own city block." 265 N.L.R.B. at 62. Finding that the union
had no reasonable alternative means of reaching consumers, the Board ordered the retailer to permit
the union to engage in handbilling on the premises. Id. at 70.
23. In Babcock, the Supreme Court asserted that it is "not a problem of always open or always
closed doors for union organization on company property." 351 U.S. at 112.
24. Enforcement of the Board remedial orders was denied in several circuits. The Sixth Circuit
set aside the Board's order and remanded in Giant Food. Giant Food Mkt., Inc. v. NLRB, 633 F.2d
18 (1980). The Fourth Circuit reversed and denied enforcement in Hutzler Brothers. Hutzler Bros.
v. NLRB, 630 F.2d 1012 (1980). The Ninth Circuit remanded Seattle-First National to the Board
for modification of its order so that the number and behavior of pickets in the restaurant foyer would
be appropriately restricted. See Seattle-First National Bank, Inc. v. NLRB, 651 F.2d 1272, 1277
(1980).
25. See discussion of cases in Note, supra note 18, at 199-213. See also Note, NLRB Orders
Granting Unions Access to. Company Property, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 895, 905, 913 (1983) (comment-
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The problem of inconsistent Board decisions, the conflicts between the
Board and the courts, and the impact of the Sears dicta have contributed
to the confusion and uncertainty surrounding the legal resolution of ac-
cess disputes. The burdens of the unsettled state of the law have fallen
most heavily on unions and employees who have, sometimes for years,
been improperly denied access to private property for the purposes of
engaging in protected collective action.
In 1986, Fairmont reversed the trend of the 1979 Board decisions,
by making it more difficult to establish rights of access under section 7.
In this respect the Board was moving in the direction of "rarely" grant-
ing nonemployees access to private property. Indeed, in an ironic twist
on the process of administrative lawmaking, the Board relied on the
Sears dicta about the trend of prior Board access cases as if it were law
controlling what the Board should do in the future. Thus, Sears became
a self-fulfilling prophecy.
But Sears only facilitated the choices that the 1986 Board would
have been likely to make in any event. By this time the Board consisted
entirely of Reagan appointees.26 By the beginning of Reagan's second
ing on the willingness of courts to "substitute their own judgment" in reviewing remedial orders of
the Board and urging the Board and courts to use the remedy of an access order "sparingly because
of its extreme impact on the private property rights of the employer").
26. Donald L. Dotson became the twelfth Chairman of the NLRB on March 8, 1983. His five-
year term expired on December 16, 1987, at which time he left the Board. After receiving his law
degree in 1968 from Wake Forest University, Dotson worked as an attorney in the Winston-Salem
Regional Office of the NLRB. From 1973 to 1981 he was a corporate attorney in private industry,
working as labor counsel first for Westinghouse, then Western Electric, and finally for Wheeling-
Pittsburgh Corporation. Dotson came to the Board from a prior appointment in the Reagan Admin-
istration: from 1981 to 1983, he served as Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor Management
Relations. See 1988 FEDERAL STAFF DIRECTORY 1006.
Wilford W. Johansen became a Member of the Board on May 28, 1985, to fill the remainder of a
term that expired on August 27, 1988. President Reagan reappointed Johansen for a second term in
July of 1988. Johansen received his law degree in 1957 from George Washington University Law
School, after which he began a career as an attorney for the NLRB. In 1971 he became Regional
Director of Region 21 in Los Angeles. In 1984 Johansen served for six months as Acting General
Counsel of the Board, his first Reagan appointment before becoming a Board Member. See id. at
1057.
On July 1, 1985, Marshall B. Babson became a Member of the Board for a term expiring on
December 16, 1989. Babson graduated from Columbia Law School in 1975 and spent his legal
career as a management attorney in private practice, including a two year stint with Littler, Mendel-
son, Falstiff & Tichy of San Francisco. Just before coming to the Board, Babson was a partner with
the firm of Wiggin & Dana in New Haven, Connecticut. Babson planned to return to private prac-
tice when he left the Board in the summer of 1988, before his term expired. See id. at 954.
James M. Stephens became a Member of the Board on October 16, 1985, for a five-year term
expiring August 27, 1990. Stephens graduated from Case Western Reserve University in 1971,
clerked for Judge Leo A. Jackson of the Ohio Court of Appeals until 1973, and then entered private
practice as an associate in an Akron, Ohio firm for several years. In 1977, Stephens entered govern-
ment work as Associate Minority Labor Counsel to the House Committee on Education and Labor.
From 1981 until his Board appointment, he served as Labor Counsel to the Senate Committee on
Labor and Human Resources. On January 7, 1988, President Reagan named Stephens as Chairman
of the NLRB, to fill the post left vacant by Dotson's departure. See id. at 1166.
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term in office, Chairman Dotson's openly expressed pro-management,
anti-union biases27 were coming under attack by groups representing a
broad spectrum of political and economic interests, including labor, man-
agement, and the government.28 For a Board that has always been polit-
ical, even while purporting to be a neutral administrative body of
"experts," its politics were beginning to get in the way of its ability to
function.29
Moreover, President Reagan's failure to fill vacant Board seats expe-
ditiously meant that for long periods of time the Board had only three or
four members rather than the full complement of five. These vacancies
contributed to the backlog of cases, not only because the work load for
each member increased, but also because the Board postponed decisions
on significant cases until the entire Board could review them.3" By Feb-
ruary 1984, the backlog of Board cases had increased to a peak of 1,647
unfair labor practice and representation cases. 3 The agency previously
considered one of the most fair and efficient in Washington came to be
perceived by many as the victim of excessive politicization and
bureaucratization. 32 Consequently, the Board became the object of in-
27. Dotson's views were expressed both in his Board decisions and frequent dissents, as well as
his public comments on the speaking circuit.
28. See, e.g., Middleton, NLRB: An Agency in Turmoil, Nat'l L.J., July 2, 1984, at 1.
29. For discussions of the politics of Board decisionmaking, see Gregory, The National Labor
Relations Board and the Politics of Labor Law, 27 B.C.L. REV. 39 (1985); and Summers, Politics,
Policy Making, and the NLRB, 6 SYRACUSE L. REV. 93 (1954).
30. See Gregory, supra note 29, at 41-42.
31. See Oversight of the NLRB: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Employment & Housing of
the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 103 (1985) (Statement of Chairman
Dotson). Dotson stated in June of 1985 that the backlog of unresolved cases had been reduced to
1,236 cases, "a decline of 411 cases--over 25 percent-since the backlog peaked in February 1984."
Id. at 104. The Chairman added that turnover among the Board members'had prevented resolution
of twelve cases then over six years old. Id. at 105.
In July of 1988, however, it was reported at another congressional oversight hearing into NLRB
delays that "the backlog of undecided cases has gone up slightly since the beginning of Fiscal Year
1988, and case output is at its second lowest output in 15 years." Delays at Labor Board, LAB. REL.
REP. (BNA) No. 128, at 397, 397 (July 25, 1988). At that hearing, newly appointed Chairman
Stephens "added that the efficiency of the agency is adversely affected when the board is at less than
full strength." Id. at 399. See also Delays in NLRB Operations Discussed by ULP Victims, LAB.
REL. REP. (BNA) No. 127, at 205 (Feb. 15, 1988) (discussing Senate labor subcommittee hearings
on NLRB delays).
32. For example, in 1985, Pamela Ames, director of the American Nurses Association, testified
at a congressional oversight hearing that "[t]he backlog of health care cases before the NLRB; em-
ployer manipulation of procedure and blatant violations of the law; and vague, ever-changing rules
issued in decisions by the Board are unconscionable." Oversight of the NLRB: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Employment & Housing of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
4, 6 (1985) (Statement of Pamela Ames).
On July 13, 1988, at an oversight hearing, Representative Tom Lantos (D-Cal.) "blasted the
agency .. .for 'unforgiveable delays' and for a quixotic decision-making process that reflects 'no
logic, order, rhyme, or reason."' LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 128, at 397 (July 25, 1988). At the
same hearing, Rep. Joseph J. DioGuardi (R-NY) described the Board as "'highly politicized'" and
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creased congressional oversight. 33  The Fairmont decision must, there-
fore, be placed within this context of Board politics and bureaucratic
backlog, as well as the context of doctrinal developments in the law. Fair-
mont and the 1987 Fairmont decisions34 are representative of, and in fact
are part of, the internal and external problems currently facing the
Board.
The Fairmont dispute presented the Board with an opportunity to
deal decisively with a class of cases that had consistently proved to be
troublesome. A number of access disputes were awaiting Board decision,
and the Fairmont case was to provide the model of analysis for deciding
the subsequent cases.35 Of all the access cases then before the Board,
Fairmont presented some of the most compelling arguments for denial of
access. It also revealed the links between the Board's conceptions of
property rights and its assumptions about the privileges of class, wealth,
and status.
B. The Dispute: The Teamsters, Bakers of Paris,
and the Fairmont Hotel
The dispute in the Fairmont case arose on September 28, 1982, when
three Teamsters Union officers began distributing handbills at the steps
of the main entrance to the Fairmont Hotel in San Francisco. The
Teamsters were then involved in a dispute with a local nonunion
bakery-Bakers of Paris-whose goods were purchased by the Fairmont
Hotel.36 The Teamsters were not attempting to organize employees at
Bakers of Paris, or at the hotel, whose employees were already repre-
sented by several unions. Rather, the union was protesting the substan-
dard wages and working conditions of the Bakers of Paris employees and
delivery drivers, which threatened to undermine the union's area stan-
dards. The union handbilling campaign was directed at consumers, re-
questing them not to patronize the Fairmont Hotel and its restaurants
until the hotel stopped buying goods from Bakers of Paris.37
The union's area standards publicity, aside from the location of the
"urged the General Accounting Office or some branch of the government to take a look at the
workings of the board." Id.
33. Speaking at the July 13, 1988, congressional hearing, Rep. Barney Frank (D-Mass.) "de-
clared that the failure of the board to carry out its mandate is 'one of the most conspicuous failures
of this administration.' " Frank reviewed "the record of past oversight hearings," and "claimed that
the agency is an example of 'nonfeasance' and that the witnesses present[ed] a record of 'seven and
one-half years of temporary aberrations.' " LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 128, at 398. See also House
Hearings on Labor Board, LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 127, at 370 (Mar. 21, 1988) (discussing
House oversight hearings on NLRB).
34. See cases cited infra note 77.
35. See infra text accompanying notes 77-86.
36. The union had previously picketed the bakery's place of business. See 282 N.L.R.B. No.
27, ALJ Decision, JD-(SF)-138-83, slip op. at 3 (June 21, 1983).
37. The handbill read as follows:
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handbilling on Fairmont Hotel property, was "clearly" protected section
7 activity.3" The question before the Board was whether the handbilling
was protected at that location-at the "private" main entrance to the
Fairmont Hotel. But this was not just ordinary private property. The
Administrative Law Judge ("AL") described the hotel as a "large and
lavish" hotel located in "an affluent section" of San Francisco.39 By
agreement of the parties, the ALJ included within the file that was for-
warded to the Board three photographs of the main entrance to the
hotel.4
The photographs assisted the Board in describing the entrance to
this "luxury" hotel. 41  The Board wrote that the Teamsters Union of-
ficers distributed handbills "at the elaborate main entrance at the front of
the hotel."42 The hotel's "privately owned steps are connected to a pri-
vately owned, semicircular driveway which in turn is connected to the
public sidewalk and street."43 The public sidewalk is about twenty feet
from the steps, and a "large canopy over the driveway, extending from
TO THE PUBLIC
PLEASE DO NOT PATRONIZE
THIS RESTAURANT-HOTEL
We are asking your cooperation to help us in a labor dispute. This restaurant-hotel uses
bakery products produced and delivered by a non-union bakery, called Bakers of Paris. Its
products are manufactured and delivered under non-union conditions.
We need the support of our community to get the message across to all employers that the
public will not accept substandard operations in San Francisco.
You can help us by telling the manager of this restaurant-hotel that you will patronize him




38. 282 N.L.R.B. No. 27, slip op. at 12, 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1260 (citing Sears, 436 U.S. at
206 n.42); id. at 16 n.2, 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1261 n.2 (Stephens, concurring) ("[n]o one contends
that, apart from the controversy over location, the Union was not within its rights in handbilling the
Fairmont as a distributor of the bakery's products").
The General Counsel had argued and the ALI had concluded that the handbilling, directed at a
secondary employer, fell within the "publicity proviso" to § 8(b)(4) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(4) (1982), and was, therefore, not prohibited by the Act. AL Decision, JD-(SF)-138-83,
slip op. at 10-11. The Fairmont Hotel handbilling technically fell within the 8(b)(4) publicity pro-
viso, because the hotel and its restaurants were "distributors" of goods produced by Bakers of Paris
with whom the union had its primary dispute. See DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB ("DeBartolo I"), 463
U.S. 147 (1983); cf DeBartolo v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council ("DeBartolo
M"), 108 S. Ct. 1392, 1401, 1403 (1988) ("[the] proviso may thus be read [not as an 'exception' to
§ 8(b)(4), but as a 'clarification' that § 8(b)(4) does not ban] nonpicketing publicity, including ap-
peals to customers of a retailer as they approach the store, urging a complete boycott of the retailer
because he handles products produced by nonunion shops").
39. ALJ Decision, JD-(SF)-138-83, slip op. at 3.
40. See Joint Exhibits 2-4, id. at 4-A, 5-A, 6.
41. 282 N.L.R.B. No. 27, slip op. at 2 n.2.
42. Id. at 2, 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1257.
43. Id.
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the steps toward the sidewalk, protects the guests entering or leaving the
hotel from the elements."' The union officers were stationed at the steps
near the taxi cab stand, where people would leave the vehicles in which
they arrived and enter the hotel. Employees and suppliers used a differ-
ent entrance on another street.
The handbilling was conducted peacefully at the hotel's steps for
about ten or fifteen minutes before the hotel's assistant chief of security
threatened the union representatives with arrest for trespass if they did
not move off the hotel's property. The ALJ described the handbillers'
behavior as follows: "At no time did they enter the hotel building. As
various persons entered or exited the hotel, the union representatives ten-
dered a handbill to them and said 'Good morning,' or 'would you like
one of these.' "' The union representatives were asked to move, how-
ever, because of the hotel's belief that "permitting such activity in the
area would exacerbate problems of congestion and theft of luggage in the
area, litter the hotel's formal lobby, disturb the hotel's guests, and dis-
rupt the hotel's decorum."" In response to the arrest threat, the union
officers moved to the public sidewalk, but abandoned that location in less
than an hour because "most of the vehicles entering the hotel's driveway
did not stop at the sidewalk."47
The union subsequently brought 8(a)(1) charges against the hotel
for interference with protected section 7 activity.4 8 The ALJ, in his deci-
sion of June 21, 1983, concluded that the hotel had not violated section
8(a)(1). The General Counsel filed exceptions, and the hotel filed cross-
exceptions. Nearly three and one-half years later, the Board issued its
decision affirming the ALJ's decision and dismissing the complaint.
The Board used Fairmont to set forth an analytical framework for
deciding access disputes. Drawing primarily upon the Supreme Court
cases of Babcock, Hudgens v. NLRB,49 and Sears, the Board designed the
Fairmont test to change the analytical focus of its earlier Giant Food deci-
sion. In Giant Food5" the Board found that union area standards picket-
ing and handbilling on private property outside a supermarket was
protected section 7 activity and the owner's use of trespass laws to inter-
44. Id. at 3, 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1258.
45. AUJ Decision, JD-(SF)-138-83, slip op. at 7.
46. 282 N.L.R.B. No. 27, slip op. at 3, 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1258.
47. Id.
48. On several occasions during March and April of 1983, union representatives were permit-
ted to distribute handbills at the steps of the Fairmont Hotel where they had previously been ex-
cluded. The hotel "tolerated this activity due to the pending litigation before the Board." Although
this handbilling apparently was conducted without disruption to the hotel's business, the ALJ noted
that these "visits" to the hotel's "premises" did "not affect the legal issues as framed by the parties
on September 28th." AUJ Decision, JD-(SF)-138-83, slip op. at 8.
49. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
50. 241 N.L.R.B. 727, enforcement denied, 633 F.2d 18 (6th Cir. 1980).
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fere with that activity violated section 8(a)(1). To reach that result, the
Board focused on the union's lack of reasonable alternative means of
communication if it were excluded from the private property.5' The
Board emphasized the problems of identifying the target audience-the
consumers of a specific store-in a two-store center surrounded by a
parking lot, as well as the problems of safety and dilution of the message
if picketing were at the public sidewalk. Thus, the Board's Giant Food
analysis made the argument for granting of access compelling.
The Fairmont Board, however, was clearly displeased with the out-
come produced by the straightforward application of the Babcock test to
the facts in Giant Food.52 In particular, the Board found that "Giant's
deferral.., to a test of available 'reasonable' alternatives suggests that a
union engaging in area-standards activity would inevitably find it easier
to establish its right to access than a union engaged in organizing activ-
ity."53 This is because the target audience is comprised not of employees
but store customers who are not readily identifiable until the moment
they enter the store. The Board argued that in light of the inferior status
of area standards activity in the hierarchy of section 7 rights, such a con-
sequence was unacceptable to the Board and was -"clearly not envi-
sioned" by the Supreme Court and at least one court of appeals.54 The
Board went on to note that "[i]ndeed, if the Board were to focus primar-
ily on the availability of alternative means, there is a substantial risk that
relatively strong claims of private property rights would be required to
yield to relatively weak claims of Section 7 rights."55
In Fairmont the Board stated that in disputes involving a conflict
between property rights and section 7 rights, "it is the Board's task first
to weigh the relative strength of each party's claim."56 The Board as-
sumed that it would be able to determine from the factual evidence
presented in any particular case whether "the property owner's claim is a
strong one" or a "tenuous one."5" Factors the Board would consider in
determining the "relative strength or weakness" of the asserted property
right "[include], but are not limited to, the use to which the property in
question is put; the restrictions, if any, that are imposed on public access
to the property or to the facility located on the property; and the size and
51. 241 N.L.R.B. at 729.
52. Although Fairmont in effect overrules Giant Food, the Board insisted in Fairmont that
"[w]e do not pass here on the conclusion reached by the Board in Giant Food." 282 N.L.R.B. No.
27, slip op. at 8 n.16, 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1259 n.16.
53. Id. at 8, 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1259.
54. Id. at 10-11 & n.19, 123 L.R.R.M. at 1260 & n.19 (citing Giant Food v. NLRB, 633 F.2d at
24).
55. Id. at 10, 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1260.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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location of the private facility."5"
The next step in the Board's Fairmont analysis was to assess "the
relative strength or weakness of a claim of section 7 rights."59 The fac-
tors to be considered in evaluating the section 7 rights "include, but are
not limited to, the nature of the right asserted, the purpose for which it is
being asserted, the employer that is the target of the activity, the relation-
ship of the situs to the target, the intended audience of the activity, and
possibly, the manner in which the right is being asserted."'6
Finally, after the initial assessments of the strengths and weaknesses
of the two competing claims are completed, the results are compared.
If the property owner's claim is a strong one, while the Section 7 right at
issue is clearly a less compelling one, the property right will prevail. If
the property claim is a tenuous one, and the Section 7 right is clearly
more compelling, then the Section 7 right will prevail. Only in those
cases where the respective claims are relatively equal in strength will ef-
fective alternative means of communication become determinative.
6'
The Fairmont test thus considered "reasonable alternative means of com-
munication" only if the first step--weighing and "balancing" of property
and section 7 rights-did not prove conclusive.
The Fairmont Board then applied its new "test ' 62 by first evaluating
the strength of the Fairmont Hotel property claim. The language of the
Board's analysis and the characteristics of the hotel that the Board high-
lighted are revealing. The discussion of the law mirrors the earlier de-
scription, in the findings of fact, of the hotel's main entrance and the
hotel owner's asserted reasons for excluding the union representatives.
The Board observed that the Fairmont is "a large luxury hotel" and the
union was attempting to distribute handbills in "the privately owned area
in front of the main hotel entrance, beyond which is the hotel's formal
lobby.",63 Furthermore, the hotel "maintains an atmosphere of formality
and decorum in these locations" and this entrance area is "generally
open only to the patrons of the hotel."' By contrast, "[a]ll employees
and suppliers are required to use other designated entrances.",
65
The Board acknowledged that the hotel "is large and, therefore, has
a substantial clientele which condition dilutes to some degree the 'pri-
58. Id. at 9, 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1259-60.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 9-10, 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1260.
61. Id. at 10, 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1260. But see Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. No. 4, slip
op. at 3 n.2, 129 L.R.R.M. 1201, 1203 n.2 (1988) (overruling Fairmont to the extent that it fails to
consider reasonable alternative means of communication in every access dispute).
62. The Board's evaluation of § 7 rights and the factor of reasonable alternative means of
communication are discussed infra Parts II.D-E, pp. 198-208.
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vateness' of the entrance area.",66 Nevertheless, this diluted "private-
ness" was "more than offset by other factors.",67 The Board provided
several examples of these factors. First, the hotel, though it had been
picketed before, had apparently not previously "permitted anyone to
handbill or picket on its private property."6 Second, the hotel had
a valid interest in minimizing congestion, litter, and the possibility of
theft of luggage in the private area in front of the hotel's main entrance.
The presence of outsiders distributing handbills in this area is inconsis-
tent with these interests and would tend to disturb the hotel's guests en-
tering or leaving through this entrance and to disrupt the hotel's
decorum. 69
Third, and related to these "valid" interests was the hotel's "valid inter-
est in limiting its tort liability" because "innkeepers are frequently held
to a higher standard of care for their guests than many other employers
offering public facilities." 7 "In sum," the Board found that the hotel's
property interests in the private driveway entrance to its hotel were so
"substantial" that they "far outweigh the section 7 rights asserted by the
Union," which were not at the " 'core of the purpose for which the
NLRA was enacted.' "71
But added into the balance were factors relating to the hotel's class-
based exclusivity. Words such as "luxury," "formality," "atmosphere,"
and "decorum" are descriptive, but they also connote status based on a
hierarchy of wealth and social position. The Board's language depicts a
world where those who serve not only know their place-their status in
the hierarchy-but also know which entrances are "designated" solely
for their use. The union officers were aptly described as "outsiders" at
the main entrance to the hotel.72 The term "outsiders" here has a double
meaning--outside their class and outside their primary employment rela-
tionship. But if the union officials had walked around the corner of the
hotel to the entrance for employees and suppliers, they would have only
been "outsiders" in the latter sense, because the back entrance (or the
public streets and sidewalks) is where they supposedly belonged.73
The Board found the union's asserted section 7 rights to be weak in
comparison to the Fairmont Hotel's strong property rights. The union
handbillers were denied access despite the fact that, as the ALJ found,





70. Id. at 11-12, 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1260 (emphasis added).
71. Id. 12-13 n.23, 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1260-61 n.23 (quoting Sears, 436 U.S. at 206 n.42).
7.2. Id. at 11, 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1260.
73. See the very different analysis of property rights when the access dispute concerns the
employee entrance to a hotel, discussed infra Section II.C.2.e, pp. 195-97.
LABOR ACCESS TO PRIVATE PROPERTY
public," and "did not create actual security or other problems."74 Fur-
thermore, since the union's area standards dispute was with a bakery, the
Board argued that the union had "no primary dispute, not even an area-
standards one," with the Fairmont Hotel."' Thus, although the hotel
distributed the bakery's goods to the ultimate consumers, the Board dis-
regarded the economic relationship between the producer, the distribu-
tor, and the consumer. Since Fairmont, the Board has rarely permitted
access to private property for purposes of area standards handbilling or
picketing even in cases where the property rights were characterized as
relatively weak.76
The property analysis in Fairmont, however, suggests that even per-
sons exercising very strong section 7 rights could be excluded from the
"private" front entranceway of luxury facilities. Moreover, the assertion
of federal statutory labor rights of employees may depend on whether
unions are seeking access to the private property of a seedy, run-down,
low-class budget motel or of a formal, decorous, high-class luxury hotel.
Undoubtedly, there are many property owners as well as unions and em-
ployees who would be dismayed at such an outcome.
II
THE PROGENY OF FAIRMONT HOTEL
A. Introduction: The Problems of Delay
After a six-month hiatus following Fairmont, the Board issued fif-
teen "Fairmont decisions" within eight months.77 This flurry of Board
74. ALJ Decision, JD-(SF)-I38-83, slip op. at 9. The ALJ found, however, that "permitting
non-employees to distribute handbills on [the hotel's] outside property would create potential secur-
ity or other hazardous conditions." Id. (emphasis added). The only "security or other hazardous"
condition which the ALI specified was concern about possible theft of guests' luggage and the hotel's
attendant tort liability. Id. The ALJ did note, however, that "[o]n at least one occasion, other than
when the Union was distributing handbills, luggage was stolen from this area." ALJ Decision, JD-
(SF)-138-83, slip op. at 10.
75. 282 N.L.R.B. No. 27, slip op. at 13, 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1261.
76. See infra Section II.D.4, pp. 203-04; see also Haas & Cox, Section 7 Update: Balancing
Employer Rights vs. Statutory Rights: Where is the Balance Today?, 4 LAB. LAW. 151, 173 (1988);
cf Polly Drummond Thriftway, 292 N.L.R.B. No. 44, 130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1188 (1989) (permit-
ting access for area standards picketing where employer had no property right in common area
under terms of lease agreement).
77. The term "Fairmont decision" is used here to mean those 1987 decisions in which the
Board analyzed property and § 7 rights under its Fairmont test to determine whether denial of
access to private property for those engaged in protected § 7 activity is an unfair labor practice under
§ 8(a)(1). The 1987 Fairmont decisions are listed in chronological order, according to date of
issuance:
United Supermarkets, 283 N.L.R.B. No. 130, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1069 (Apr. 30);
Browning's Foodland, 284 N.L.R.B. No. 104, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1264 (July 13);
Schwab Foods, Inc., 284 N.L.R.B. No. 120, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1225 (July 17), enforced, 129
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2601 (7th Cir. 1988);
Greyhound Lines, 284 N.L.R.B. No. 123, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1266 (July 20);
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activity resolved a number of property/section 7 disputes that had oc-
curred between December of 1977 and December of 1984. As Table I
shows, on average, these cases took about six years and eleven months to
go from the initial dispute, through the filing of an unfair labor practice
charge, the issuance of a complaint, the hearing, the issuance of an ad-
ministrative law judge's decision, to, finally, the issuance of a Board
decision.7"
An inordinate delay in processing disputes over access has signifi-
cant consequences for employees and unions. In many cases of picketing
or handbilling during a primary strike, during collective bargaining, or in
response to an employer unfair labor practice, a union's need for access
Smitty's Super Markets, 284 N.L.R.B. No. 128, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1268 (July 23);
Providence Hospital, 285 N.L.R.B. No. 52, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1145 (Aug. 18);
Skaggs Co., 285 N.L.R.B. No. 62, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1149 (Aug. 19);
Sisters Chicken & Biscuits, 285 N.L.R.B. No. 105, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1148 (Sept. 15);
L & L Shop Rite, 285 N.L.R.B. No. 122, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1151 (Sept. 24);
Emery Realty, 286 N.L.R.B. No. 32, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1241 (Sept. 30), enforced, 130 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2154 (6th Cir. 1988);
Pizza Crust Co., 286 N.L.R.B. No. 45, 129 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1281 (Sept. 30), enforced, 862 F.2d 49
(3d Cir. 1988);
Homart Development, 286 N.L.R.B. No. 72, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1244 (Oct. 15);
Center Street Market, 286 N.L.R.B. No. 73, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1212 (Oct. 15);
SCNO Barge Lines, 287 N.L.R.B. No. 29, 127 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1081 (Dec. 15), enforced sub nom.
National Maritime Union v. NLRB, 867 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1989);
G.W. Gladders Towing, 287 N.L.R.B. No. 30, 127 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1088 (Dec. 15).
Until addressing Jean Country in September 1988, the Board decided only one more Fairmont-
type case. On March 25, 1988, the Board denied a union access to the interior hallway of an office
building for purposes of picketing a dental clinic whose employees were on strike. See 40-41 Realty
Assocs., Inc., 288 N.L.R.B. No. 23, 128 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1001 (1988).
Two other access cases, which did not rely on Fairmont, involved the rights of nonemployee
union organizers to solicit off-duty employees in employer-operated cafeterias that were open to the
public. The organizers in both cases were using the restaurant facilities as patrons, and their behav-
ior was orderly and nondisruptive. In finding that the employers violated § 8(a)(1) by threatening to
arrest the organizers and discriminating against them solely on the basis of their union activity, the
Board followed a line of cases dealing with public restaurants. The Board was careful to note that
they did not view "the majority position in Fairmont ... as conflicting with this analysis." See
Montgomery Ward & Co., 288 N.L.R.B. No. 20, slip op. at 5-6, n.8 (1988); Baptist Medical Sys., 288
N.L.R.B. No. 97, slip op. at 2-3, n.3 (1988).
78. Of the 15 1987 post-Fairmont cases discussed here, the median, Providence Hospital, took
about seven years and five months (2717 days) from dispute to Board decision. Because Board
decisions are not self-enforcing, the Board may have to petition a federal court of appeals for an
enforcement order. See NLRA § 10(e), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1982). Also, "[a]ny person aggrieved by
a final order of the Board," may obtain appellate review from the court of appeals. See NLRA
§ 10(f), 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1982). In 1980, this stage of enforcement and review added an average
of sixteen months (485 days) to an already lengthy process. Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing
Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1796-97 (1983).
There is also the possibility that a party may petition the United States Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari.
Tables I and II are patterned after Professor Weiler's Table III. Id. at 1796. The format is used
here to invite comparison of the data.
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to private property will be keyed to specific events that the union and
employees cannot control. Once the critical event or period has passed,
the access dispute becomes moot. Organizing drives that are delayed lose
momentum, particularly where unions have scarce resources to devote to
a number of different workplace sites. Area standards picketing and
handbilling are often directed at either new establishments, which are
hiring nonunion employees at wages below the union's area standards, or
at employers who are having nonunion construction work done at that
location or at other sites belonging to the employer. In either case, once
the new workforce is hired or the new construction is completed, the
impetus for area standards pressure disappears.
Thus, time is of the essence for unions asserting access privileges to
exercise section 7 rights. The Board procedures in the Fairmont dis-
putes, however, were slow at all stages, particularly in light of the impor-
tant federal statutory rights that were at stake. Table II illustrates the
length of delay between the Board procedures. Unions appear to have
been swift and sophisticated in asserting interference with section 7
rights: in most of the fifteen disputes examined here, unions filed section
8(a)(1) unfair labor practice charges within one or two weeks of the dis-
pute.79 Occasionally the unfair labor practice charge was filed the same
day or within a day or two of the dispute, indicating, perhaps, that the
union anticipated denial of access to private property. ° The time be-
tween the filing of the section 8(a)(1) charge and the issuance of a com-
plaint ranged from two months to eight-and-a-half months. The average
delay between an unfair labor practice charge and complaint was 120
days. In a number of the Fairmont disputes, then, the union very likely
no longer needed access by the time the complaint was issued. 8'
The delay between the filing of the unfair labor practice charge and
the issuance of a complaint in the Fairmont cases was over two and one-
half times the 1980 average.82 The average delay between the Fairmont
case complaint and hearing was one-half month shorter than the 1980
average, but the average delay between the hearing and the decision of
79. The statute of limitations for filing an unfair labor practice charge is six months. See
NLRA § 10(b), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1982).
80. In all of the Fairmont decisions, unions, not individual employees or groups of employees,
filed the § 8(a)(l) charges.
81. The 1987 Fairmont decisions discussed here only provide information about disputes that
culminated in Board decisions. In 1980, around the time when most of the Fairmont disputes oc-
curred, over 80% of all the unfair labor practice charges filed in regional offices were settled, with-
drawn, or administratively dismissed without issuance of formal complaints. Of the disputes that
resulted in formnal complaints, a majority were settled before the administrative hearing stage. See
Weiler, supra note 78, at 1797. The fifteen cases reviewed here undoubtedly represent only a small
fraction of the actual disputes over access to private property to exercise § 7 rights.
82. In 1980, the average delaX between the filing of an unfair labor practice charge and the
issuance of a formal complaint was a month and a half (46 days). See id. at 1796, Table III.
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TABLE I: PROCEDURES IN FAIRMONT HOTEL AND THE 1987 FAIRMONT CASES
Access ULP Filing of Close of ALJ Board
Case Dispute* Charge* Complaint+ Hearing Decision Decision
Fairmont Hotel
United
9/28/82 10/4/82 11/29/82 4/11/83 6/21/83 11/13/86
Supermarkets 8/10/79 6/25/80 9/18/80 4/30/87
Browning's
Foodland 3/17/80 3/19/80 4/18/80 10/2/80 2/11/81 7/13/87
Schwab Foods 12/15/77 12/20/77 5/31/78 1/18/79 9/28/79 7/17/87
Greyhound Lines 7/3/80 5/6/81 9/2/81 7/20/87
Smitty's
Super Mkts. 9/27/79 9/13/79+ + 1/15/80 5/2/80 3/6/81 7/23/87
Providence Hosp. 3/10/80 3/10/80 11/26/80 12/8/80 7/28/81 8/18/87
Skaggs Co. 11/17/79 5/30/80 3/5/81 9/17/81 8/19/87
Sisters Chicken &
Biscuits 7/20/81 9/4/81 6/30/82 10/18/82 9/15/87
L & L Shop Rite 11/19/79 11/20/79 4/29/80 10/1/80 7/28/81 9/24/87
Emery Realty 6/6/84 6/22/84 9/13/84 11/8/84 4/18/85 9/30/87
Pizza Crust 12/14/84 12/24/84 3/14/85 4/4/85 12/6/85 9/30/87
Homart Dev. 3/21/81 4/2/81 7/21/81 2/23/82 8/13/82 10/15/87
Center Street Mkt. 11/9/81 10/15/81++ 3/12/82 8/5/82 9/10/82 10/15/87
SCNO Barge Lines 8/9/79 8/23/79 11/9/79 12/19/79 4/14/81 12/15/87
Gladders Towing 8/10/79 8/23/79 11/9/79 12/18/79 4/7/81 12/16/87
* Date of first relevant denial of access to private property.
** Date of filing of first charge related to access dispute. In some cases, charges were amended at a
later date.
+ Time of filing of initial complaint or a consolidated complaint.
+ +The charge filed was based in part on activity occurring prior to the relevant access dispute.
the ALJ was over two months longer than the 1980 average.8 3 The ex-
traordinarily lengthy delays between the ALJ's decision and the decision
of the Board in these cases are inexplicable and unjustifiable. Table II
shows that the Board took on average 2046 days--over five and one-half
years-to decide the 1987 Fairmont cases. This is over fifteen times
longer than the 1980 average of 133 days reported by Professor Weiler. 4
On July 21, 1987, the House Government Operations Subcommittee on
Employment and Housing criticized the Board for its eight-year delay in
issuing a decision in one of the post-Fairmont cases.85 Apparently, over a
83. In the 1987 Fairmont decisions, the average delay between the filing of the complaint and
the close of the hearing was about four and a half months (136 days); the longest delay was 299 days;
and the shortest delay was 12 days. (Data for two cases-United Supermarkets and Greyhound
Lines-was unavailable.) In 1980 the average delay between the filing of the complaint and the close
of the hearing for all ULP cases was approximately five months (155 days). See id. Between the
close of the hearing and ALJ decision, the average delay for a post-Fairmont case was over seven
months (221 days); the longest delay was 482 days; the shortest delay was 36 days. In 1980, the
average delay between the close of the hearing and the ALI decision for all ULP cases was again
about five months (158 days). Id.
84. Id.
85. See Analysis, LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 125, at 53, 56 (Aug. 3, 1987). The case was
Schwab Foods, which the Board took 2849 days to decide. The Board, at its most expeditious, took
one year and nine months (663 days) to issue the Pizza Crust decision which, ironically, was the post-
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period of years, these access cases accumulated with the backlog of
Board cases in Washington, D.C., where they languished in limbo, await-
ing the moment in 1986 when the elucidating formulas of the Board's
Fairmont test should free them from their stasis.
With Fairmont in hand, the Board made quick work of the access
cases, issuing several decisions a month in the last half of 1987. Neither
the outcomes nor the analyses of the fifteen 1987 Fairmont decisions,
however, have warranted the long wait for their arrival. Technically,
property rights prevailed over section 7 rights in nine out of the fifteen
cases.8 6 In the remaining six cases, the Board found that the employers
87
had committed an unfair labor practice in denying employees, or some-
times nonemployee union representatives, access to their property. In
the six cases where the employer improperly denied access to unions, the
Board ordered the employer to cease and desist from prohibiting access,
and to post notices for sixty days announcing its violation of the Act and
its agreement not to deny the access specified by the Board. Such reme-
dies, coming six, seven, eight, or even nine or more years after the dis-
putes, were virtually worthless. Although access was formally granted in
six cases, and denied in nine, delay in remedy meant that access was
substantively denied in virtually all fifteen of the Fairmont cases.88
Although the Board was especially dilatory in its handling of these
access disputes, matters would not have been helped much if Board
processes had been expeditious--one or two years rather than six or
Fairmont case with the greatest number of other unfair labor practice issues. Such Board delay
continues: on December 20, 1988, the Board issued a decision granting access in a trespass dispute
that occurred on October 7, 1980-a delay of over eight years. See Butterfield Theaters, 292
N.L.R.B. No. 8, 130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1113.
86. Property rights prevailed in Browning's Foodland, Greyhound, Smitty's Super Market,
Providence, Skaggs, Sisters Chicken, L & L Shop Rite, Homart, and SCNO Barge Lines.
87. In some cases, the companies asserting property rights were lessees or managers of the
property. In Hudgens v. NLRB, the Supreme Court suggested that it "may or may not be relevant in
striking the proper balance" between § 7 rights and property rights that "the property interests
impinged upon" are "not those of the employer against whom the § 7 activity was directed, but of
another." 424 U.S. 507, 522 (1976). In his concurrence in Scott Hudgens, Chairman Fanning ar-
gued that whether the property right is "vested in the employer against whom the protected activity
was directed" or "a third party, matters from the standpoint of those asserting the statutory right,
little ... , and from the standpoint of the property right holder who chooses to become a lessor not
much, if any, more." 230 N.L.R.B. 414, 416 (1977).
The Board recently has made clear that the nature of the lease also helps determine the impor-
tance of the employer's property right. See Polly Drummond Thriftway, 292 N.L.R.B. No. 44, slip
op. at 5, 130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1189 (according to the lease, the subtenant lacked the requisite
"control" of the common sidewalk in front of the subtenant's store to assert a "right to exclude
anyone").
88. The only exception was L & L Shop Rite, where the local police, at the direction of the
county prosecutor, refused to arrest informational picketers and handbillers in the parking lot of a
small shopping center. 285 N.L.R.B. No. 122, slip op. at 5-6, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1153. Ac-
cess, however, was ultimately denied by the Board. See infra note 259 for a discussion of L & L Shop
Rite.
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* Days from access dispute to close of hearing (not included in calculation of average days).
+ Days from access dispute to filing of complaint (not included in calculation of average days).
seven. Board procedures simply are not designed to produce quick,
straightforward answers to the question that access disputes pose: does
the property owner violate section 8(a)(1) by denying access to private
property to persons asserting section 7 rights? While some of the as-
serted violations of the Act by unions-such as secondary boycotts or
unlawful recognitional or organizational picketing-receive priority
Board handling under statutory mandate because of the important prop-
erty and economic rights involved,89 violations of employee rights under
section 7 are not entitled to similar expedited treatment.
Furthermore, under section 10(l) of the Act, the Board is required
to obtain injunctive relief from the federal district courts to protect em-
ployers from the adverse economic consequences of unlawful secondary
boycotts or organizational/recognitional picketing.90 Under section 10()
the Board is permitted, but not required, to seek "appropriate temporary
relief" from the federal district courts after any other unfair labor prac-
89. See NLRA § 10(l), 29 U.S.C. § 160(l) (1982).
90. Id.
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tice complaint has been issued. 9 ' Such section 10(j) injunctions, how-
ever, are rarely sought to protect section 7 rights of employees from
employer interference under section 8(a). For example, the Board has
been reluctant to use the 10(j) injunction to protect the jobs of employees
discharged during union organizing campaigns, even in the most egre-
gious circumstances. 9 2 Preserving the status quo during unfair labor
practice proceedings has meant protecting the employer's absolute right
to discharge her at-will employees. Likewise, in access cases, preserving
the status quo has meant protecting the property owner's absolute right
to exclude others from her private property, regardless of the extent to
which that property may have lost its private character.93
Assuming for the moment that the problem of slow and cumber-
some Board procedures could be overcome, either within the existing
statutory framework or through legislative reform, we are still left with
the problem of making the final decision-permitting or denying access.
For this task of substantive decisionmaking, Fairmont was intended not
as a per se rule, but as a set of problem-solving techniques to be applied
to each new factual situation. Presumably, the Fairmont "test" would
gain legitimacy and predictive power as factually similar cases decided
under its formula began to fall into readily identifiable "patterns." '9 4 The
Fairmont test was well suited to the traditional Board process of case by
case adjudication.
As the first fifteen post-Fairmont decisions illustrate, however, the
Board that created the Fairmont formula was not able to apply it in a
clear and consistent fashion. Because it was an important decision, Fair-
mont was decided by the full Board, which at the time consisted of four
members: Chairman Donald L. Dotson, and Members Marshall B. Bab-
son, Wilford W. Johansen, and James M. Stephens.9 5 Decisions in all of
the 1987 post-Fairmont cases were delegated, according to usual Board
procedures, to three-member panels of the Board.9 6 Chairman Dotson
was on the panel for all but two of the 1987 Fairmont decisions-the last
two in December of 1987-and the rest of the panel always consisted of
members who had decided Fairmont.
Since the Board members who devised the Fairmont test were the
91. . NLRA § 10(j), 29 U.S.C. § 1600) (1982).
92. See Weiler, supra note 78, at 1799-801.
93. See, e.g., Silverman v. 40-41 Realty, 668 F.2d 678, 682 (2d Cir. 1982).
94. The Board now views Jean Country's reformulation of Fairmont as a key to this analytical
process of finding "patterns" in access cases. Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. No. 4, slip op. at 10, 129
L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1205; see infra Section II.E, pp. 205-08.
95. Although the full Board consists of five members, during much of the Reagan presidency
the Board had one or more vacancies, a fact which has contributed to its backlog of cases. See supra
text accompanying note 30. All Fairmont Board members were appointed by President Reagan. See
supra note 26.
96. See NLRA § 3(b), 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1982).
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same members who applied it to these fifteen new factual situations in
1987, the extent of disagreement among them about how to "weigh"
property rights and section 7 rights is quite remarkable. Although there
are only three decisions in which there are dissents,9 7 six of the decisions
have concurrences, and virtually all of the decisions, including those that
are unanimous, have footnotes in which the Board members each assert
their very different views on how the Fairmont test should be applied to
the facts of the case before the Board. They did strive for consensus, at
least in outcome. But each Board member's insistence on his own ver-
sion of the Fairmont analysis was a little like the blind men trying to
describe an elephant on the basis of having touched but one portion of
it-the tail, an ear, the trunk. Somewhere in all of this, they missed the
elephant. And, in the process, they have shown the Fairmont test to be
an unwieldy instrument that poorly serves the federal policies of protect-
ing collective action of workers.
The effects of the "footnote wars" in inhibiting exercise of protected
section 7 rights cannot be ignored.98 After Fairmont, regional offices of
the Board had to decide whether to issue a complaint under the confus-
ing Fairmont test with its ambiguous burdens of proof. The General
Counsel could not be sure what was required to make a case against an
employer stand up at the hearing level. Furthermore, ALJs had to con-
duct hearings and decide access disputes not knowing which member's
Fairmont standard was the correct one to apply. The Board's 1988 deci-
sion in Jean Country,9 9 apparently intended to correct some of these
problems failed to alter the inherent ambiguities of Fairmont's "balanc-
ing" approach.
The Fairmont Board members disagreed on all aspects of the Fair-
mont test: the initial weight to be accorded property rights and section 7
rights, and the relevance of "reasonable alternative methods of communi-
cation." The simple fact remains that whenever property rights are as-
serted in an 8(a)(1) dispute before the Board, section 7 rights are
sacrificed, either because delay in remedy makes their recognition mean-
ingless, or because the rights are not viewed as sufficiently important to
warrant the privilege of access. Thus, to maintain property rights, the
Board consistently undermines section 7 rights.
97. Chairman Dotson dissented in two of these decisions: Schwab Foods and Pizza Crust.
Member Johansen dissented in SCNO Barge Lines.
98. The Fairmont decisions demonstrate how Board expertise operates within a framework of
contradictory legal theories and assumptions. As Karl Klare has argued, "labor rights theories are
ambiguous and internally contradictory and cannot provide coherent, principled answers to the most
significant legal problems. In this respect, labor law theory is but a paradigm of the theoretical
difficulties of liberal legalism which possesses no coherent theory of rights." Klare, Labor Law as
Ideology: Toward a New Historiography of Collective Bargaining Law, 4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 450, 478
(1981).
99. 291 N.L.R.B. No. 4, 129 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1201; see infra Section II.E, pp. 205-08.
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B. Assessing Property Rights: The Footnote Wars
The Fairmont standard calls for an initial assessment of the relative
strengths and weaknesses of the property rights and section 7 rights in-
volved in the access dispute. If the property right is "a strong one, while
the section 7 right at issue is clearly ... less compelling," that is the end
of the matter.'" There is no section 8(a)(1) violation and the property
owner is free to deny access. If the property claim is "tenuous," and the
section 7 right "clearly more compelling," then the section 7 right
"prevails" and the property owner has violated 8(a)(1). 11 If, however,
the two competing rights are "relatively equal," only then does the Board
consider whether the factor of the employee's or union's "effective alter-
native means of communication" tips the scale either way. 1o2 At least in
theory, when property rights and statutory rights are in balance, a find-
ing of no alternative means of communication leads to granting of access.
There are a number of analytical problems with the Board's
"formula." It is not clear whether the strength or weakness of the "prop-
erty right" is to be measured on some sort of objective, absolute scale, or
whether it is to be measured "relative" to the context of the specific ac-
cess dispute and the federal labor policy that defines the claimed section
7 right. The Board seems to assume that it is applying a test that is
objective and universal. But factors that "may affect" the strength or
weakness of the property right may also be valued subjectively.
The Board is attempting, in this first stage of its analysis, to rational-
ize either intrusion on private property or denial of access to private
property on the basis of subjective factors that are created and assigned
arbitrary value by the decisionmaker. Thus, the "privateness" of any
particular type of property-the "strength" of the property claim-is in-
determinate, and can be manipulated to justify either the granting or de-
nying of access in any particular claim. The initial evaluation of the
strength of the property right often determines both the analysis and the
outcome. Under the Board's plurality view of the Fairmont standard,
consideration of "reasonable alternative means of communication"
should occur only when property rights and section 7 rights are relatively
equal.
The footnotes, and in one case, a dissent, in seven of the 1987 post-
Fairmont decisions, demonstrate the difficulty which the Board members
experienced in making an initial assessment of the strength of the prop-
erty right."0 3 In these seven decisions, Chairman Dotson found that the
100. Fairmont, 282 N.L.R.B. No. 27, slip op. at 10, 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1260.
101. Id.
102. Id., overruled by Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. No. 4, slip op. at 3 n.2, 129 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
at 1203 n.2 (ruling that the Board must always consider alternative means of communication in
access cases).
103. See Browning's Foodland, 284 N.L.R.B. No. 104, slip op. at 4-5 n.4, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
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property right either outweighed or was "less attenuated" than the sec-
tion 7 right, thus eliminating the need to consider reasonable alternative
means of communication. Generally, Member Babson disagreed with
Dotson's initial property assessment, and argued that the property right
was relatively equal to the section' 7 right, thus requiring analysis of rea-
sonable alternative means of communication. In contrast, Member Jo-
hansen did "not evaluate the [section] 7 claim apart from the factor of
reasonable alternative means of communication. Rather, he view[ed] this
factor as significant in assessing the strength of the [section] 7 claim.
'' 4
Member Stephens, adopting a position somewhat similar to Johansen's,
announced in his Fairmont concurrence that he was
not ready to embrace an access rights test under which [the Board] would
be barred from inquiring into the availability of reasonably effective alter-
native means of communication with the target audience unless [they]
found that the "property rights" at issue were of relatively equal strength
with Section 7 rights implicated in the activity on the affected
property.1
0 5
What emerged in the post-Fairmont decisions, then, were at least
two, possibly three, distinctly different access tests: (1) Dotson and Bab-
son evaluated and "weighed" the property and section 7 claims sepa-
rately. They only considered reasonable alternative means of
communication if the two asserted rights were relatively equal. (2) Jo-
hansen always considered reasonable alternative means of communica-
tion in assessing the strength or weakness of the section 7 claim before he
determined the relative weight to assign to the property right and the
section 7 right. (3) Stephens' approach was similar to Johansen's, in that
it would require "consideration of alternative means of communication
regardless of how one assesses the relative weights of particular property
rights and Section 7 rights."'0 6 Thus, Stephens argued, in cases in which
"the two categories of rights" are not "exactly in equipoise," the Board
1264, 1265-66 n.4; Schwab Foods, Inc., 284 N.L.R.B. No. 120, slip op. at 9 n.20, 29, 31, 125
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1225, 1228 n.20, 1234, 1235, enforced, 129 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2601 (7th Cir. 1988);
Greyhound Lines, 284 N.L.R.B. No. 123, slip op. at 5-6 n.5, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1266, 1267-78
n.5; Smitty's Super Mkts., 284 N.L.R.B. No. 128, slip op. at 5-6 n.4, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1268,
1269-70 n.4; Skaggs Co., 285 N.L.R.B. No. 62, slip op. at 4-5 n. 1, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1149, 1151
n.1; L & L Shop Rite, 285 N.L.R.B. No. 122, slip op. at 8-10 n.4, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1151, 1154
n.4; Homart Dev., 286 N.L.R.B. No. 72, slip op. at 7-9 n.12, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1244, 1246-47
n.12.
104. Browning's, 284 N.L.R.B. No. 104, slip op. at 4-5 n.4, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1265-66
n.4; see also Schwab, 284 N.L.R.B. No. 120, slip op. at 9 n.20, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1228 n.20;
Greyhound, 284 N.L.R.B. No. 123, slip op. at 5-6 n.5, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1267-68 n.5; Smitty's,
284 N.L.R.B. No. 128, slip op. at 5-6 n.4, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1269-70 n.4; L & L, 285 N.L.R.B.
No. 122, slip op. at 8-9 n.4, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1154 n.4.
105. Fairmont, 282 N.L.R.B. No. 27, slip op. at 15, 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1261 (Stephens,
concurring).
106. Homart, 286 N.L.R.B. No. 72, slip op. at 11, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1247 (Stephens,
concurring).
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"still might find it desirable to factor into the 'accommodation' analysis
the existence vel non of reasonable means of communicating with the
target audience." ' 7 Reasonable alternative means of communication,
consequently, tended to become the central focus of Stephens' analysis
rather than, as in Johansen's analysis, just a factor in determining the
section 7 rights.
The Dotson-Babson test was the most mechanical, and seemingly
the most objective and arithmetic. Nevertheless, in six of the nine post-
Fairmont cases which both Dotson and Babson heard, they disagreed on
the initial weight to be assigned to the property right. In five of these
cases, Dotson found that the property right outweighed the section 7
right, obviating any need to consider reasonable alternative means of
communication. Babson found the property right and section 7 right rel-
atively equal, thus mandating consideration of reasonable alternative
means of communication.' 8 In one case, Schwab Foods, Babson and
Dotson were diametrically opposed in their assessments of the competing
claims.'0 9 Thus, despite the fact that Dotson and Babson were the only
two members of the Board in 1987 who clearly agreed on the same defini-
tion of the Fairmont test, in two out of every three times they applied the
test to the same fact pattern during that year, they initially assigned dif-
ferent weights to the competing property and section 7 claims. So much
for the objective test.
Johansen's version of the Fairmont test was the most sensitive to
federal labor policy because he always considered the significance of the
union's or employees' reasonable alternative means of communication in
determining the nature and strength of the section 7 claims. In this
sense, Johansen's analysis of the competing claims was initially more
comprehensive and more contextual than the Dotson-Babson test. Jo-
hansen also was unwilling to place unrealistic and unreasonable burdens
on a union's ability to establish the lack of alternative means of commu-
nication." 0 He did, however, expect the General Counsel to present sub-
stantial evidence to prove the unavailability of reasonable alternative
107. Fairmont, 282 N.L.R.B. No. 27, slip op. at 15, 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1261 (Stephens,
concurring) (emphasis added).
108. See Browning's, 284 N.L.R.B. No. 104, slip op. at 44 n.4, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1265
n.4; Smitty's, 284 N.L.R.B. No. 128, slip op. at 5 n.4, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1270 n.4; Skaggs, 285
N.L.R.B. No. 62, slip op. at 4-5 n.1, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1151 n.1; L & L, 285 N.L.R.B. No.
122, slip op. at 8-9 n.4, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1154 n.4; Homart, 286 N.L.R.B. No. 72, slip op. at
7-8 n.12, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1247 n.12.
109. Babson believed the § 7 right outweighed the property right. See 284 N.L.R.B. No. 120,
slip op. at 9 n.20, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1228 n.20. Dotson argued that the property right out-
weighed the § 7 right. See id., slip op. at 12-13, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1229 (Dotson, dissenting).
Consistent with their version of the Fairmont test, both members did not consider reasonable alter-
native means of communication in analyzing the competing rights in Schwab Foods.
110. See SCNO Barge Lines, 287 N.L.R.B. No. 29, slip op. at 14, 127 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1081,
1085 (Johansen, dissenting), enforced sub nom. National Maritime Union v. NLRB, 867 F.2d 767
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means of communication, a burden which the General Counsel failed to
meet in over half the post-Fairmont cases."'
The centrality of reasonable alternative means of communication to
Stephens' version of the Fairmont test also appeared to be more respon-
sive to federal statutory policies than the Dotson-Babson test. But his
test also placed a high burden on unions. Stephens believed his version
was most faithful to the Supreme Court's analysis in Babcock,1 2 and,
(2d Cir. 1989); G.W. Gladders Towing, 287 N.L.R.B. No. 30, slip op. at 12, 127 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
1088, 1092 (Johansen, concurring).
111. The General Counsel failed to meet the burden of proving a lack of reasonable alternative
means of communication in eight post-Fairmont cases. See Browning's, 284 N.L.R.B. No. 104, slip
op. at 6, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1266; Greyhound, 284 N.L.R.B. No. 123, slip op. at 6, 125
L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1268; Smitty's, 284 N.L.R.B. No. 128, slip op. at 6 n.4, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at
1270 n.4; Providence Hosp., 285 N.L.R.B. No. 52, slip op. at 7-8, 126 L.R.R.M. 1145, 1145; Skaggs,
285 N.L.R.B. No. 62, slip op. at 5 n.3, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1151 n.3; L & L, 285 N.L.R.B. No.
122, slip op. at 10, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1155; Homart, 286 N.L.R.B. No. 72, slip op. at 8-9, 126
L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1247; SCNO, 287 N.L.R.B. No. 29, slip op. at 12, 127 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at
1085.
It should be noted that in every one of the 1987 Fairmont Board cases under consideration here,
the Regional Director issued the complaint and the General Counsel prosecuted the case on the basis
of pre-Fairmont law. Likewise, in each case, the ALI applied pre-Fairmont law in making eviden-
tiary rulings at the hearing and in reaching a decision. In a number of these cases, the ALJs wrote
lengthy opinions analyzing the law of access as they understood it. Because the Board adopted a
"new" test (or tests) in Fairmont, they basically disregarded the legal analysis, though not the find-
ings of fact, in the ALJ decisions. This retroactive application of the Fairnont analysis, while clearly
necessary given the long delays that had already occurred, certainly left much to be desired in terms
of fairness to the interests of the parties, particularly the unions. It is too early to speculate on
whether the outcomes in these types of access cases will be different if all parties are aware of the
evidentiary burdens and legal arguments which can make or break a case under the Fairmont test
and its 1988 reformulation in Jean Country.
112. See, e.g., Fairmont, 282 N.L.R.B. No. 27, slip op. at 15, 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1261
(Stephens, concurring); Homart, 286 N.L.R.B. No. 72, slip op. at 11, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1247
(Stephens, concurring). Stephens certainly felt strongly about the correctness of his own version of
Fairmont: in nearly half of the post-Fairmont decisions in which he was on the three-member panel,
he wrote separate concurring opinions referring to his Fairmont concurrence. Stephens was on the
panel in ten of the post-Fairmont cases, and wrote separate concurrences in four of these. See Grey-
hound, 284 N.L.R.B. No. 123, slip op. at 8, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1268 (Stephens, concurring);
Skaggs, 285 N.L.R.B. No. 62, slip op. at 7, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1151 (Stephens, concurring);
Homart, 286 N.L.R.B. No. 72, slip op. at 11, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1247 (Stephens, concurring);
Center Street Mkt., 286 N.L.R.B. No. 73, slip op. at 10, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1212, 1214 (Stephens,
concurring).
In nearly all the remaining cases where he joined the majority opinion, he articulated, in foot-
notes, his disagreement with the majority's test and his reasons for believing that his own version of
the test had been satisfied. See United Supermarkets, 283 N.L.R.B. No. 130, slip op. at 8 n.6, 125
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1069, 1072 n.6; Providence, 285 N.L.R.B. No. 52, slip op. at 8 n.6, 126 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) at 1147 n.6; Emery Realty, 286 N.L.R.B. No. 32, slip op. at 10 n.15, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
1241, 1244 n.15, enforced, 130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2154 (6th Cir. 1988); SCNO, 287 N.L.R.B. No. 29,
slip op. at 4 n.9, 127 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1082 n.9; Gladders, 287 N.L.R.B. No. 30, slip op. at 3 n.6,
127 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1089 n.6.
In only one case did Stephens not feel compelled to express his distinct views on Fairmont, and
that case, Pizza Crust, was one in which the majority (but not the dissent), decided the Fairmont test
did not apply at all. See Pizza Crust Co., 286 N.L.R.B. No. 45, 129 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1281, en-
forced, 862 F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1988).
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indeed, it may have been. When the General Counsel must meet an ex-
tremely high burden to establish a union's lack of reasonable alternative
means of communication, the outcomes, with few exceptions, will be
overly protective of property rights. In the three cases decided in Bab-
cock, the statutory policy arguments for access had seemed quite compel-
ling to the Board, yet the Court found that the unions had reasonable
alternative means of communication and denied access."13
Dotson and Babson seemed to assume that they could weigh or
value the asserted property right by considering it independently of the
statutory right. In effect, therefore, they treat the property right as if it is
a disembodied form, clearly discernible and quantifiable without compar-
ison to other rights. Even the three factors that "may affect" the
strength or weakness of the property right-the use of the property, the
restrictions on public access, and its size and location' ' 4-relate to the
union's or employees' reasons for choosing that property as a situs for
communication. The property's use, accessibility, size, and location are
factors relevant to a consideration of a union's reasonable alternative
means of communication, not just the "weight" of the property right.
Though the Board formally invoked the factors of use, accessibility,
size, and location of the property to evaluate the strength of the property
right, they used other criteria as well. In the cases that deal with access
to retail and service facilities, these other criteria are primarily related to
wealth, social class, and status-the extent to which the property owner
has created an environment with an ambience of luxury, comfort, and
exclusivity. In fact, it appears that, at least for Chairman Dotson, a
property's snob appeal can become determinative of its "strength," de-
spite other characteristics of the property that would otherwise make it a
weak property claim under the Fairmont test. "15
In many of these cases, however, the Board's decision to grant ac-
cess turns, not on the strength of the property right, but on whether the
section 7 right is deemed sufficiently important to warrant intrusion on
private property. This judgment involves the Board in analysis of the
appropriate means and ends of collective action which, in its narrow and
113. In Babcock, the Court noted
In each of these cases the employer refused to permit distribution of union literature
by nonemployee union organizers on company-owned parking lots. The National Labor
Relations Board, in separate and unrelated proceedings, found in each case that it was
unreasonably difficult for the union organizer to reach the employees off company property
and held that, in refusing the unions access to parking lots, the employers had unreasona-
bly impeded their employees' right to self-organization in violation of § 8(a)(1) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act.
NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 106 (1956). The Court concluded that the Act
"does not require that the employer permit the use of its facilities for organization when other means
are readily available." Id. at 114.
114. Fairmont, 282 N.L.R.B. No. 27, slip op. at 9, 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1259-60.
115. See infra text accompanying notes 211-14.
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limited focus, is similar to the legal analysis employed by some judges in
a number of significant late nineteenth and early twentieth century tort
and antitrust labor cases."t 6 The analysis dampens and limits the al-
lowed avenues of collective action, and it is presented without acknowl-
edgment of its underlying assumptions."1 7
C. Retail and Service Facilities Cases
1. The "Large Shopping Mall Rule" and the "Single Store Rule"
In Fairmont, the Board, relying on its analysis of several Supreme
Court cases dealing with the problem of "accommodating" property
rights and section 7 rights, provided two descriptions of property rights
claims in the retail setting---one strong and one weak. Although these
descriptions are nothing more than examples, they reveal the Board's
method of analysis and are later referred to, indeed relied on, in some of
the post-Fairmont decisions, as if they are statements of rules. I will thus
refer to these two examples as Rule # 1-"The Large Shopping Mall
Rule"-and Rule # 2-"The Single Store Rule."
The Board noted in Fairmont, that
the mandate in Babcock "to accommodate" [property rights and section
7 rights] with "as little destruction of one as is consistent with the main-
tenance of the other" implicitly recognizes that the claim of a party to
one or the other of these rights will have varying degrees of strength
depending on the facts of the particular case.'
18
The Board then proceeded to describe two rules of thumb that illustrate
the way in which property claims of owners of retail facilities should be
weighed or measured.
The two Fairmont "rules" are:
[Rule # 1-The Large Shopping Mall Rule]
For example, the owner of a large shopping mall who allows the general
public to utilize his property without substantial limitation may well have
a heavy burden to bear in seeking selectively to exclude pickets who are
engaged in an economic strike against their employer who is a tenant in
the mall. In such a case, the strength of the mall owner's claim that
private property rights are being violated may be undercut by the fact
that heretofore virtually no one had been excluded.
[Rule # 2-The Single Store Rule]
116. See Avery, Images of Violence in Labor Jurisprudence: The Regulation of Picketing and
Boycotts, 1894-1921, 37 BUFFALO L. REV. 1 (1988/89) (discussing the assumptions by some judges,
during the decades spanning the turn of the century, that unions may legally engage in collective
activity for individualistic, egoistic, and economic goals, but not for broad-based, communitarian,
altruistic goals).
117. See J. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW (1983) (discuss-
ing the significance in American labor jurisprudence of the values and assumptions regarding the
status of workers, the role of managerial control, and the importance of maintaining productivity).
118. 282 N.L.R.B. No. 27, slip op. at 8, 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1259.
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On the other hand, a single store surrounded by its own parking lot pro-
vided exclusively for the convenience of customers will have a signifi-
cantly more compelling property right claim."
9
In these rules, the Fairmont Board suggested that there is an inher-
ent distinction between a large shopping mall and a single store for pur-
poses of evaluating the strength of the property claim. The Fairmont
rules incorrectly and inappropriately draw on Supreme Court free speech
cases that distinguished between the shopping mall and the single store.
For a brief period, the Court had held that under the first amendment a
single store is more "private" than a large shopping mall, and the single-
store owner's claim to "privacy" is stronger than the mall owner's.
1 20
This constitutional analysis has confused and clouded a number of the
Board access decisions before and after Fairmont. Fairmont reaffirmed
the centrality of these constitutional distinctions to the "weighing" of
competing statutory rights and property claims.
The genesis of these two "rules" is in the Supreme Court cases of
Amalgamated Food Employees Union, Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza,
Inc. , 2 1 Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB,'22 Lloyd v. Tanner,123 and
Hudgens v. NLRB. 124 The Supreme Court in NLRB v. Babcock & Wil-
cox Co. acknowledged that the Board had found that the "place of work"
was "so much more effective a place for communication of informa-
tion;"' t 2 nevertheless, the Board had "failed to make a distinction be-
tween rules of law applicable to employees and those applicable to
nonemployees. "126 In Babcock, nonemployee union organizers wanted
to distribute union literature to employees in the parking lot of a large
factory. Although "[t]he right of self-organization depends in some mea-
sure on the ability of employees to learn the advantages of self-organiza-
tion from others," the Court found that the record failed to show that the
employees were "beyond the reach of reasonable union efforts to commu-
nicate with them."' 127 Long before Fairmont, the Board had treated Bab-
119. Id. at 8-9, 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1259. For evidence of the persistence of these "rules,"
even after the Jean Country reformulation of Fairmont, see Mountain Country Food Store, 292
N.L.R.B. No. 100, slip op. at 5, 130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1329, 1330 (1989).
120. See infra text accompanying notes 138-57.
121. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
122. 407 U.S. 539 (1972).
123. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
124. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
125. 351 U.S. 105, 108 (1956).
126. Id. at 113.
127. Id. The Court found it significant that "[t]he plants are close to small well-settled commu-
nities where a large percentage of the employees live. The usual methods of imparting information
are available .... The various instruments of publicity are at hand. Though the quarters of the
employees are scattered they are in reasonable reach." Id. The "usual methods of imparting infor-
mation" referred to distribution of literature to employees in cars entering and leaving the plant
along a public right-of-way, mailing literature to employees' homes, and talking to employees on the
telephone, at their homes, and in the streets of the nearby town. Id. at 107 n.1.
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cock as placing an exceptionally high burden on the General Counsel and
unions to prove, essentially, that no other means of communication with
employees existed.' 2 8 Alternatives that were less safe, less convenient,
less effective, and more expensive than communicating on the employer's
property were nonetheless "reasonable alternatives."
The Babcock Court had announced that "[t]his is not a problem of
always open or always closed doors for union organization on company
property."12 9 Nevertheless, except for situations where employees were
"isolated from normal contacts,"' 1 30 such as employees living in remote
lumber camps13' or in company towns,13 2 the Babcock rule has meant
that "the door" is nearly "always closed" for union organizers seeking
access to an employer's private property for the purpose of communicat-
ing with employees.
In effectively closing that door, however, the Babcock Court failed
to analyze the employer's property interests which were at stake, other
than to note that property rights are preserved by the same government
that grants organizational rights to employees. 33 This implicit invoca-
tion of the fifth and fourteenth amendments facilitated the Court's con-
clusion that the Act "does not require that the employer permit the use
of its facilities for organization when other means are readily avail-
able." ' 34 Nevertheless, the Constitution is not a total bar to government
regulation that places burdens on property rights, for it is only when
"regulation goes too far" that "it will be recognized as a taking."' 35 The
question that the Babcock Court should have, but did not, ask is why
should an employer's assertion of rights based on bare title to land place
burdens on the statutory rights of employees to organize. Property
rights, including the right to exclude, are not absolute. The New Jersey
Supreme Court has observed in a slightly different context dealing with a
criminal trespass case: "Property rights serve human values .... Title to
real property cannot include dominion over the destiny of persons the
owner permits to come upon the premises. Their well-being must remain
the paramount concern of a system of law."'1
3 6
The Babcock "accommodation," which falls heavily on the side of
128. See Board decisions cited in Note, Focusing on Labor Pickets' Rights in Shopping Centers
with a Section 7 Lens-Scott Hudgens, 27 DE PAUL L. REV. 1287, 1291 n.26 (1978).
129. 351 U.S. at 112.
130. Id. at 111.
131. See, e.g., NLRB v. Lake Superior Lumber Corp., 167 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1948); see also
Note, supra note 18, at 199-201 (discussing Board treatment of union access rights to "live-in em-
ployee facilities").
132. See, e.g., NLRB v. Stowe Spinning Co., 336 U.S. 226 (1949).
133. 351 U.S. at 112.
134. Id. at 114.
135. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922); cf Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S.Ct. 1232 (1987).
136. State v. Shack, 58 N.J. 297, 303, 277 A.2d 369, 372 (1971).
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protecting the employer's right to exclude, has remained the general rule
for cases of nonemployee union organizers seeking access to private park-
ing lots and entranceways surrounding businesses, factories, and indus-
trial parks.' Other, quite different, considerations have come into play
in cases where employees and nonemployees have sought access to pri-
vate property surrounding retail facilities for purposes of picketing,
handbilling, or soliciting union membership. The labor law doctrine
dealing with access to shopping malls and store parking lots developed in
the shadow of the Supreme Court's short-lived recognition of a first
amendment right of access to shopping malls, at least for purposes of
speech "directly related in its purpose to the use to which the shopping
center property was being put."' 38 For eight years, labor access disputes
involving retail facilities were decided under a first amendment analysis
rather than a Babcock statutory analysis.
The 1968 Supreme Court case of Amalgamated Food Employees
Union, Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza Inc., '39 relied on the first and
fourteenth amendments to protect the rights of nonemployee union
members to engage in peaceful area standards picketing"4 in the private
parking lot and parcel pick-up zone of a supermarket in a large shopping
center. The shopping center owner and the supermarket obtained an ex
parte order enjoining the picketers from picketing and trespassing on the
Logan Valley Plaza's private property. 4 The Court found that the
shopping center served as a "community business block" which was the
"functional equivalent of the business district" of a company town."'
This analogy to a company town brought Logan Valley within the
scope of Marsh v. Alabama. 4 3 In Marsh a Jehovah's Witness was ar-
rested under Alabama's criminal trespass law for distributing religious
literature on the sidewalks of the business district of a company town
owned by a private corporation. The Supreme Court reversed Marsh's
137. Employer restrictions on employee self-organization on the employer's property, on the
other hand, is prohibited "unless the employer can demonstrate that a restriction is necessary to
maintain production or discipline." Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803 (1945).
138. Amalgamated Food Employees Union, Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S.
308, 320 n.9 (1968).
139. 391 U.S. 308.
140. The union was arguably engaged in either "informational" or "area standards" picketing,
or possibly "organizational" picketing, but the question of whether the picketing was a protected § 7
collective activity was not before the Court. See id. at 309-10 n. 1. The picketers carried signs that
stated that the supermarket, which had just opened, "was nonunion and that its employees were not
'receiving union wages or other union benefits.' " Id. at 311.
141. The question whether state court jurisdiction to enjoin the union's trespass was preempted
by the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRA over the subject matter was not addressed. Id. Justice
Harlan argued that the "pre-emption ground would plainly [have been] a preferable basis for deci-
sion." Id. at 333 (Harlan, J. dissenting). He recognized, however, that the preemption question was
not properly before the Court. Id. at 336 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 318-19.
143. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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trespass conviction on the grounds that she had been exercising first
amendment rights that could not be infringed by a private corporation
whose property had assumed the public function and character of a mu-
nicipality. The Marsh Court noted that "the town and its shopping dis-
trict are accessible to and freely used by the public in general and there is
nothing to distinguish them from any other town and shopping center
except the fact that the title to the property belongs to a private
corporation."1
The basis for the Board's Fairmont distinction, in dictum, between
the strength of property rights in shopping center cases versus single-
store cases follows from the first amendment Marsh "community busi-
ness block" analysis that the Court adopted in Logan Valley. Having
taken this functionalist approach in Logan Valley, the Supreme Court
had little choice but to acknowledge, several years later in the case of
Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB,'45 the logical limits of the Marsh/Logan
Valley first amendment analysis.
In Central Hardware, nonemployee union organizers engaged in
union solicitation activities in the open parking lot surrounding a single
free-standing store. Although the parking lot was generally open to the
public, the store owner enforced a general rule against solicitation on its
property by ordering the union organizers to leave the premises. The
union, in turn, filed a section 8(a)(1) charge claiming that the denial of
access to the store parking lot interfered with the store employees' sec-
tion 7 rights. Both the Board and the court of appeals agreed that the
"character and use" of the store parking lot was unlike the parking lot
surrounding the industrial plant in Babcock. '46 Thus rejecting a Babcock
analysis, the Board instead relied on Logan Valley to order the store to
permit access to the union organizers. The Board's theory was that the
owner had "diluted his property interest by opening his property to the
general public for his own economic advantage."' 47 The Supreme Court
held that Logan Valley constitutional arguments did not apply in the sit-
uation of a single, free-standing store and remanded the case to the court
of appeals for consideration under the principles of Babcock.
The Supreme Court clearly demonstrated its unease with the broad
first amendment implications of Logan Valley in another shopping center
access dispute, Lloyd v. Tanner,'48 which was decided at the same time as
144. Id. at 503.
145. 407 U.S. 539 (1972).
146. Id. at 542.
147. Id. at 546 n.4 (quoting Brief for the NLRB at 20).
148. 407 U.S. 551 (1972). Lloyd held that a shopping mall owner, who enforced a no-distribu-
tion rule, did not violate the first amendment rights of persons attempting to distribute antiwar
handbills in mall walkways, because, unlike Logan Valley, the handbilling was unrelated to the com-
mercial purposes of the mall and the handbillers had other reasonable methods of communicating
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Central Hardware, but did not involve union activity or claims to federal
statutory rights. Lloyd represented the Court's refusal to extend Logan
Valley's first amendment protection of speech in a private shopping mall
to noncommercial speech unrelated to the mall's purposes. Further-
more, Central Hardware represented the Court's refusal to "cut Logan
Valley entirely away from its roots in Marsh."'4 9 While a large shopping
center has many public characteristics of a "business block" of a munici-
pality, a single free-standing store does not serve a similar public func-
tion. Thus, although the store parking lot may be, in effect, "open to the
public," the Court noted that the same could be said about "almost every
retail and service establishment in the country, regardless of size or loca-
tion. '"150 A property owner's general invitation to the public to enter a
free-standing retail or service facility, for the purpose of doing business
there, did not therefore alter the "long-settled rights of private property
protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments."'' Furthermore,
as Justice Powell noted in Lloyd:
In terms of being open to the public, there are differences only of de-
gree-not of principle-between a free-standing store and one located in
a shopping center, between a small store and a large one, between a single
store with some malls and open areas designed to attract customers and
Lloyd Center with its elaborate malls and interior landscaping.
152
Thus, Logan Valley and Central Hardware created the constitutional dis-
tinction between a large shopping center and a free-standing store.
The constitutional significance of the degree of difference between
the shopping center that is the functional equivalent of a "community
business block" and the free-standing retail facility was short-lived. In
the 1976 case of Hudgens v. NLRB, '53 the Supreme Court overruled Lo-
gan Valley and laid to rest the possibility of any federal constitutional
right of free speech in private shopping centers and malls.' 54 In the labor
area, however, Hudgens recognized that striking employees or union or-
ganizers might have a statutory right of access to retail facilities under
the principles of Babcock.
In Hudgens, four striking warehouse employees picketed their em-
ployer, Butler Shoes, in front of one of its retail outlets in a large, en-
with the public. See generally, Note, Lloyd v. Tanner. The Demise of Logan Valley and the Disguise
of Marsh, 61 GEo. L.J. 1187 (1973).
149. Central Hardware, 407 U.S. at 547.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. 407 U.S. at 565-66.
153. 424 U.S. 507.
154. But the Supreme Court subsequently acknowledged that state constitutional or statutory
requirements that private shopping centers permit access to persons for purposes of speech or peti-
tions do not violate the federal constitution. PruneYard v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). States are
thus free to define rights of access to property more expansively than the federal constitution does.
See infra Section III.C, pp. 220-23.
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closed shopping mall. When the general manager of the mall threatened
to have the picketers arrested for criminal trespass, they left the mall.
The union responded by filing section 8(a)(1) charges with the Board,
which eventually ordered the mall owner (found to be "an employer"
under the Act) to cease and desist from denying access to the picketers.
The outcome in Hudgens, however, remained unresolved through a
tortuous process of litigation, which the Supreme Court described as "a
history of shifting positions on the part of the litigants, . . . in short, of
considerable confusion, engendered at least in part by decisions of this
Court that intervened during the course of the litigation." '5 Having de-
termined that "the constitutional guarantee of free expression has no part
to play in a case such as this,"' 56 the Supreme Court remanded the case
to the Board for consideration under the Babcock criteria for accommo-
dating conflicts between employees' section 7 rights and employers' prop-
erty rights " 'with as little destruction of one as is consistent with the
maintenance of the other.' "'v17
The Court acknowledged that the "primary responsibility for mak-
ing this accommodation must rest with the Board in the first in-
stance."'  Nevertheless, the Court, in remanding the case to the Board,
suggested three aspects of the Hudgens case which distinguished it from
Central Hardware and Babcock and which "may or may not be relevant
in striking the proper balance" between conflicting section 7 rights and
property rights.'59 Whereas both Central Hardware and Babcock in-
volved "organizational activity carried on by nonemployees on the em-
ployers' property," Hudgens involved (1) "lawful economic strike
activity," (2) carried on by the shopping center tenant's "employees (al-
beit not employees of its shopping center store), not by outsiders," and
(3) affecting the property interests, not "of the employer against whom
the section 7 activity was directed, but of another."''
The Supreme Court was thus suggesting that the Board consider
whether these factors-the identity of the persons asserting the section 7
155. Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 512. The Board and the court of appeals had initially relied on the
Supreme Court's Logan Valley analysis of a first amendment right of access to find a violation of the
NLRA. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit first remanded the case to the Board for recon-
sideration in light of the 1972 Supreme Court decisions in Lloyd and Central Hardware. Id. at 510.
On remand, an ALJ concluded that the mall owner had violated the Act by excluding the picketers
from the mall. The ALJ "ostensibly" applied the Babcock criteria, as required by Central Hardware,
but also relied on Logan Valley for "a realistic view of the facts." Id. at 511. As the case then
proceeded back up through the Board, the court of appeals, and, eventually, oral argument before
the Supreme Court, additional theories were advanced, including the argument that Republic A via-
tion controlled the case. See id. at 510-12.
156. Id. at 521.
157. Id. (quoting Babcock, 351 U.S. at 112).
158. Id. at 522.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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right, their relationship to the targeted employer, and the identity of the
affected property owner-might be relevant in applying Babcock to an
admittedly different factual situation. On remand, the Board, in the
Scott Hudgens decision,16' applied the Babcock criteria and considered
the implications of the Supreme Court's three suggested distinctions be-
tween Babcock and Hudgens. The Board found, again, that the section 7
rights of the picketing warehouse employees had been violated when the
mall owner threatened them with arrest for trespass.
The Supreme Court's decision in Hudgens was, however, an explicit
rejection of the analytical framework of Logan Valley that distinguished
large private shopping centers from free-standing retail facilities on the
basis of the former's functional equivalence to a municipal "business
block." In other words, for purposes of statutory analysis of access dis-
putes under the Act, there should be no difference, a priori, between a
large shopping mall and a free-standing store. Hudgens disposed of the
public/private distinction between the mall and the single store for pur-
poses of first amendment access questions and statutory access questions.
But Fairmont continues to cling to the old constitutional dichotomy.
2. Applying the Fairmont Test
In evaluating the nature and strength of property rights of retail
facilities in the post-Fairmont decisions, some Board members started
and ended their analysis with the large shopping mall/single-store rules.
When this occurred, the use of the "rules" avoided the necessity of any
real analysis of property rights. Thus, the "rules" served as a convenient
analytical fiction that facilitated the section 7/property rights accommo-
dation. In other cases, however, where mechanical application of the
"rules" would have led to outcomes the Board wanted to avoid, the
Board turned to other factors to alter the significance and impact of the
rules. It becomes clear, then, that the Board itself did not always put
much stock in its two property "rules of thumb" in the retail cases, but
used them for convenience and for instrumental reasons. But far more
important for the Board's analysis is the evaluation of the section 7 activ-
ity. If the Board believes that access is important because the section 7
right is very significant, or that access is unwarranted because the section
7 right is insignificant, the shopping mall/single-store property rules col-
lapse and a very different analytical framework emerges. 62
a. The Single Store
Two of the 1987 Fairmont decisions involved single free-standing
stores, but the property interests in each were evaluated differently. In
161. 230 N.L.R.B. 414 (1977).
162. See infra Section IID, pp. 198-204.
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Sisters Chicken & Biscuits, members of a construction union attempted to
distribute handbills outside the doorways of three Sisters fast food restau-
rants.'63 The handbillers were protesting the restaurant corporation's
use of nonunion contractors to build and remodel its restaurants.
Although no construction or remodeling work was underway at the three
targeted restaurants, Sisters had engaged a nonunion contractor to build
a new restaurant in the area. When the restaurant management ordered
the handbillers off the restaurant property, the union quickly abandoned
handbilling at street entrances as ineffective and filed an 8(a)(1) charge.
The Board dismissed the unfair labor practice charge, finding that the
property interests outweighed the right to engage in area standards
handbilling.
Evaluating the property right, the Board noted that each of the Sis-
ters restaurants was "a single facility surrounded by its own parking lot
provided for the convenience of its customers. '' "6 The restaurants had
drive-through service-and private off-street parking for customers want-
ing table service. Interestingly, the Board found that the use of the prop-
erty for "fast food restaurant service" did not give rise to "any particular
privacy concerns" as did the free-standing hotel in Fairmont.'65 This
assertion is presented without further analysis, but its meaning is appar-
ent. Free-standing luxury hotels, perhaps even free-standing luxury res-
taurants, are more "private" than fast-food chains. Only the affluent and
wealthy, the appropriately dressed, the high class patron is really "in-
vited" and welcome at the former; the general public-regardless of so-
cial class-is "invited" to the latter. The Board made this explicit in its
statement that there was "no evidence" that Sisters "places any limita-
tions on general public access to its restaurant entrances for customer
purposes."' 66 If this was so, why did the Board find that Sisters was
asserting "a substantial property interest in limiting the use to which its
property was put"? 67
Other than the single-store rule, the only explanation given for the
property owner's "substantial" and "compelling" property claim was
that there was "no evidence" that Sisters "has ever permitted handbil-
ling, picketing, or any other nonconsumer, nonemployee activity on its
private premises."'' 68 If there had been evidence of a discriminatory de-
nial of access, the analysis of the dispute would have been completely
163. 285 N.L.R.B. No. 105, slip op. at 2, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1148, 1148.




168. Id. The "single-store rule" apparently still has relevance for the Board where free-standing
facilities are surrounded by parking areas for the "exclusive use" of patrons, and where the employer
enforces rules against solicitation and loitering. See Butterfield Theaters, 292 N.L.R.B. No. 8, slip
op. at 9, 130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1113, 1115 (1988).
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different. Babcock and Republic Aviation support the principle that the
employer cannot open her property for nonunion solicitation or distribu-
tion of materials and deny similar access for employees or nonemployees
engaged in section 7 activities.
169
In many cases, the first step in the section 8(a)(1) analysis of an
access dispute should be to determine whether the employer has denied
access for protected section 7 activity on a discriminatory basis. If the
employer has treated section 7 activity different from other similar activ-
ity, then the Board should find an 8(a)(1) violation, regardless of the na-
ture and strength of the property rights and section 7 rights or the
existence of alternative means of communication. If there is no evidence
of employer discrimination in denial of access, then, and only then,
should a Babcock accommodation question be raised.
Evidence of nondiscrimination is, therefore, not evidence that goes
toward the issue of the nature and strength of the property right. Non-
discrimination merely places the case within a different analytical frame-
work. Where the property owner has behaved neutrally in denying
access uniformly to all "outsiders," the access dispute must be decided
on the basis of other evidence and criteria. Even to begin to engage in
the Babcock accommodation as proposed in Fairmont, it must be as-
sumed that discrimination is not an issue, either because there was no
evidence presented of discrimination or because the property owner in-
troduced evidence of strict enforcement of a nondiscriminatory no-access
rule.
The Board's unanimous conclusion in Sisters that the restaurant's
property right was "substantial," and that the "compelling property
right claim clearly outweighs the Union's claimed Section 7 right" is
mystifying. Unlike the Fairmont Hotel, the restaurant asserted no pri-
vacy concerns such as high-class ambience or other limitations on access
to the general public. Lack of evidence of discriminatory granting of
access for other groups engaged in handbilling, by definition, should not
be relevant to the determination of the strength of the property right.
Furthermore, status as a single store surrounded by a parking lot is a
distinction of a (now defunct) "constitutional dimension" that should be
totally irrelevant to the statutory analysis.
The result in Sisters can only be explained in terms of the Board's
169. Babcock, 351 U.S. at 112; Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at 805. In Jean Country, the Board
noted that "[w]e of course continue to adhere to the distinct analytical view that a denial of access
for Sec. 7 activity may constitute unlawful disparate treatment where, by rule or practice, a property
owner permits similar activity in similar, relevant circumstances." 291 N.L.R.B. No. 4, slip op. at 4
n.3, 129 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1201, 1203 n.3 (1988). The Sixth Circuit affirmed this principle in Emery
Realty v. NLRB, 130 L.R.R.M. 2154, 2157 (1988). See also D'Alessandro's Inc., 292 N.L.R.B. No.
27, 130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1089 (1988) (access for informational picketing granted where property
owner had previously permitted a wide range of similar activities).
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reluctance to permit area standards handbilling on private property.
1 70
The Board noted that the union's section 7 right was "essentially the
same as the section 7 right asserted in Fairmont."'17 ' The Board consid-
ers this type of section 7 activity to be "of limited significance and 'not at
the core purpose for which the NLRA was enacted.' "172
The relevance of the Board's single-store rule in its analysis of com-
peting property and statutory rights became clearer in the Schwab Foods
decision. Schwab involved a union engaged in an economic strike
brought on by a breakdown in contract negotiations with a supermarket
owner. 173 The bargaining unit consisted of the employees of one store-
the Mooresville store. The striking employees and union representatives
engaged in strike-related activity at the Mooresville store and at three
other nonunionized Schwab stores in the area. The access disputes, how-
ever, involved only two stores: the Mooresville store, which was part of a
two-store center,' 74 and-the Martinsville store, a free-standing store.
The Board disagreed on the relative strength of the property and
section 7 claims in the Martinsville dispute.175 At Martinsville, the store,
the parking lot, and the land at the parking lot entrances were owned by
Schwab Foods. Several striking Mooresville employees and union repre-
sentatives patrolled with picket signs on private property next to the en-
trance and exit to the store's parking lot. Within a short time the pickets
were warned by police in a patrol car not to obstruct traffic. Minutes
later, a person identifying himself as the chief of police threatened them
with arrest if they did not move to the closest public sidewalk, which was
across the street. The pickets moved across the street, where they "found
'there wasn't anybody walking down the street' and they just were not
effective at all and left."' 176 Subsequently, attorneys for the city and the
union entered into an agreement allowing the union's pickets to patrol a
private area "running along the lower edge of the parking lot" which was
"defined" as a public "easement," although there was no public sidewalk
170. Cf Butterfield, 292 N.L.R.B. No. 8, slip op. at 9, 130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1115 (permitting
access to a free-standing cinema where the § 7 right was the "core" right of primary economic
activity).
171. Sisters, 285 N.L.R.B. No. 105, slip op. at 4, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1149.
172. Id. at 5, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1149 (citation omitted).
173. In addition to resolving the access dispute, the Board found that the employer violated
§§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) by engaging in surface bargaining. In context, the 1977 access dispute was but
a part of the employer's long history of hostility to unions. Schwab Foods, Inc., 284 N.L.R.B. No.
120, slip op. at 1-2 n.2, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1225, 1226 n.2 (1987), enforced, 129 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2601 (7th Cir. 1988). For earlier history of the parties, see Schwab Foods, 197 N.L.R.B. 1068
(1972); Schwab Foods, 233 N.L.R.B. 394 (1976).
174. The description of the strike at the Mooresville store and the Board's analysis of it are
discussed infra in text accompanying notes 188-94.
175. This part of the Board's Schwab decision provoked a strong dissent by Chairman Dotson.
284 N.L.R.B. No. 120, slip op. at 12, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1229 (Dotson, dissenting).
176. 284 N.L.R.B. No. 120, slip op. at 7, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1227.
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there. 77
Members Johansen and Babson affirmed the ALJ's finding of an
8(a)(1) violation in the Martinsville access dispute. The majority ac-
knowledged the Fairmont rule that "a single store surrounded by its pri-
vate parking lot has a more compelling property right claim than the
owner of a large shopping mall."' 78 The Board found, "[n]evertheless,"
that "on balance" this property claim was "not stronger than the signifi-
cant section 7 right exercised by the striking employees in picketing at
Martinsville."' 79 The factors which made up this "nevertheless" in the
majority's property analysis were that (1) the store had "issued a general
invitation to the public to enter its parking lot and patronize its store,"
(2) "no restrictions were placed on public access to the property," (3) the
property claim "concerns an area far removed from the store entrance,"
and (4) there was "no evidence of safety or other problems associated
with the Union's activity at the entrance to the parking lot."' 80
In Chairman Dotson's dissenting analysis of the strength of the
property claim, he first referred to the Fairmont single-store "rule," not-
ing that "in Fairmont ... the Board found a single store surrounded by
its private parking lot presents a particularly strong property right."''
Dotson stated: "the property right in question at Martinsville is just the
type referred to in Fairmont."' 8 2 He then concluded that Schwab Foods
"was attempting to preserve a substantial private property right when it
prohibited patrolling by the pickets at Martinsville."' 8 3 Because Dotson
found the section 7 interest "attenuated" and the property right "sub-
stantial," he would have dismissed the section 8(a)(1) complaint.'
8 4
While Dotson could avoid any real analysis of the property claim by
appealing to the Fairmont single-store rule, the Board majority had to
engage in a more substantive analysis to show why the single-store rule
did not apply to this case. But its analysis still does not provide insight
into what distinguishes this single store from other single stores. The
first two factors-a general invitation to the public to patronize the store,
and an absence of restrictions on access-do not distinguish this store
from any other retail or service facility, whether it be a single store, a
restaurant, a hotel, or a shopping mall. Retail and service facilities must
invite the "general public" as patrons and facilitate access to do
177. Id. at 7 n.l, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1227 n.il.
178. Id. at 10, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1228.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 30, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1235 (Dotson, dissenting). The Board, of course,
presented its single-store/shopping mall rules as dictum, not doctrine.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 30-31, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1235.
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The final factor-the lack of evidence of "safety or other problems"
with the picketing at the entrance to the store parking lot-does not con-
tribute much to an analysis of the store's right to exclude for trespass, but
is rather an observation about the conduct of the picketing. No matter
where the picketing occurs, whether on private or public property, if
safety is a problem, the state can intervene to restrain picketing that is
violent, blocks ingress and egress, or harasses customers.1 86 The em-
ployer does not need to rely on the laws of trespass. The fact that picket-
ing could be safely conducted at the parking lot entrances means that the
only way the property owner could remove the pickets from that location
was to rely on trespass-the right to exclude based on bare title alone.
The Board members did not take their analysis that far because it would
have forced them to confront the fact that the right to exclude, conceived
as an absolute right, is the property right they are protecting in cases
where they find a "strong" or "compelling" property interest.
An intriguing factor used to find that the Martinsville store had as-
serted a "relatively limited" property interest was that the property claim
concerned "an area far removed from the store entrance."' 87 The major-
ity offered a novel notion that an owner's property rights are diluted at
the perimeter of the property and grow stronger closer to the actual en-
trance to the enclosed building that houses the retail facility. If the right
to exclude because of title or possession is an absolute, the right should
not depend on how close to the building the trespass occurs. This was
essentially the position taken by the property owner in Schwab Foods.
The Board's analysis indicates they might have evaluated the prop-
erty right differently if the picketing had occurred at the store entrance,
as in Sisters, rather than at the periphery of the parking lot. What the
union wants, of course, is to picket or handbill at the entranceway to the
target store, whether that entrance is on a public sidewalk or hundreds of
feet from the nearest public sidewalk. Picketing or handbilling at vehicu-
lar entrances, aside from safety considerations, is never as effective as
face-to-face encounters with pedestrians as they enter a store.
185. Although being "open to the public" does not make such facilities into "public forums" for
federal first amendment purposes, the privilege of engaging in interstate and intrastate commerce
carries with it certain limitations on the right to exclude. See. e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). For example, the
Supreme Court has recently upheld the constitutionality of a New York City law which makes it
unlawful for private clubs that, in effect, serve business and commercial purposes to deny member-
ship to persons on the basis of sex, race, or religion. The principle that even the most "private"
facilities cannot deny access on a discriminatory basis when they engage in commercial functions
illustrates the "public" responsibilities, and loss of "private" control, which the state can impose on
the privilege of access to the commercial market. See New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New
York, 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988).
186. See infra text accompanying notes 327-29.
187. Schwab Foods, 284 N.L.R.B. No. 120, slip op. at 10, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1228.
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The union pickets at the Martinsville store, however, had chosen a
location for their picketing that was not very "intrusive," since they had
not moved very far onto private property. But the picketing was also not
"intrusive" because it was not likely to be very effective so "far removed"
from the store entrance. The Board here has offered a corollary to its
single-store "rule" which devalues an otherwise "compelling" property
right in a case where the "intrusion" onto the property is de minimis and
has limited economic effect. If valuation of economic impact is the rea-
son for the corollary, then it becomes clear that the Board here would
approve the use of trespass laws to insulate employers from the poten-
tially harmful economic consequences of disputes with unions, but not
the ones that are relatively harmless. In the end, the owner of the single,
free-standing store wins because the Board's "corollary" to its single-
store property "rule" protects what the owner, for economic reasons,
most wants to protect-the customer and employee pedestrian entrances.
But the business owner's ability to protect the pedestrian entrance may
depend on the fortuity of her owning and operating a single, free-stand-
ing store surrounded by a large, private parking lot. When the context of
the access dispute moves to a multi-store setting, the owner's ability to
assert property rights to protect economic interests decreases, but not
completely, as the following cases indicate.
b. The Two-Store Center
Schwab Foods also analyzed the access dispute in a two-store setting.
Several striking Mooresville employees, accompanied by nonemployee
union supporters, began to picket and handbill in the vestibule and walk-
way area at the entrance to the Mooresville supermarket. A store vice
president called the police and threatened to have the pickets arrested if
they did not move their activity to the parking lot entrances. After the
police arrived and threatened to arrest the pickets, they moved to the
parking lot entrances, where they continued their picketing and handbil-
ling without further incident. Subsequently, the union filed an 8(a)(1)
unfair labor practice charge, and both the ALJ and the Board found that
the employees' section 7 rights had been violated.
The entrance area to Schwab's Mooresville store, as well as the
parking lot, was "shared" with an adjoining drugstore, and the entire
facility was leased from a "disinterested third party."' 88 The customers
and employees entered the Schwab supermarket, which was open twenty-
four hours a day, through this common vestibule. Schwab Foods used
the canopy-covered walkway, which ran along the front of the adjoining
stores, for vending machines, "extra" shopping carts, and "bulky sea-
188. Id. at 4, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1227.
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sonal merchandise."'
189
The Board majority in Schwab Foods, after some analysis of the
company's property claim, found that it was "a relatively weak one." 190
The Board quoted the Fairmont single-store and shopping mall "rules"
first, as their primary authority for finding a "relatively weak" property
interest, and then proceeded to support their analysis with a list of addi-
tional factors. These factors were: (1) the supermarket had "invited the
general public to patronize its store," (2) the common vesti-
bule/walkway, shared with the adjoining drugstore, was not limited to
customers of the supermarket, but was "open to virtually anyone," (3)
access to the common parking lot was not "restricted in any way," and
(4) the pickets "did not pose a significant impediment to persons seeking
to enter and leave the stores." '' Thus, in view of the "unrestricted ac-
cess" and "dilution" of property rights because of the "presence of the
adjoining business," the property rights were relatively weak.' 92 How-
ever, it is precisely because ingress and egress was not blocked that the
store resorted to property rights-the trespass laws and the police-to
exclude the pickets. The "compelling" property right asserted was noth-
ing more than the absolute right to exclude because of the store's posses-
sory interest in the property.
Chairman Dotson, in dissent, argued that the company was "assert-
ing a compelling property right in limiting the use to which its property
was put. ' 19 3 To reach this conclusion, he characterized the facts in a
very different fashion, emphasizing problems of congestion at the store
entrance. Dotson's concern that the store be able to maintain its normal
"atmosphere" is even more troubling than his misplaced and mistaken
concern about the entranceway being physically blocked. Presumably
the normal "atmosphere"-without pickets or handbillers, without strik-
ing employees, without a labor dispute-is most conducive to the re-
laxed, inviting shopping environment the store has attempted to create.
What Dotson was trying to protect was the store's ambience, just as the
Board protected the "decorum" of the Fairmont Hotel entranceway.
The notion that a specially created atmosphere is a substantial prop-
erty right appears implicitly in several post-Fairmont decisions. It is true
that atmosphere, ambience, and decorum are created out of a property
owner's expenditures for real estate, location, building materials, archi-
tecture, landscape design, advertising, fixtures, furnishings, and service
and security personnel, and the like. Such "investment" in creating an
environment that is inviting and pleasing to customers and employees in
189. Id.
190. Id. at 8, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1228.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 29, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1234.
LABOR ACCESS TO PRIVATE PROPERTY
the retail and service sector, or to clients and employees in the business
sector, is clearly valuable to the retail store or business owner. Physical
damage to fixtures, furnishings, the landscape, and the other physical as-
sets that make up the "atmosphere" is damage to the owner's property.
But it is important to ask how union handbilling and picketing, otherwise
legal under the Act, actually harm or destroy the property owner's in-
vestment in atmosphere and decorum. Is the law simply vindicating the
property owner's interest in having "the right people" around?
Employers do not assert trespass laws to protect the "atmosphere"
from physical harm. Other tort and criminal laws adequately protect
employers against damage to their physical property. An employer's
concern about economic harm to her business interests due to the effects
of handbilling or picketing is certainly the primary reason she asserts
trespass laws. But the Board has undercut federal labor policy by per-
mitting employers to assert bare title to land as a means of avoiding the
economic consequences of unionism. 94 It is for this reason, presumably,
that Babcock required an "accommodation" of the competing property
and statutory interests, so that trivial or insignificant property interests
would not defeat important statutory rights.
Business owners will use trespass laws to avoid otherwise legitimate
economic harm when union picketers or handbillers come onto their pri-
vate property, regardless of the trespassers' impact on the "atmosphere."
So why has the property owners' creation of an ambience or atmosphere
become so important in these access disputes? The Board apparently be-
lieves that a special ambience means a stronger property right. An at-
mosphere of exclusivity thus enhances the employer's ability to exclude
protected section 7 union activity under the Fairmont test. Ambience is
important not only because it is good for business, but also because it
strengthens the trespass claim. Ambience adds weight to the right to
exclude and makes it more difficult for unions to gain access.
Additional investment in "atmosphere," then, may be viewed as in-
vestment in a union-free environment. The property owner with prop-
erty plus "atmosphere" has greater assurances of avoiding the intrusion
of pickets and handbillers if a dispute comes before the Board. The
Board's deference to "atmosphere," however, creates an analytical dis-
tinction between property claims apparently based on class and wealth.
It may be, too, that the Board's inclination to protect "atmosphere" is a
mirror of the property owner's sentiment about unions. The. harm
caused by union or employee picketing at a place like the Fairmont Hotel
entrance is not in the economic harm of turning hotel customers away
because they wish to join the union's cause. Indeed, it is highly unlikely
194. See discussion of federal labor preemption and the Sears case, infra Section III.A, pp. 208-
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that many of the patrons of the hotel will be sympathetic to the union's
cause. But the harm is that the existence of "labor trouble"-face-to-
face confrontations with working people and their labor problems-will
be distasteful or discomfiting to hotel patrons, and will drive them away.
In a sense, unions can turn class and anti-union bias to their advantage:
they can impose economic harm indirectly, by affecting the "atmos-
phere," in cases where direct appeals to union sympathy or solidarity
might not work..
The Board has, on the basis of underlying class assumptions, chosen
to protect symbols of social status at the expense of federal statutory
rights. Such assumptions conflict with the democratic, egalitarian aspi-
rations of the federal labor statute, and its expressed purpose of re-
dressing the "inequality of bargaining power" between employees and
employers.' 95 Nevertheless, Babcock granted special deference to the
formal property entitlements of the owner of land. And the Fairmont
gloss on the Babcock analysis explicitly recognizes accouterments of
wealth, class, and status that can be associated with and created through
the ownership of land. The message of Fairmont and the post-Fairmont
decisions is that if the property owner highly values a union-free environ-
ment, she will invest in exclusivity.
c. The Small-to-Medium-Sized Mall
In access cases involving small shopping centers, the Board contin-
ued to have problems consistently applying the Fairmont test. Five of
the 1987 Fairmont decisions dealt with shopping malls ranging in size
from four stores to twenty stores. 9 6 In all of these cases the Board
found, consistent with the Fairmont shopping mall "rule," that the prop-
erty owner had "retained only a very limited property right claim" to the
area in dispute, usually at the store entranceway or in the parking lot.
But there was not always complete agreement among the Board members
as to how weak this property claim was. In four of the five decisions,
Chairman Dotson found that the property right outweighed the section 7
right, thus eliminating the need to consider alternative means of commu-
nication, whereas Member Babson found the competing claims relatively
equal in strength, thus requiring consideration of alternative means of
communication.
United Supermarkets was the one decision where the Board mem-
bers agreed on the relative strengths of the property and section 7 rights,
195. See NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
196. L & L Shop Rite, 285 N.L.R.B. No. 122, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1151 (four stores); United
Supermarkets, 283 N.L.R.B. No. 130, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1069 (eight); Smitty's Super Mkts., 284
N.L.R.B. No. 128, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1268 (eight); Browning's Foodland, 284 N.L.R.B. No. 104,
125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1264 (ten); Skaggs Co., 285 N.L.R.B. No. 62, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1149
(twenty).
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and was the only decision of this group of five cases in which an 8(a)(1)
violation was found and union access granted as a remedy. United Su-
permarkets involved unfair labor practice picketing by two employees
who had been discharged, allegedly for union activity.'97 The two dis-
charged employees, wearing picket signs and accompanied by two union
representatives, walked up and down the sidewalk in front of the super-
market. The store called the police, and the four pickets were arrested,
prosecuted, and ultimately acquitted of criminal trespass.
The Board characterized the store owner's property rights in United
Supermarkets much as it did in the four subsequent small to medium-
sized mall cases and the two-store cases.' 98 After quoting the Fairmont
"accommodation" formula and the Fairmont single-store/shopping mall
rules, the Board noted that the case involved a "small shopping center
which the general public is invited to patronize."' 99 The customer park-
ing lot, which was shared with the other stores in the shopping center,
provided "ready access from the adjacent public streets," and there were
"no restrictions on access through these entrances." 2" The Board found
that it was "apparent" that the sidewalk in front of the supermarket was
"open to virtually anyone and certainly to customers of any of the
merchants at the shopping center." The supermarket's property rights in
its sidewalk were thus limited by the fact that "access to the sidewalk"
was "so unrestricted" and it was "commonly used by persons who [were]
not customers, employees, or suppliers of the supermarket.""'' These
themes, or refrains, were repeated, nearly verbatim, in the analyses of the
remaining small-to-medium mall cases.2" 2
Thus, the most one can say in summarizing the small sized shopping
mall cases is that the store owner's property right, consistent with the
Fairmont "rules," was considered relatively weak. But the weight as-
signed to the property right and the burdens placed before the General
Counsel depended on the individual perspective of the Board member
deciding the case. Even in cases where the General Counsel argued that
197. While it delayed in settling the access dispute, the Board did decide the issues surrounding
the employees' discharge. In a decision five years earlier, it found that the employer did commit
unfair labor practices in discharging one of these two employees for union activity and for refusing to
bargain with the union after it was certified. See United Supermarkets, 261 N.L.R.B. 1291 (1982).
198. See supra text accompanying notes 188-92.
199. United Supermarkets, 283 N.L.R.B. No. 130, slip op. at 4-5, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1071.
200. Id. at 5, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1071.
201. Id. Because the Board unanimously found the property right weak and the § 7 right quite
strong, it was "unnecessary to consider the availability of reasonable alternative means by which the
Union could have communicated its message to its intended audience." Id. at 7, 125 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) at 1072.
202. See Browning's, 284 N.L.R.B. No. 104, slip op. at 4 n.4, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1265 n.4;
Smitty's, 284 N.L.R.B. No. 128, slip op. at 5 n.4, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1269 n.4; Skaggs, 285
N.L.R.B. No. 62, slip op. at 5 n.1, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1151 n.I; L & L, 285 N.L.R.B. No. 122,
slip op. at 7-8, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1154.
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the property rights were weak and the section 7 claims very strong, the
Board could disagree and require proof of (virtually complete) lack of
reasonable alternative means of communication before granting access.
In the seven cases dealing with two-store centers and small shopping
malls, access depended on the Board finding a section 7 right which it
considered important and worth protecting. The Board granted access
for exercise of section 7 rights that they found compelling, such as the
unfair labor practice picketing in United Supermarkets and the primary
strike activity in Schwab Foods. The four cases in which access was de-
nied involved informational or area standards picketing, generally by
nonemployees. 20  Even where the private property rights are weakest, in
that most "public" of spaces, the small suburban shopping center, the
communication rights of unions and employees may not be found as sig-
nificant as the right to exclude. The Board has thus succeeded in com-
pleting the task it denied it began in the Fairmont decision: it has
rejected and discredited the analysis and conclusions of its 1979 decision,
Giant Food Markets. 21 Given the difficulty of proving that a union lacks
"reasonable alternative means of communication," it is unlikely that the
Board will often permit area standards activity on private property.
d. The Mega-Mall
The future of effective area standards picketing and handbilling in
the face of the "malling" of America seems to have been finally deter-
mined by one of the last Board shopping mall decisions-in a case deal-
ing with a mega-mall. In Homart Development Co., the Board analyzed
the property interests of the Fiesta Mall in Mesa, Arizona. It is a proto-
typical mega-mall-a massive building housing the department store in-
volved in the case, three other large department stores, and 135 smaller
tenants, surrounded by a privately owned two-level parking area. The
corporation that developed, owned, and maintained the mall also owned
and operated "at least 50 shopping malls throughout the United
States."2 5 A plumbers' union objected to the substandard wage scale
paid by nonunion subcontractors working at the construction site of a
new Diamond's department store being built at another location. To
take their area standards dispute to the public, the union initiated a con-
sumer boycott of Diamond department stores through a handbilling
203. See cases cited supra note 202. For discussion of the place of area standards picketing in
the "hierarchy" of § 7 rights, see infra Section I.D.4, pp. 203-04.
204. The Board stated in Fairmont that -[w]e do not pass here on the conclusion reached by the
Board in Giant Food," 241 N.L.R.B. 727 (1979), which granted area standards pickets access to the
private sidewalk in front of a supermarket in a two-store shopping center. 282 N.L.R.B. No. 27, at 8
n.16, 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1259 n.16.
205. Homart, ALJ Decision, JD-(SF)-195-82, slip. op. at 6.
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campaign directed at the customers of their stores located in six metro-
politan Phoenix shopping malls.
At the Fiesta Mall, nonemployee union representatives distributed
handbills on the mall sidewalk several feet from the outside entrance to
Diamond's department store. The handbills requested "the public" not
to patronize Diamond's because it "was building a store using construc-
tion companies which paid substandard wages." 2 6 Within a few minutes
after the handbilling began, a mall security guard informed the union
representatives that they "could not be handing out handbills" at that
location because they were "on private property." He directed them to-
ward a mall entrance at the road surrounding the periphery of the mall
property, and they left. For over a month, the union continued handbil-
ling (or, more accurately, "carbilling") on the median strip at one of the
vehicular entrances to the Fiesta Mall. At this point the police forced
them to abandon this location because they were " 'creating an act of
entrapment' of the motorists. '20 ' Because the union considered the
other vehicular entrances too dangerous or ineffective, and did not want
to risk "a trespass lawsuit" by reentering the mall property, they aban-
doned their handbilling at the Fiesta Mall and filed an 8(a)(1) charge.2 08
The Board dismissed the complaint. But Chairman Dotson and
Member Babson once again disagreed on the relative strength of the
property right, as well as the section 7 right.20 9 Babson found that the
property claim was "not a strong one." His analysis of the property
claim was consistent with his analysis in other shopping center cases:
The Fiesta Mall is large and open to the general public 7 days a week.
Although marked as "private property," restriction to use of the mall, its
walkways, and parking lot is limited.... Both the parking lot and the
sidewalk in front of the mall are open to virtually anyone, and certainly
they are open to customers of any of the 139 businesses at the mall.
210
Dotson, on the other hand, focused on the ways in which the mall
had attempted to maintain its exclusivity by strictly enforcing rules and
regulations prohibiting "all individuals and organizations from coming
on its property (either inside or outside) to distribute literature for any
type of activity or stated purpose. '"21 The no-distribution rule was
maintained by the mall owner "to promote and provide a conducive
206. Homart, 286 N.L.R.B. No. 72, slip op. at 4, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1245-46.
207. Id. at 5, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1246.
208. Id. at 5-6, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1246.
209. The Board quoted the Fairmont single-store/shopping mall rules, acknowledged their disa-
greement regarding the relative weight of the competing property and statutory claims, and then,
"assuming the relative equality of these interests," proceeded to analyze the reasonable alternative
means of communication. Id. at 7-8, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1246-47.
210. Id. at 8 n.12, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1246-47 n.12.
211. Id. at 7 n.12, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1246 n.12.
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shopping environment. ' 21 2 Again, the mall owner's investment in an ex-
clusive "atmosphere" emerges as a relevant factor in the evaluation of
the property right. Dotson wrote, "although the mall is large, having
139 stores and a parking lot accommodating 15,000 cars daily, the [mall
owner] ensures 'a very pleasant environment' by protecting potential cus-
tomers from solicitation and distribution of literature unrelated to the
sale of merchandise by its retail tenants. '2 1 3 Dotson concluded that,
although the mall was open "to the general public," the mall owner was
"asserting a substantial property interest in limiting the use to which its
private property was put.
' ' zl4
The rules which a property owner establishes for the comprehensive
exclusion of classes of persons or types of activities should not affect the
Board's decision about whether persons engaged in federally protected
activity should be excluded as well. Under Dotson's analysis, property
owners who want to insulate themselves from union activity now have
strong incentives to adopt and enforce broad rules prohibiting solicita-
tion and distribution. As long as the rules are applied in a nondiscrimi-
natory fashion, they strengthen the argument that the property owner is
protecting a "substantial" property right-its environment, its ambience,
its pleasant atmosphere.
Dotson characterized the mega-mall as more "private" than small
shopping centers because of the owner's control of the environment and
imposition of rules. Clearly the Fairmont "rules of thumb" lost their
utility for Dotson when he changed the focus from size to "atmosphere."
Ironically, the giant private suburban malls that serve as a social and
commercial substitute for the public urban retail center-the old "down-
town"-are successful, to a great degree, because they can exclude that
part of the public "real" world that is not conducive to a "pleasant"
shopping, socializing atmosphere. 2" But in order to be able to exclude
unions along with the "undesirables"-street vendors, panhandlers, the
homeless, sidewalk preachers, and the like-the mall must exclude some
groups they might want to include for purposes of civic virtue, such as
the Girl Scouts, the League of Women Voters, and the Veterans of For-
eign Wars. Under the Board's analysis, if the mall owner allows, or has
212. Id.
213. Id. at 7-8 n.12, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1246-47 n.12.
214. Id.
215. As historian Kenneth Jackson has noted:
In reality, even the largest malls are almost the opposite of downtown areas because
they are self-contained and because they impose a uniformity of tastes and interests. They
cater exclusively to middle-class tastes and contain no unsavory bars or pornography
shops, no threatening-looking characters, no litter, no rain, and no excessive heat or
cold.... [T]heir emphasis on cleanliness and safety is symptomatic of a very lopsided view
of urban culture.
K. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 260
(1985).
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at one time allowed, charitable solicitations or distributions, the strength
of its property claim is greatly diminished, even apart from the issue of
discrimination against union activity. This principle is demonstrated in
another post-Fairmont case dealing with access to an urban arcade.
e. The Urban Arcade
In Emery Realty the Board granted nonemployee union organizers
access to a private urban arcade.216 Emery owned and operated the Ca-
rew Tower, a complex in downtown Cincinnati containing a forty-seven-
story office building, retail and service shops, and a hotel employing
about 300 employees who were not unionized. The hotel employees' en-
trance was recessed about six feet off the main lobby or "arcade" of the
complex. The arcade itself, lined with store fronts, was a city block in
length with numerous entrances from stores, the public streets, and a
public skywalk system connecting some of the downtown buildings. The
arcade was used by employees, tenants, and customers of the Carew
Tower complex, but was also used by pedestrians "simply as a conve-
nient passageway to other buildings." '217 Three representatives of a hotel
employees union attempted to handbill at the employee entrance to the
hotel, but left minutes later when private security guards informed them
that soliciting was not permitted and that they would be arrested for
trespass if they refused to leave.21
In "assessing the relative strength" of the Emery's property claim,
the Board noted that the arcade was open "to the public generally," with
no restrictions on access. 219 In fact, access was permitted "7 days a
week, 24 hours a day... even when the arcade stores and shops [were]
closed for business."' 220 Access was permitted without restriction to
"those who are merely pedestrians who simply want to use the arcade as
a cut-through between streets."'22 ' Thus, the interior store arcade was, in
most respects, functionally indistinguishable from a public street. Be-
cause of the pedestrian "cut-through" and the lack of access restrictions
or hours, the arcade was, technically, even more open to the general pub-
lic than a shopping mall. Indeed, the Board did not rely on or even refer
216. 286 N.L.R.B. No. 32, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1241 (1987), enforced, 130 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2154 (6th Cir. 1988).
217. Id. at 2, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1241.
218. Several days later, during a second attempt to distribute organizational handbills at the
hotel employees' entrance, the union organizers were confronted by security guards, the Emery's
building superintendent, and two police officers, and again threatened with arrest for trespass. Id. at
3-4, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1242.
219. Id. at 4, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1242.
220. Id. at 4 n.4, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1242 n.4. The Board acknowledged that Emery
"does close the arcade for a short period of time during one night each year as a means to preserve
its status as owner." Id.
221. Id. at 4, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1242.
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to the Fairmont shopping center "rule" in finding that the owner's prop-
erty interest in the arcade was "relatively weak." '2 22
Nevertheless, despite the arcade's openness and function as a "cut-
through," the owner did attempt to exercise certain control over its use
that would have been typical in a large shopping mall. Shortly after the
union's attempted handbilling, Emery Realty instituted a rule forbidding
charitable solicitations. Emery had "in the past permitted solicitations in
the arcade by various social service organizations," and continued to per-
mit "Christmas displays on the arcade floor." '2 23 The patrolling of pri-
vate security guards, and the (belated) imposition of a no-solicitation, no-
distribution rule which the guards enforced, made the arcade more
"mall-like" and less like a public pedestrian thoroughfare. But the lack
of evidence that past charitable solicitation had caused "any interference
with Emery's property rights" or "interfered in any way with the normal
use of the arcade" undercut its claim to a protectible interest in its atmos-
phere, or ambience.224 Thus, although the arcade was, in many respects,
an urban analog of the suburban shopping center, the Board did not
make that comparison. Instead it stressed the arcade's "low degree of
'privateness' " due to the owner's failure to consistently maintain an at-
mosphere of exclusivity.225
The Board concluded that the section 7 right outweighed the prop-
erty right. It found that the property owner's interest in the arcade area
near the hotel employees' entrance was "relatively weak, ' 22 6 and the
union's section 7 interest in organizational solicitation--one of the inter-
ests "at the 'very core' " of the NLRA-was "quite a strong one. "227
Since the two rights were not relatively equal, the Board, applying Fair-
mont, did not consider the union's reasonable alternative means of com-
munication to be determinative. Yet, as an additional theory to support
their access order, the Board also found that the union had no reasonable
alternative means of communication with the hotel employees.228
The willingness of the Board to permit access in Emery Realty thus
222. Id. at 7, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1243.
223. Id. at 4-5, 126 L.R.R.Mo (BNA) at 1242.
224. Id. at 5, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1242.
225. Id. at 4-5, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1242. The Board also noted that, unlike the economic
relationship in the Fairmont case, Emery Realty, the hotel's lessor, had an "economic interest in the
business success of the employer with whom the Union [had] its primary dispute." Id. at 5, 126
L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1242. While Emery's economic relationship with the hotel was quite direct, and
indeed the lease price may have been tied to the hotel's profits, this analysis ignores the indirect
economic benefit-through lower prices-which the Fairmont Hotel undoubtedly received from do-
ing business with a baker whose delivery truck drivers were nonunionized. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 36-37.
226. 286 N.L.R.B. No. 32, slip op. at 7, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1243.
227. Id. at 5, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1242.
228. It was this finding which "salvaged" the Board's Fairmont analysis from being found defec-
tive by the Sixth Circuit. See Emery Realty v. NLRB, 130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2154, 2159 (1988).
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depended on a unique configuration of weak property rights, strong sec-
tion 7 rights, and demonstrated lack of reasonable alternatives of com-
munication. The arcade was more accessible to the public than the
Fiesta Mall in Homart Development. And Emery had only recently at-
tempted to impose no-solicitation rules. Also the section 7 activity con-
cerned "core" rights of organization rather than the peripheral rights of
protecting area wage scales.1
29
But the absence of injury to "ambience" appears to have played a
significant role in the result. The union "stayed in its place" in every
sense of the phrase. The Board stressed that the union had confined its
handbilling activity to a small, recessed area "directly in front of the em-
ployees' entrance to the Hotel, which was reserved solely for their use
and which was also the only entrance the Hotel employees were sup-
posed to use."' 23" Therefore, the handbilling occurred "completely off the
arcade itself."' 231 There were no allegations that the handbilling "inter-
fered in any way with the normal operation of the arcade," nor any "evi-
dence of complaints, by merchants, customers, or even pedestrians
regarding the handbilling. ' 23 2 In fact, the handbilling was "in such
proximity to the targeted employer's employees that the Union could not
have more carefully restricted its handbilling activities so as to be able to
reach the intended audience while not disturbing others.,
2 3 3
The Board thus assumes that union activity on "public" types of
private property is acceptable as long as the "public" does not have to be
"disturbed" by what is going on. If the union "interferes" with custom-
ers and merchants, the case begins to look very different. Area standards
consumer boycotts "interfere" with the "normal operation" of the
arcade, because their purpose-to encourage people not to buy certain
products or from certain merchants-runs counter to the purpose of the
arcade-which is to encourage consumerism. But organizational activity
directed exclusively at employees and confined to the separate employees'
entrance-the equivalent of the servants' or service entrance to a man-
sion--does not "disturb" others. The physical segregation and isolation
of the labor activity from the other commercial activity of the mall con-
fines the labor "disturbance" to the laborers.
229. For discussion of the hierarchy of section 7 rights, see infra text accompanying notes 234-
40.
230. 286 N.L.R.B. No. 32, slip op. at 6, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1243.
231. Id.
232. Id. The implication is that if someone was bothered by the handbilling, regardless of why
they were bothered, the argument for denying access would be greater. This creates an almost irre-
sistible incentive for merchants and customers to complain, particularly if their real reasons are
antiunion hostility.
233. Id. (emphasis added).
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D. The "Hierarchy" of Section 7 Rights
The Fairmont test requires an evaluation of the "strength or weak-
ness" of the asserted section 7 right.234 The Supreme Court in Hudgens
endorsed the concept of a "spectrum" of section 7 rights (and property
rights) when it stated that the "locus of the accommodation of section 7
rights and the private property rights . . .may fall at different points
along the spectrum depending on the nature and strength of the respec-
tive section 7 rights and property rights asserted in any given context." '235
The Court has suggested that some section 7 rights are more significant
than others in that they are closer to the "core" purposes for which the
Act was passed. 236 For example, in dictum in Sears, the Court suggested
that "the right to organize is the very core of the purpose for which the
NLRA was enacted. '23 7 On the other hand, the Court observed, "[a]rea
standards picketing . . . has only recently been recognized as a § 7
right." '238 The Court asserted that because area standards picketing does
not have a "vital link to the employees located on the employer's prop-
erty," the "argument" for protecting it is "less compelling than that for
trespassory organizational solicitation." '239 The Supreme Court has also
recognized primary economic strike activity as a "core" purpose of the
Act.
240
In Hudgens, the Court noted that "the primary responsibility for
making [the] accommodation [between section 7 rights and property
rights] must rest with the Board in the first instance."'24 ' Nevertheless
the Fairmont Board deferred to the Supreme Court dictum in Sears
about how the accommodation should be made, rather than making the
accommodation "in the first instance." Consequently, the Board avoided
altogether any serious analysis of either the concept of a hierarchy of
statutory rights or the criteria for ranking such rights.
234. See Fairmont, 282 N.L.R.B. No. 27, slip op. at 9-10, 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1259-60; see
discussion supra text accompanying notes 59-60.
235. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 522 (1976).
236. Implicit in the Supreme Court's analysis of competing property and statutory rights was
the notion that there is a hierarchy of § 7 rights. See, e.g, id.
237. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 206
n.42 (1978).
238. Id.
239. Id. In one of the post-Fairmont cases, Dotson took this "argument" one step further by
asserting that the interests of area standards pickets are "adverse" to the employees of the target
employer. See Browning's, 284 N.L.R.B. No. 104, slip op. at 4 n.4, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1265
n.4.
240. See, e.g., United Steelworkers (Carrier Corp.) v. NLRB, 376 U.S. 492, 499 (1964); NLRB
v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 233-34 (1963); Division 1287, Amalgamated Ass'n of Street,
Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Missouri, 374 U.S. 74, 82 (1963); NLRB v. International
Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665, 672 (1951).
241. 424 U.S. at 522.
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1. Primary Economic Activity
In line with its Scott Hudgens decision,242 the Board has generally
protected peaceful primary strike activity on private property shared by
two or more employers, regardless of whether the activity was engaged in
by employees or nonemployees, and without distinctions between picket-
ing and handbilling.243 Shopping centers, large and small, and office
buildings which are "generally open to the public," create problems of
identifying customers and employees of the target employer unless access
is granted. Moving the pickets and handbillers to the periphery of the
property will often not be a reasonable alternative means of reaching the
audience, because at a distance from the target employer the message is
diluted and neutral employers are enmeshed in the dispute. When a sin-
gle-employer facility is involved, however, the Board has rarely granted
access, regardless of whether the facility is generally open to the pub-
lic.2" Given the absence of the problem of enmeshing neutrals, as well
as the presence of a clearly identifiable audience, the burden of proving
no reasonable alternative means of communication will be extremely
high.
The post-Fairmont decision of Providence Hospital demonstrates the
difficulties of gaining access in the single-facility context for primary eco-
nomic activity of employees. In Providence Hospital off-duty nurses pick-
eting during contract negotiations with the hospital were denied access to
the sidewalk leading to the hospital's main entrance. The Board found
that the hospital's property right "in its hospital and surrounding
grounds, which it does not share with any other enterprise, is at least as
strong as that of a luxury hotel or a single retail store surrounded by its
own parking lot."2 4 ' The picketers were engaged in "primary economic
activity" which involved "a core Section 7 right." '24 6 Nevertheless, the
Board found the General Counsel had not met her burden of proving
that requiring the pickets to stand in an isolated, dangerous area, along a
busy highway entrance to the hospital, denied them reasonable alterna-
tive means of communication with their audience of hospital patients and
242. Scott Hudgens, 230 N.L.R.B. 414 (1977) (Board decision on remand of Hudgens, 424 U.S.
507). In Scott Hudgens, the Board noted that economic strike activity "deserves at least equal defer-
ence" with organizational picketing. Id. at 416.
243. See, e.g., Schwab Foods, 284 N.L.R.B. No. 120, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1225 (1987); Center
Street Mkt., 286 N.L.R.B. No. 73, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1212 (1987); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 243
N.L.R.B. 898 (1979). But see 40-41 Realty Assocs., 288 N.L.R.B. No. 23, 128 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
1001 (1988) (distinguishing Seattle-First National and denying primary economic picketers access to
a second-floor hallway adjacent to a dental clinic in an office building).
244. But see Butterfield Theaters, 292 N.L.R.B. No. 8, 130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1113 (1988) (ap-
plying Jean Country clarification of Fairmont standard); Montgomery Ward & Co., 265 N.L.R.B. 60
(1982), discussed supra note 22.
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employees.2 47
In sum, even the strongest of section 7 rights-economic picketing
by employees-will rarely be "stronger" than the property rights of the
occupant of a single-employer facility. Proving the absence of reasonable
alternative means of communication will be difficult, if not impossible.
Thus, the fortuity that two or more employers share facilities on a single
piece of property can result in protected rights of access for primary eco-
nomic activity of employees. The occupant of the single-employer facil-
ity, regardless of whether she "shares" her property rights with co-
owners, a landlord, or a mortgagee, can surround her property with a
"cordon sanitaire ' 24" and reasonably expect the Board to respect it even
when "core" section 7 rights are at stake.
The consequence is a rule that preserves the autonomy of the solo
entrepreneur and elevates her private property to a preferred status, as if
her property is the last bastion of rugged individualism and is therefore
worthy of distinctive treatment. On the other hand, when developers
aggregate individual employers into shopping centers, industrial parks,
and office complexes, the individual interests and identities of the em-
ployers are subsumed by the shared commercial enterprise. The "pri-
vate" property interests may be diluted and devalued as a cost of each
employer's decision to share property and points of access.
2. Union Organizing Activity
Nonemployee union organizing is also a "core" section 7 right, but
as the Supreme Court noted in Sears, "the interests being protected by
according limited-access rights to nonemployee union organizers are not
those of the organizers but of the employees located on the employer's
property.".249 Because the organizers are exercising derivative rights, not
rights of their own, they are often characterized as "outsiders" or "stran-
gers" to the employer and the employees °.2 " This has justified a general
247. Id. Nonetheless, the hospital was required to permit the employees to handbill on the
sidewalk in front of the hospital because the hospital's rules discriminated against union solicitation
on its property. See id. at 8-10, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1147.
248. Amalgamated Food Employees Union, Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S.
308, 325 (1968).
249. 436 U.S. at 206 n.42 (citing NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 113 (1956)).
250. The concept of union organizers as "outsiders" to the employment relationship begins to
collapse in the face of different views of their role under the Act. First, many union organizers are
also "employees" who are protected under the Act regardless of whether they are "employees of a
particular employer." NLRA § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982). Second, the Supreme Court has
recognized that employees may engage in broad-based collective action "for mutual aid or protec-
tion" of employees in general. See Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 564-68 (1978). Finally, the
structure and substance of the Act makes unions quasi-public institutions that are carrying out im-
portant functions regulated by federal statute and consonant with federal labor policy. The ambigui-
ties of the public/private nature of union organizations have been explored in Klare, The
Public/Private Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1358 (1982).
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rule of protecting the employer's right to exclude union organizers unless
there are no other reasonable means of communication.251
Generally, off-duty employees have more favorable access rights for
organizing purposes than the Babcock nonemployee organizers. The
technical distinction between the two groups of organizers is that off-
duty employees are still employees, and therefore, cannot be trespassers
on the employer's property. In property terms, the off-duty employees
are licensees, whose license has been expanded by Board doctrine. In-
deed, in 1976, in Tri-County Medical Center,25 2 the Board adopted a
broad access rule for off-duty employees which states that, "except when
justified for business reasons, a rule which denies off-duty employees en-
try to parking lots, gates, and other outside nonworking areas will be
found invalid."
253
In his dissent in one of the 1987 post-Fairmont cases, Pizza Crust
Co., Chairman Dotson argued that the Fairmont test should be extended
to an access dispute involving employees on workers compensation
leave.254 The employees attempted to distribute union literature to co-
workers in the parking lot of a factory. Applying Fairmont in such cir-
cumstances would generally result in a denial of access. The Board ma-
jority, however, adopted the position that its Tri-County test, not the
Fairmont balancing test, should be applied when employers interfere
with access rights of their off-duty employees, regardless of the reasons
the employees are "off-duty." 255
251. Two of the 1987 Fairmont cases--SCNO and Gladders-demonstrate how difficult it may
be under the Fairmont analysis for union organizers to prove they lack reasonable alternative means
of communication, even in isolated work environments. The cases involved union requests for access
to river barges and towboats for the purposes of union organizing. In Gladders, the Board found
that the barge company had violated § 8(a)(l) by denying the union both access and a mailing list of
employees. G.W. Gladders Towing, 287 N.L.R.B. No. 30, 127 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1088. In SCNO,
however, the Board found that although the company denied the union access, it had not violated
§ 8(a)(l) because it provided the union with a list of the names and home addresses of its employees
who lived in twelve states. SCNO Barge Lines, 287 N.L.R.B. No. 29, 127 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1081,
enforced sub noa. National Maritime Union v. NLRB, 867 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1989). Because the
union failed to use all conceivable means of communication made possible by the mailing lists, they
did not satisfy the high burden of proof imposed by the Board. Member Johansen wrote a strong
dissent in SCNO demonstrating the unreasonableness of the Fairmont analysis and burdens of prov-
ing lack of alternative means of communication in this factual context. See id., slip op. at 14, 127
L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1085 (Johansen, dissenting).
252. 222 N.L.R.B. 1089 (1976).
253. Id. at 1089.
254. 286 N.L.R.B. No. 45, slip op. at 4 (1987) (Dotson, dissenting), enforced, 862 F.2d 49 (3d
Cir. 1988).
255. Pizza Crust, slip op. at 2 n.l, 129 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1282 n.1. In dissent in Pizza Crust,
Chairman Dotson expressed his continuing dissatisfaction with the Tri-County rule, and argued that
the Fairmont test should be used to analyze the access rights of off-duty employees who are not
"active" employees. Id. at 4, 129 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1283. Dotson argued that he would overrule
Tri-County and return to the Board rule in GTE Lenkurt, 204 N.L.R.B. 921 (1973). Id. at 4, n.1,
129 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1283 n.1; see also Orange Memorial Hosp. Corp., 285 N.L.R.B. No. 136,
126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1200 (1987) (Dotson, dissenting). The Third Circuit has strongly rejected
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11:145
3. Unfair Labor Practice Activity
Unfair labor practice picketing and handbilling were not discussed
in Sears or Hudgens, but the Board has turned to other court authority
for the proposition that protesting employer unfair labor practices is a
significant section 7 right.2" 6 The strength of the right to engage in un-
fair labor practice picketing, by employees and nonemployees alike, is
such that it should generally outweigh the property right in situations
involving multi-employer establishments that are generally open to the
public, such as the eight-store shopping center in United Supermarkets.
Under the Fairmont test, the balancing would not necessarily require an
evaluation of the reasonable alternative means of communication.
But the Greyhound Lines decision25 7 demonstrates the difficulty
with making assumptions about how the Board will evaluate property
rights. In Greyhound, the Board found that the bus company had not
violated the Act by denying access to union organizers attempting to
picket and handbill at the entrance to a Burger King restaurant located
in the bus terminal. The union had recognitional and organizational
objectives, but was also protesting Burger King's unfair labor practices.
The Greyhound bus terminal was a multi-employer facility generally
open to the public. Nevertheless, the Board found a relatively strong
property right, at least as strong as the section 7 right to engage in unfair
labor practice picketing, and the existence of alternative means of com-
munication resulted in denial of access. The fact that the picketing inside
the bus terminal was conducted by nonemployee union organizers may
have been a key element in the Board's analysis, although off-duty em-
ployees were participating in the overall picketing campaign at the termi-
nal. Once again, the "insider/outsider" distinction appears to have
affected evaluation of the accommodation between property rights and
section 7 rights.
Access to free-standing facilities, even if they are open to the general
public, is not likely to be protected despite the Board's recognition of the
importance of unfair labor practice protests. In such cases, the Board
gives great weight to the property rights and places a high burden of
proof on the issue of alternative means of communication.258 Conse-
Dotson's argument that Fairmont should apply to off-duty employees in access cases. See NLRB v.
Pizza Crust Co., 862 F.2d 49, 53 (3d Cir. 1988).
256. In United Supermarkets, the Board cited Pecheur Lozenge Co., 98 N.L.R.B. 496 (1951),
enforced as modified, 209 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1953), for the proposition that "[tihe importance of the
right to protest unfair labor practices is evidenced by the greater rights accorded employees who
strike over unfair labor practices as compared to employees who strike over economic issues." 283
N.L.R.B. No. 30, slip op. at 6, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1069, 1071 (1987).
257. 284 N.L.R.B. No. 123, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1264 (1987).
258. See supra text accompanying notes 244-47. For a post-Jean Country Board analysis of
facts which meet the burden of proof of lack of reasonable alternative means of communication in
the context of a free-standing retail facility, see Butterfield Theaters, 292 N.L.R.B. No. 8, 130
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quently, employers with the financial ability to invest in free-standing
facilities surrounded by land barriers may effectively insulate themselves
from many of the effects of handbilling and picketing brought on by em-
ployer unfair labor practices, economic strikes, or union organizing
drives.
4. Area Standards Activity
In the 1987 Fairmont cases, the Board consistently refused to use
section 8(a)(1) to protect the rights of employees or union representatives
engaged in area standards picketing or handbilling on private property.
The Board adopted this view even where the property right was weak,
such as in the shopping centers "generally open to the public" which
selectively permit access to nonunion groups for charitable and commer-
cial purposes. Indeed, six out of the fifteen 1987 post-Fairmont access
disputes involved area standards or informational activity, and access
was denied in all six of these cases.2 59
In the area standards cases involving free-standing single facilities,
the property right easily outweighed the section 7 right. 2 1 In the shop-
ping center cases, however, there was more disagreement about the initial
valuation of the property right, and the existence of alternative means of
communication often determined rights of access. In light of the contra-
dictory analysis in these cases, it is difficult to predict when the Board
will require a property owner to permit trespassory picketing or handbil-
ling for purely informational or area standards purposes. This conclu-
sion has significant consequences for the future of unions.
Although the Supreme Court in Sears hypothesized that area stan-
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1113 (1988). But see also the Second Circuit's imposition of an exceptionally
difficult burden of proof in its enforcement of one of the post-Fairmont cases dealing with access of
union organizers to river barges in National Maritime Union v. NLRB, 867 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1989).
259. Area standards picketing was at issue in the following six cases: Homart Dev., 286
N.L.R.B. No. 72, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1244; L & L Shop Rite, 285 N.L.R.B. No. 122, 126
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1151; Sisters Chicken & Biscuits, 285 N.L.R.B. No. 105, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
1148; Skaggs Co., 285 N.L.R.B. No. 62, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1149; Smitty's Super Mkts., 284
N.L.R.B. No. 128, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1268; Browning's Foodland, 284 N.L.R.B. No. 104, 125
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1264.
One of these cases, L & L, arguably involved mixed motives of informational and recogni-
tional/organizational purposes. The Board majority accepted the union's announced disclaimer of
interest in organizing the employer, and identified the § 7, activity as an "informational campaign to
protest alleged antiunion activities and to promote a consumer boycott." See L & L, 285 N.L.R.B.
No. 122, slip op. at 12, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1155 (Babson, concurring). Member Babson, how-
ever, disagreed with the Board majority's use of "descriptive rather than analytical terminology" to
evaluate the § 7 rights. Id. at 15, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1156. In Babson's view, "it is apparent
that the Union's picketing and handbilling constitute a form of recognitional or organizational activ-
ity." Id. The effect, of course, of the Board majority's refusal to acknowledge the alternative motive
of the picketing was to assure that the § 7 right asserted was placed at the lowest position in the
"hierarchy" of § 7 rights.
260. See, e.g., Sisters, 285 N.L.R.B. No. 105, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1148, discussed supra text
accompanying notes 163-72.
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dards picketing is low on the hierarchy of section 7 rights,26 ' this may
not correspond to the way unions view area standards and informational
picketing and handbilling. Currently area standards picketing may be
more important to unions than organizational and economic picket-
ing.26 2 Union organizing drives are extremely difficult, expensive, and
often unsuccessful due, among other reasons, to well financed and sophis-
ticated employer use of consultants in anti-union campaigns. 263 Primary
economic strike activity is now much less frequent than in the past, espe-
cially in industries such as textiles which are threatened by competition
with nonunion and foreign producers. 2' Area standards picketing may
now be one of the most valuable, and least costly, methods that unions
have to protect their bargaining gains and to build public awareness of
the benefits of unionism. Such policy considerations have not played a
role in the Board analysis of this section 7 right.265 Consequently, due to
the ability of increasing numbers of employers to insulate their facilities
with property barriers and property rules, the Board has assured that this
"recent" section 7 right has only a small role to play in modem labor
relations.266
261. 436 U.S. at 206 n.42.
262. For example, the United Food and Commercial Workers Local 880 are "regularly picket-
ing" 19 retail food establishments in northeast Ohio as part of "a comprehensive million-dollar cam-
paign aimed at non-union stores, an effort that also includes prime time television and radio spots,
newspaper ads, and union-sponsored billboards." See UFCW Picketing at Non-Union Stores, LAB.
REL. REP. (BNA) No. 129, at 112 (Sept. 26, 1988).
263. See, e.g., Joyce, Union Busters and Front-Line Supervisors: Restricting and Regulating the
Use of Supervisory Employees by Management Consultants During Union Representation Election
Campaigns, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 453, 454-60 (1987). For discussion of economic, structural, and
demographic barriers to union organizing see R. FREEMAN & J. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do?
(1984).
264. On February 24, 1988, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that "[a]ll measures of
major work stoppages were at record low levels during 1987 ... . Only 46 major work stoppages-
strikes and lockouts involving 1,000 or more workers and lasting at least one full day or shift-were
recorded for 1987, the lowest number since BLS began the data series in 1947." Measures of Strikes
and Lockouts, LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 127, at 313 (Mar. 7, 1988). In 1987, there were no work
stoppages in "textiles and textile mill products industries," and the largest work stoppage involved
public school teachers in Chicago. Id.
265. In Montgomery Ward & Co., the AU found that "consumer-directed product boycott
picketing and area standards picketing are Section 7 rights of equal nature and strength" and that
"consumer-directed product boycott picketing, organizational activity, and primary economic activ-
ity are also Section 7 rights of equal nature and strength." 265 N.L.R.B. 60, Decision of AL, at 66
(1982). The Board, however, found it "unnecessary to consider," and did "not adopt" the* AL's
"extensive analysis and his resultant findings" that these § 7 rights are "of equal nature and
strength." Id. at 60.
266. But see Target Stores, 292 N.L.R.B. No. 93, 130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1331 (1989). For dis-
cussion of prior Board and court treatment of trespassory area standards picketing, see Rigler, The
Status of Area Standards Picketing as Protected Conduct Under Section 7, 32 LAB. L.J. 770 (1981).
LABOR ACCESS TO PRIVATE PROPERTY
E. "Reasonable Alternative Means of Communication":
The Jean Country Postscript to Fairmont
In September of 1988, in Jean Country,26 7 the Board "overruled"
Fairmont to the extent that it had expressed "the plurality view that con-
sideration of the alternative means factor must sometimes be excluded
from [its] determination of whether and to what extent property rights
should yield to the exercise of Sec. 7 rights." '268 The Board acknowl-
edged that in the post-Fairmont cases, "individual Board members dif-
fered over interpretation and application of the Fairmont test."
26 9
Therefore, the Board decided to "re-evaluate" the factor of alternative
means of communication in light of its "experience in applying the Fair-
mont test."' 270 The Board concluded that "the availability of reasonable
alternative means is a factor that must be considered in every access
case."
271
In Jean Country, nonemployee union organizers picketed a nonun-
ion clothing store in a large shopping mall. The union's purpose was to
inform store patrons that the store's clerks were not represented by the
union. Within an hour after the picketing commenced, the mall operator
and the store manager called the police who threatened the pickets with
arrest for criminal trespass if they did not move to the public roads sur-
rounding the mall property. The pickets departed and filed section
8(a)(1) charges. The Board found an 8(a)(1) violation and ordered
access.
On its face, the Jean Country decision suggests that the Board has
undertaken a substantial revision of the Fairmont test. The Fair-
mont/Jean Country hybrid, however, does not change the Board's funda-
mental analytical framework for deciding access cases-the weighing and
balancing of property rights and section 7 rights. Jean Country merely
restores the factor of reasonable alternative means of communication as a
potentially significant element of the analysis in all access cases. The
267. 291 N.L.R.B. No. 4, 129 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1201.
268. Id., slip op. at 3 n.2, 129 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1203 n.2. By the time Jean Country was
decided, the only remaining members of the Fairmont "plurality" were Stephens (now Chairman of
the Board) and Johansen. After nearly two years of footnotes, concurrences, and dissents, Stephens
and Johansen "won," in part, by default. Their views about alternative means of communication
were, at last, accepted by the two new Board members-Mary Miller Cracraft and John Higgins-
who joined in the unanimous Jean Country decision.
269. Id. at 2, 129 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1202.
270. Id. at 2-3, 129 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1202.
271. Id. at 3, 129 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1203. The Sixth Circuit has approved the Board's Jean
Country clarification of Fairmont, holding that "the Fairmont Hotel standard erroneously subordi-
nates the issue of reasonable alternative means of access to other factors." Emery Realty v. NLRB,
130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2154, 2158 (1988). Contra, NLRB v. Schwab Foods, 129 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2601 (7th Cir. 1988) (a pre-Jean Country decision approving the Fairmont Board's consideration of
reasonable alternative means of communication only when property rights and § 7 rights are rela-
tively equal).
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presence or absence of a union's reasonable alternative means of commu-
nication will no longer be just a tie-breaker when property rights and
section 7 rights are relatively equal. In this respect, the Board returns
the Fairmont test to its analytical roots in Babcock and Hudgens.
2 72
For the moment, Jean Country appears to be a change without a
difference. In most of the 1987 Fairmont cases, a majority of the Board
members on each panel considered the factor of reasonable alternative
means of communication in their analysis of the access dispute.2 73 Thus,
if we were to apply Jean Country retroactively to most of the 1987 post-
Fairmont cases, it is unlikely that the outcomes would change.
Jean Country retains the heart of Fairmont's approach to valuing
property and section 7 rights. In effect, the Board in Jean Country uses
the "large shopping mall" rule and a class-based analysis of the em-
ployer's property interests to find that the property right is "quite
weak.",174 Jean Country was one of 106 stores in the Cross Country
Shopping Center in Yonkers, New York. Unlike the enclosed and very
exclusive Fiesta Mall in Homart, the Yonkers mall was "open-air" and
its invitation to the public was "broad. '2 75 The mall's smaller stores,
including the Jean Country store, were arranged in aisles separated by
sidewalks and central areas of "grass, shrubbery, and trees" which cre-
ated "the appearance of a public street but without the problems of park-
ing and traffic."21 7 6 Large parking areas surrounded the mall, and it was
accessible to public transportation. In addition, the mall permitted its
parking lots to be used for annual charity and arts and crafts fairs. Fur-
thermore, despite the mall manager's asserted reliance on no-solicitation
and no-picketing rules to deny the union access, no such rules or regula-
tions were submitted into evidence. In sum, the Board characterized the
mall's size and physical appearance, its openness and accessibility to. the
public, as "quasi-public traits" which tended to "lessen the private na-
ture of the property.
277
The Board in Jean Country also affirmed the concept of a hierarchy
of section 7 rights. Although the picketing had organizational and recog-
nitional objectives, the Board found that it fell within the protection of
the publicity proviso of section 8(b)(7). 278 The union's picketing had
272. See 291 N.L.R.B. No. 4, slip op. at 7-8, 129 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1203-04.
273. In Jean Country, the Board notes that "the great number of cases decided under Fairmont
involved a finding by at least a majority of the Board panel that one right asserted did not clearly
outweigh the other. It was therefore necessary to examine the availability of reasonable alternative
means in those cases." Id. at 3 n.2, 129 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1203 n.2.
274. Id. at 19, 129 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1208.
275. Id. at 17, 129 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1207.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. The union was attempting to organize the Jean Country store clerks and had demanded
that the employer recognize the union. The Board found that the union's picket signs "truthfully
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multiple objectives-obtaining recognition of the union, organizing the
employees, informing the store patrons and the general public of the
store's nonunion status, and protecting the union's area wage stan-
dards.27 9 The Board, though, found that the "immediate goal" of the
picketing was "to persuade potential customers not to patronize the Jean
Country store."'2 8° The fact that the picketing occurred at the situs of the
primary dispute-the store the union hoped to organize-and was "lim-
ited in manner, peaceful, and unobstructive" neither "diminish[ed]" nor
"substantially enhance[d]" the strength of the section 7 right.2" 1 The
Board concluded that the union's asserted section 7 right was "not on the
stronger end of the 'spectrum' of section 7 rights," but it was "a right
that is certainly worthy of protection against substantial impairment." '282
Under the Fairmont test, the Board could have concluded that the
section 7 right was slightly stronger than the property right and required
the employer to permit the union access to its property. Or the Board
could have found the two rights "relatively equal" and turned to an ex-
amination of the union's reasonable alternative means of communication
to resolve the dispute. Either way, the outcome under the old Fairmont
test would have been the same as the outcome in Jean Country. The
Board's consideration of alternative means of communication in Jean
Country echoes the evaluation of the "quasi-public" character of the as-
serted property right. The Board found that requiring the union to use
the public property at the mall's periphery-one-quarter mile from the
store-would be unreasonable. The Board stressed the "substantial dilu-
tion of the effectiveness of the union's message" in light of the "sheer
physical distance" between the mall entrance and the target store, the
"large number of other stores," and the "great number of people, coming
advised the public that... Jean Country was a nonunion employer, and there [was] no evidence that
it had an effect of inducing a cessation of deliveries or other services." Id. at 19, 129 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) at 1208.
Regardless of whether employees or nonemployees are involved, when the object of the union
activity is organizational or recognitional, the distinction between handbilling and picketing becomes
critical. See NLRA § 8(b)(7), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (1982). Organizational or recognitional picket-
ing is protected activity as long as it does not violate the prohibitions of section 8(b)(7), whereas
there is no statutory bar to organizational/recognitional handbilling (unless, it has a "signal" effect
like picketing). See Sears, 436 U.S. at 225 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting); L & L Shop Rite, 285
N.L.R.B. No. 122, slip op. at 16 n.6, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1151, 1156 n.6 (1987) (Babson, concur-
ring) (arguing that "recognitional picketing and handbilling [does] not violate Section 8 of the Act,"
and that it "is protected under Sections 7 and 13 of the Act"). Nonetheless, regardless of its loca-
tion-whether it is trespassory or not-picketing that violates § 8(b)(7) can be enjoined by a federal
district court upon application of the Board. See NLRA § 10(1), 29 U.S.C. § 160(l) (1982); see also
Modjeska, Recognition Picketing Under the NLRA, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 633 (1983).
279. The union represented retail clerk employees in other stores in the mall, including clothing
stores in direct competition with Jean Country.
280. 291 N.L.R.B. No. 4, slip op. at 29, 129 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1208.
281. Id. at 20, 129 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1208.
282. Id.
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on the property at eight different entrances. '2 83 These factors made it
almost impossible for the union to identify its audience-the Jean Coun-
try patrons-but also risked enmeshing neutrals in the union's dispute
with the store. The Board noted, furthermore, that in analyzing alterna-
tive means of communication, "it will be the exceptional case where the
use of newspapers, radio, and television will be feasible alternatives to
direct contact. ' 28 4 In conclusion, the Board found that "there was in
fact no method of communicating the Union's message effectively other
than entry onto the [mall's] property."2 5 Thus the argument for grant-
ing access became compelling.
It is, perhaps, too early to tell where the Jean Country gloss on the
Fairmont test may lead. While consideration of a union's reasonable al-
ternative means of communication promises to be more sensitive to a
union's needs to reach its audience of consumers or employees, this may
not always prove to be the case. The Board made it "clear" that "a
union's own definition of the audience it seeks to reach through the activ-
ity in question will not necessarily control the analysis of what other
means of communication constitute reasonable alternatives., 286  The
Board also seems determined to continue relegating area standards activ-
ity to a low status in the hierarchy of section 7 rights.28 7 Jean Country
may thus be only a postscript to the Fairmont case which confirms Fair-
mont's balancing approach to labor and property rights.
III
FEDERAL LABOR POLICY AND ACCESS TO PRIVATE
PROPERTY UNDER STATE LAW:
THE CONTESTED TERRAIN
A. Sears and Federal Preemption
Fairmont and its progeny will have far-reaching implications for
federal labor policy. When labor trespass cases come before state courts,
the union or employee defendants may assert the affirmative defense of
federal preemption of state court jurisdiction. At that time, state courts
must rely on the Board's Fairmont/Jean Country cases as a critical ele-
283. Id. at 21, 129 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1208.
284. Id. at 22, 129 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1208.
285. Id. at 21, 129 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1209.
286. Id. at 6, 129 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1204.
287. For example, the Board notes that, when a union is engaged in an area standards protest,
a claim that the union's intended audience consists of the customers of every establishment
that has even a remote connection to that target employer will not necessarily warrant
access to any and all sites at which such customers may be found, even if access to private
property might be necessary to reach the customers at one such site.
Id. (emphasis in original). Cf Target Stores, 292 N.L.R.B. No. 93, 130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1331
(1989) (a post-Jean Country decision permitting nonemployees access to the private sidewalk of an
employer in a three-store center for purpose of area standards handbilling).
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ment in the analysis of the defense of federal preemption-an analysis
which will involve complex doctrinal and policy issues of federal labor
law.
The supremacy clause requires that state property rights yield to
federal rights under the Act when the two conflict. Congress failed to
provide any statutory guidelines in the Act to aid courts in deciding fed-
eral labor preemption cases; nor did Congress explicitly discuss preemp-
tion in legislative debates. Thus, in the resolution of conflicts between
state and federal jurisdiction, procedures, and substantive laws, the
Supreme Court has been called upon to render this "penumbral area...
progressively clear only by the course of litigation.
2 8
In the 1978 preemption case of Sears, the Supreme Court held that,
under certain circumstances, state courts could assert jurisdiction over
peaceful trespassory labor activity that was arguably subject to the juris-
diction of the Board.2 9 In doctrinal terms, the Sears decision was a sig-
nificant erosion of the Garmon doctrine that had, for almost twenty
years, determined the preemption analysis of cases involving potential
288. Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 480-81 (1955). The course of federal labor
law preemption litigation under the aegis of the Supreme Court, while not always "progressively
clear," has produced three distinct lines of analysis depending on the type of case. Until recently,
there were two "categories" of preemption cases. First, "Garmon doctrine preemption": preemp-
tion that is "based predominantly" on the primary subject matter jurisdiction of the National Labor
Relations Board. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). Second,
"Machinists preemption": preemption of state regulation that "focus[es] on the crucial inquiry
whether Congress intended that the conduct involved be unregulated because left 'to be controlled
by the free play of economic forces.'" Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 138, 140 (1975) (citations omitted). The
Supreme Court has retreated somewhat from the Machinists "free play" branch of preemption analy-
sis in some recent cases. See, e.g., Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491 (1983); New York Tel. v. New
York State Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519 (1979).
The attractiveness of individual employee lawsuits to recover damages for work-related eco-
nomic injuries has given rise to a third category of preemption cases: "301 preemption": preemp-
tion of state law claims which are "substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an
agreement made between the parties in a labor contract," and which are thus exclusively subject to
federal contractual law arising under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. Allis-Chalmers
Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985); see also Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 108 S.
Ct. 1877 (1988); IBEW v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851 (1987).
289. The Sears case has been the subject of extensive scholarly analysis and commentary. See,
e.g. Brody, Labor Preemption Again-After the Searing of Garmon, 13 Sw. U.L.J. 201 (1982); Cox,
Recent Developments in Federal Labor Law Preemption, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 277 (1980); Gregory, The
Labor Preemption Doctrine: Hamiltonian Renaissance or Last Hurrah?, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV.
507, 538-45 (1986); O'Connor, Accommodating Labor's Section 7 Rights to Picket. Solicit, and Dis-
tribute Literature on Quasi-Public Property with the Owner's Property Rights, 32 MERCER L. REV.
769 (1981); Willis, A Survey of Recent Retail Facilities Nonemployee Access Decisions, 32 MERCER L.
REV. 797 (1981).
Only the Garmon doctrine preemption analysis was relevant to the competing state law and
federal statutory claims discussed in Sears. Sears, 436 U.S. at 199-200, n.30. It has been argued that
the Court might have reached a different result if the policy implications of Machinists preemption
had been considered. See, e.g., Comment, Picketing and the Expanding Role of the State Labor
Injunction, 11 TEX. TECH L. REV. 779, 810-11 (1980).
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conflicts between the NLRB and state tribunals.29' Garmon established
two principles for accommodating state law to the federal labor law.
First, Garmon stated that states must forego jurisdiction over activity
that is clearly protected by section 7 of the NLRA or clearly prohibited as
an unfair labor practice by section 8 of the NLRA.29 '
The second Garmon preemption principle set forth a "sweeping pro-
phylactic rule":2 9 2 "When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of
the Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclu-
sive competence of the Board if the danger of state interference with na-
tional policy is to be averted."'2 93 But Garmon also recognized two
"exceptions" to this broad principle of preemption where (1) "the activ-
ity regulated was a merely peripheral concern" of the Act, or (2) "where
the regulated conduct touched interests so deeply rooted in local feeling
and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direc-
tion, [the Court] could not infer that Congress had deprived the States of
the power to act."
29 4
The Garmon principles did not easily resolve all of the preemption
disputes that came before the Court.2 95 Over the years, new exceptions
were carved out of the Garmon doctrine.29 6 Nevertheless, until the Sears
290. For discussion of the erosion of the Garmon doctrine prior to Sears, see generally Broom-
field, Preemptive Federal Jurisdiction over Concerted Trespassory Union Activity, 83 HARV. L. REV.
552 (1970); Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1337 (1972); Gould, Union
Organizational Rights and the Concept of "Quasi-Public" Property, 49 MINN. L. REV. 505 (1965);
Lesnik, Preemption Reconsidered: The Apparent Reaffirmation of Garmon, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 469
(1972).
291. This "first" principle of the Garmon doctrine was stated:
When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities which a State purports to
regulate are protected by § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, or constitute an unfair
labor practice under § 8, due regard for the federal enactment requires that state jurisdic-
tion must yield. To leave the States free to regulate conduct so plainly within the central
aim of federal regulation involves too great a danger of conflict between power asserted by
Congress and requirements imposed by state law.
359 U.S. at 244.
292. Sears, 436 U.S. at 187.
293. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 245 (emphasis added).
294. Id. at 243-44.
295. Justice Frankfurter's observation, made a year before he formulated the "Garmon doc-
trine," accurately described much of the post-Garmon litigation as well: "The statutory implications
concerning what has been taken from the States and what has been left to them are of a Delphic
nature, to be translated into concreteness by the process of litigating elucidation." International
Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 619 (1958), quoted in Sears, 436 U.S. at 188 n.12
("aptly" describing the Court's "never-completed task").
296. For example, the Court does not apply preemption "where the particular rule of law
sought to be invoked before another tribunal is so structured and administered that, in virtually all
instances, it is safe to presume that judicial supervision will not disserve the interests promoted by
the federal labor statutes." Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 297-98 (1971)
(citations omitted). Nor is preemption applied in cases where the state is asserting a "substantial
interest in protecting . . . the health and well-being of its citizens" and "the tort action can be
resolved without reference to any accommodation of the special interests" of the Act. Farmer v.
United Bhd. of Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290, 302-03, 305 (1977).
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decision, the Supreme Court, in its analysis of labor preemption, showed
particular concern that states not regulate federally protected conduct.297
Sears, however, abandoned overprotection of employees' federal statu-
tory rights in favor of overprotection of property owners' rights. In the
process, as Justice Brennan argued, the Court created the "certain pros-
pect of state-court interference that may seriously erode § 7's protections
of labor activities.
298
The dispute in Sears arose when a union learned that remodeling
work at a Sears store was being done by carpenters who had not been
dispatched from the district hiring hall. Union representatives subse-
quently began to picket the Sears store. The pickets, who were "peaceful
and orderly," initially walked on the sidewalks next to the store and a
short distance into the large rectangular parking lot that surrounded the
store.299 The store security manager demanded that the pickets leave
Sears property. When the pickets refused to move, Sears obtained a tem-
porary restraining order, ex parte, from the superior court of California.
The order enjoined the pickets from continuing their activity on Sears
private property.
In response to the court order, the union "promptly removed the
pickets to the public sidewalks" which were at the periphery of the Sears
parking area.3"' Within two weeks, the union abandoned this location
because they concluded that the picketing was "too far removed from the
store to be effective."" '' After a hearing on the merits of the trespass
dispute, the court entered a preliminary injunction, which was affirmed
by a California court of appeal, despite the union's preemption argu-
ments.3 °2 The California Supreme Court, however, applied the Garmon
guidelines and reversed the court of appeal on preemption grounds.30 3
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to decide, for the first
time "[s]ince the Wagner Act was passed in 1935 .... whether, or under
what circumstances, a state court has power to enforce local trespass
laws against a union's peaceful picketing." 3"
Because the picketing in Sears was both arguably protected and ar-
297. See, e.g., Farmer, 430 U.S. at 302.
298. Sears, 436 U.S. at 217 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
299. Id. at 182.
300. Id. at 183.
301. Id. at 183 n.2.
302. The court of appeal held that the union's continuing trespass was within the exception to
the Garmon doctrine for conduct which "touched" interests "deeply rooted in local feeling and
responsibility." Id. at 183.
303. 17 Cal. 3d 893, 901-02, 553 P.2d 603, 610, 132 Cal. Rptr. 443, 450 (1976). The California
Supreme Court concluded that the picketing was both arguably protected and arguably prohibited
under the Act, and that its "trespassory character" was "merely a factor which the National Labor
Relations Board would consider in determining whether or not it was in fact protected." Id.
304. Sears, 436 U.S. at 184.
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guably prohibited under the Act,3 °5 the Sears Court declared that their
analysis concerned only the second analytical principle of Garmon.a°6
The Court plurality30 7 seemed confident that the Sears holding did not
alter the first Garmon principle that state courts are preempted from ju-
risdiction over conduct that is clearly protected or prohibited under the
Act. The Court acknowledged that "[c]onsiderations of federal
supremacy ... are implicated to a greater extent when labor-related ac-
tivity is protected than when it is prohibited. 308 Nevertheless, one of
the consequences of the analysis in Sears and the Fairmont cases is that it
will rarely be "clear" that trespassory picketing oi handbilling is pro-
tected under the Act.
305. The union could have brought charges under § 8(a)(l) that the company's demand that the
pickets leave the property interfered with their § 7 rights to engage in area standards or recognitional
picketing. Sears, on the other hand, could have brought charges under § 8(b)(4)(D) that the picket-
ing was either an unlawful work-assignment dispute or for recognitional purposes in violation of
§ 8(b)(7)(C). Yet neither Sears nor the union brought unfair labor practice charges before the
Board. Justice Stevens described the union's failure to bring an 8(a)(1) charge as "intransigence"
which, in effect, left Sears with "only three options: permit the pickets to remain on its property;
forcefully evict the pickets; or seek the protection of the State's trespass laws." Id. at 202.
306. Id. at 203.
307. Justice Stevens wrote the opinion of the Court. Justices Blackmun and Powell wrote sepa-
rate concurring opinions, and Justice Brennan wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Stewart
and Marshall.
308. 436 U.S. at 200. The Court noted that concurrent state and NLRB jurisdiction over con-
duct prohibited by federal law would not be objectionable "[a]part from notions of 'primary jurisdic-
tion,'" but "state-court interference with conduct actually protected by the Act" would raise a
"constitutional objection." Id. at 199. Partly because of the different constitutional and statutory
considerations involved in determining whether "arguably" protected or "arguably" prohibited con-
duct is preempted, the Court reviewed the two "branches" separately. Under the prohibited branch
of analysis, the Court applied the Farmer exception to the Garmon doctrine to reach its result in
Sears.
This Article is primarily concerned with the problem of state regulation of activity protected
under § 7 of the NLRA. Thus, the prohibited branch of Sears will be summarized here, but will not
be analyzed further.
Arcording to the Sears articulation of Farmer, in cases dealing with "local interests" two fac-
tors "warrant a departure" from the general rule of preemption of state jurisdiction over arguably
prohibited activity: first, when there is "a significant state interest in protecting the citizen from the
challenged conduct," and, second, when, despite the fact that the tort occurred during a labor dis-
pute, state jurisdiction over the tort action entails "little risk of interference with the regulatory
jurisdiction of the Labor Board." Id. at 196. To determine this second factor, the state court must
inquire whether "the controversy presented to the state court is identical to ... or different from...
that which could have been, but was not presented to the Board." Id. at 197. The Supreme Court
concluded that the Sears dispute involved a significant state interest-protection of property rights-
and that adjudication of the trespass action would pose little risk of interference with Board regula-
tion of prohibited conduct. The question in state court would focus solely on the location of the
conduct, and the question before the Board would focus solely on whether the conduct had a prohib-
ited objective under the Act. Id. at 198.
But under the protected branch of analysis, the Court adopted an approach that was a complete
break with the Garmon doctrine. Although the Court attempted to minimize the significance of its
new preemption analysis of arguably protected trespassory picketing, Justice Brennan asserted the
"this Court's departure from Garmon creates a great risk that protected picketing will be enjoined."
Id. at 228 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Under Sears, the state court must first determine whether or not the
trespassory conduct is actually protected under the Act. If the conduct
is clearly protected, state jurisdiction is preempted, and if it is clearly
unprotected, the state court may proceed. If the trespassory conduct is
only arguably protected, however, the state court must apply the appro-
priate Sears preemption analysis for arguably protected trespassory con-
duct.3 °9 This analysis involves a "three-step process." The court must
inquire: (1) "whether the employer had a 'reasonable opportunity' to
force a Board determination" of the protected status of the conduct;
310
(2) if the employer had no such acceptable means, whether, in light of the
court's assessment of the likelihood that the trespassory conduct might
be protected by section 7, "there is a substantial likelihood that [the
court's] adjudication will be incompatible with national labor policy";
and (3) whether "the anomaly of denying an employer a remedy out-
weighs the risk of erroneous determinations by the state courts. ' 31 1  In
effect, the second "step" of the Sears preemption analysis will require the
state court to review recent Board decisions to speculate about how the
Board would be likely to resolve the property/section 7 dispute.
Sears has significantly expanded the scope of state court jurisdiction
over peaceful labor activity that occurs on private property.312 Ironi-
cally, although the dissenters in Sears were concerned with property
owners' use of equitable remedies to defeat federal statutory rights,313 the
Fairmont cases suggest that the use of criminal trespass laws may be as
309. Id. at 199-208.
310. Id. at 235 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In the aftermath of Sears, when a union or employees
engage in trespassory picketing or handbilling that is clearly or arguably protected under § 7 of the
Act, they may not necessarily have an opportunity to file an 8(a)(1) charge and bring the issue before
the Board. In dictum in two footnotes in Sears, the Court asserted that a property owner's demand
that union trespassers leaVe is a sufficient basis for the filing of an 8(a)(l) charge of interference with
§ 7 rights, and that such a demand "would have been required as a matter of federal law" for the
property owner to "avoid a valid claim of pre-emption." See id. at 207 nn.43-44. This issue-
whether a property owner's demand to leave private property constituted "interference" with § 7
rights-had not been resolved at the time of the dispute in Sears.
Presumably, as a matter of federal preemption law, such a demand would be required as a
condition precedent to the invocation of criminal trespass laws as well. However, the property
owner's act of filing for injunctive relief alone does not violate § 8(a)(l). Clyde Taylor Co. 127
N.L.R.B. 103 (1960). After Sears, the property owner who wants to preserve the potential benefits
of state jurisdiction in the face of a preemption challenge will always demand that trespassers leave
the property before taking any other action, such as obtaining a temporary restraining order or
having the trespassers arrested.
311. 436 U.S. at 235, 236 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
312. For the three dissenting Justices in Sears, this possibility brought to mind the "historic
abuses of the labor injunction" that convinced Congress to create a "centralized expert agency to
administer the Act." Id. at 218 (Brennan, J., dissenting). State courts have expressed the view that
the effect of Sears was to expand the scope of state court jurisdiction in labor disputes. See, e.g.,
Brown Jug, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 959, 688 P.2d 932, 935 (Alaska 1984);
Shirley v. Retail Store Employees, Local 782, 225 Kan. 470, 474, 592 P.2d 433, 436 (1979).
313. To the dissenters, Sears illustrated the folly of ignoring the "lessons of history" which
showed that the Supreme Court's "efforts in the area of labor law pre-emption have been largely
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effective as injunctive relief in barring union activity on private property.
With a cooperative police force and district attorney, criminal processes
are certainly less costly to the property owner. The criminalization of
conduct that is either clearly or arguably protected by federal statutory
law obviously raises constitutional concerns that were not fully appreci-
ated by the Supreme Court in Sears. Even the threat of arrest on crimi-
nal trespass charges may inhibit the exercise of federally protected rights
of workers and union representatives.3 14
In his concurrence in Sears, Justice Powell was concerned about the
"danger of violence" in trespassory picketing if state court remedies were
preempted until the General Counsel determined whether the facts war-
ranted a complaint on the unfair labor practice charges.3 t5 Under the
Act, the General Counsel cannot obtain injunctive relief from the federal
courts until a Board complaint is issued. 3t6  After an 8(a)(1) charge is
filed, Powell observed, "nothing is likely to happen 'in a timely fashion,'
directed to developing durable principles to ensure that local tribunals not be in a position to restrain
protected conduct." 436 U.S. at 222.
314. The use of criminal laws and procedures to stop union collective action has an even more
ancient history than the labor injunction. See generally M. TURNER, THE EARLY AMERICAN LA-
BOR CONSPIRACY CASES, THEIR PLACE IN LABOR LAW: A REINTERPRETATION (1967). Indeed, if
Justice Brennan were to write his Sears dissent today, he could add a reference to the early use of the
criminal conspiracy doctrine to his recitation of the historical abuses of the labor injunction.
315. The well-advised union engaging in collective activity on private property will file a
§ 8(a)(1) charge with the Board as soon as the property owner makes a demand that they leave. But
the preemptive effect of the filing of an unfair labor practice charge on the jurisdiction of a state
court was not determined in Sears. Justice Brennan noted in his dissent that "[t]he Court assiduously
avoids holding that resort to the Board will oust a state court's jurisdiction and is divided on this
question." Sears, 436 U.S. at 233; see also id. n.14. In his concurrence in Sears, Justice Blackmun
asserted that "the logical corollary of the Court's reasoning is that if the union does file a charge...
and continues to process the charge expeditiously, state-court jurisdiction is pre-empted until such
time as the General Counsel declines to issue a complaint or the Board ... rules against the union
and holds the picketing to be unprotected." Id. at 209. "Similarly," Blackmun argued, the filing of
an 8(a)(1) charge would stay "any pending injunctive or damages suit brought by the employer"
until it is determined by the General Counsel or the Board "that the picketing is not protected by
§ 7." Id. On the other hand, Justice Powell believed that "the realities of the situation" made it
necessary for states to retain jurisdiction over trespassory picketing at least until the General Coun-
sel decided to issue a complaint. Sears, 436 U.S. at 212-14.
It is not clear from Powell's concurring opinion whether issuance of a complaint would auto-
matically preempt state court jurisdiction. He seemed to suggest that state courts might retain juris-
diction until the Board obtains temporary injunctive relief under section 10(j) of the Act. See Sears,
436 U.S. at 214.
In light of the Board's reluctance to seek 10(j) injunctions in 8(a)(l) cases, access disputes may
fall under concurrent state and Board jurisdiction until the 8(a)(1) case is resolved by the Board or
court of appeals, and the state court finally holds that its jurisdiction has been preempted. The Giant
Food litigation demonstrates the federalism problems created by the concurrent state and Board
jurisdiction that may exist as a consequence of the Sears analysis. See Giant Food Mkts., Inc., 241
N.L.R.B. 727 (1979), enforcement denied, 633 F.2d 18 (6th Cir. 1980); Wiggins & Co. v. Retail
Clerks Union Local 1557, 595 S.W.2d 802 (Tenn. 1980); see also Comment, supra note 21.
316. Section 10(j) of the NLRA reads: "The Board shall have power, upon issuance of a com-
plaint as provided in subsection (b) charging that any person has engaged in or is engaging in an
unfair labor practice, to petition any United States district court within any district wherein the
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.. [a]nd it may take weeks for the General Counsel to decide to issue a
complaint." '317 In the meantime, Powell continued, the" 'no-man's land'
prevents all recourse to the courts, and is an open invitation to self-
help."31 Justice Powell was "unwilling to believe that Congress in-
tended, by its silence in the Act, to create a situation where there is no
forum to which the parties may turn for orderly interim relief in the face
of a potentially explosive situation."
31 9
The experience with the 1987 Fairmont cases indicates that the
length of delay between the filing of an 8(a)(1) charge and the issuance of
a complaint is likely to be measured in months, not weeks as Powell
suggested.32 ° Powell's concern about the length of delay was not mis-
placed; if anything, he greatly underestimated the slowness of Board
processes. But his concern about the likelihood that delay would lead to
violence was questionable, particularly in a case in which, as Blackmun
observed, "[t]here was no hint of such a problem, "321 as well as in a
"generic situation" in which, as Brennan observed, "there is no realistic
possibility of violence. '3 22 Blackmun noted that he could "not see what
'danger of violence' remains in such a situation, any more than for a
business that fronts upon a public sidewalk.,
32 3
The Fairmont cases bear out the views of Brennan and Blackmun,
not the fears of Powell.3 24  The manner in which the picketing and
unfair labor practice in question is alleged to have occurred or wherein such person resides or trans-
acts business, for appropriate temporary relief or restraining order." 29 U.S.C. § 1600) (1982).
Given the continued uncertain status of federal rights of access in labor disputes under the
Fairmont analysis, the federal courts may not be receptive to 10(0) injunction petitions in trespass
cases. See, e.g., Silverman v. 40-41 Realty Assocs. Inc., 668 F.2d 678, 680-81 (2d Cir. 1982) (vacat-
ing temporary injunction in case involving interior picketing in office building corridor). But see
Eisenberg v. Holland Rantos Co., 583 F.2d 100 (3d Cir. 1978) (enforcing temporary injunction and
affirming district court's 90-day limitation on injunctive relief for employer's refusal to allow em-
ployee access to manufacturing facility).
317. Sears, 436 U.S. at 212-13.
318. Id.
319. Id. Powell argued that the state courts "should have the authority to protect the public
and private interests by granting preliminary relief" because
[t]respass upon private property by pickets, to a greater degree than isolated trespass, is
usually organized, sustained, and sometimes obstructive-without initial violence--of the
target business and annoying to members of the public who wish to patronize that business.
The "danger of violence" is inherent in many-though certainly not all-situations of sus-
tained trespassory picketing. One cannot predict whether or when it may occur, or its
degree.
Id. at 212-13.
320. For the 1987 Fairmont cases for which filing and complaint dates are available, the shortest
time between charge and complaint was one month in Browning's Foodland, 284 N.L.R.B. No. 104,
125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1264 (1987). Several cases took three to four months, and one, Providence
Hospital, 285 N.L.R.B. No. 52, 126 L.R.R.M. 1145 (1987), took eight months. Fairmont took
about seven weeks. See supra Table II, p. 166.
321. Sears, 436 U.S. at 210 n.* (Blackmun, J., concurring).
322. Id. at 233 n.14 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
323. Id. at 210 n.* (Blackmun, J., concurring).
324. Justice Stevens wrote for the plurality that failure to allow the option of state court juris-
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handbilling was conducted in Fairmont and the post-Fairmont cases
shared an important characteristic: in virtually every one of these four-
teen cases that involved entry onto private property by employees or
union representatives, the handbilling or picketing was peaceful, orderly,
and nondisruptive.3 25 Litigated Board cases are hardly a fair sampling of
access disputes. Nevertheless, the dire view of the Sears plurality, that
trespassory picketing may lead to violence, has little basis.
There is a good explanation for the overall courteous and mannerly
behavior of the pickets in these labor disputes. In most of the retail
cases, and even in the organizing cases, the goal of the union has been to
persuade its audience to support the union's cause by joining a consumer
boycott, or to consider joining the union. To a great extent, this is a
public relations problem. Particularly in the retail context, the unions
have attempted to understand their market of middle-class consumers
and to design and conduct their informational campaigns to appeal to
that target audience. In some of the Fairmont cases, the pickets and
handbillers were instructed on appropriate clothing to wear, where to
stand, what to say and what not to say to store customers and manag-
ers.3 26 The pickets and handbillers were described as courteous, polite,
deferential, and unobtrusive. When asked to leave the private property,
usually by managers or security guards threatening them with arrest, the
union representatives departed promptly and quietly and moved to areas
at the periphery of the private property or abandoned their activity
entirely.
It is, indeed, because the pickets and handbillers were peaceful and
nonobstructive that the property owners had to turn to trespass laws to
force them to leave. Federal labor preemption does not prevent state
intervention and jurisdiction over mass picketing, violence, threats of vio-
lence, or obstruction of ingress and egress to property.3 27 In addition,
"4violent tortious conduct on a picket line is prohibited by section
diction to determine whether trespassory picketing is protected would involve "a risk of violence"
because one of the property owner's two remaining options would be to "forcefully evict the pick-
ets." Id. at 202. The other option left to the property owner, to "permit the pickets to remain on its
property" was never seriously considered by the Supreme Court to be a "legitimate" option. Id.
325. In the two barge cases, SCNO Barge Lines, 287 N.L.R.B. No. 29, 127 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
1081 (1987), enforced sub nom. National Maritime Union v. NLRB, 867 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1989),
and G.W. Gladders Towing, 287 N.L.R.B. No. 30, 127 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1088 (1987), the union
representatives never had an opportunity to enter onto the private property-the towboats.
326. See, e.g., Homart Dev., 286 N.L.R.B. No. 72, slip op. at 4, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1244,
1245 (1987) (handbillers "were to dress appropriately," and to "station themselves as close as possi-
ble to the outside entrances to the.., stores," and "not interfere with customer ingress or egress").
327. See, e.g., UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958); Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131
(1957); UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266 (1956); United Constr. Work-
ers v. Laburfium Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954); Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111, United Elec.,
Radio & Mach. Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740, 749 (1942).
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8(b)." 3 28 Thus, the Board and states have concurrent jurisdiction over
such tortious or criminal conduct. Furthermore, in cases where the pick-
ets and handbillers are striking employees, the employer has recourse to
discharge or discipline for "acts of trespass or violence against the em-
ployer's property."32 9 But Sears and most of the Fairmont cases involved
nonemployee access to private property, in which event discharge and
discipline was not an option for the property owner/employer.
If the pickets and handbillers were not engaged in recognitional or
secondary picketing in violation of sections 8(b)(4) or 8(b)(7) of the
Act,33° Board jurisdiction was not a possibility. Furthermore, as the
Court in Sears argued, even if these unfair labor practice provisions of
the Act could be invoked by the property owner, the Board would ad-
dress only the issue of whether the picketing was conducted for prohib-
ited purposes, not whether it was protected at that particular location.33'
What the property owners wanted was to have the pickets and handbills
removed as quickly and cheaply as possible. While the injunction served
well as a mechanism to enforce trespass laws in Sears, the criminal tres-
pass laws appear now to be the method of choice for property owners.
In Fairmont and in ten of the 1987 post-Fairmont trespass cases, the
pickets or handbillers were threatened with arrest.332 In several cases
security guards or officers requested the union representatives to leave
328. Sears, 436 U.S. at 220 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
329. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 255 (1939). Fansteel held that em-
ployees who engage in a "sit-down" strike-"who illegally take and hold possession of (their em-
ployer's] property"-are not protected under § 7 of the Act, and their "trespass or violence against
the employer's property," is "cause" for discharge under § 10(c) of the Act. Id. at 252, 255.
330. 29 U.S.C. § 8(b)(4) & (7) (1982); see supra note 38.
331. Sears, 436 U.S. at 198. The only way the Board can determine the issue of the federally
protected status of picketing on private property is for the union to file an 8(a)(l) charge of interfer-
ence with protected concerted activity. After Sears, in the absence of an 8(a)(1) charge, the state
court can proceed to determine, in effect, the accommodation of § 7 rights and property rights in the
process of its preemption analysis. Sears bridged the "no-man's land" of jurisdiction over peaceful
trespassory picketing by permitting state court adjudication, when Board adjudication is not avail-
able, or not swift enough to protect asserted property rights. See id. at 209, 211 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
332. Threats of arrest on criminal trespass charges were made in Fairmont and in the following
1987 post-Fairmont cases: Schwab Foods, Inc., 284 N.L.R.B. No. 120, slip op. at 6-7, 125 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1264, 1227, enforced, 129 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2601 (7th Cir. 1988); Greyhound Lines, 284
N.L.R.B. No. 123, ALJ Decision JD-MI 430-81, slip op. at 5; Smitty's Super Mkts., 284 N.L.R.B.
No. 128, slip op. at 3, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1268, 1269; Skaggs Co., 285 N.L.R.B. No. 62, slip op. at
2-3, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1149, 1150; L & L Shop Rite, 285 N.L.R.B. No. 122, slip op. at 5, 126
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1151, 1153; Emery Realty, 286 N.L.R.B. No. 32, slip op. at 3, 126 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1241, 1242, enforced, 130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2154 (6th Cir. 1988); Pizza Crust Co., 286
N.L.R.B. No. 45, ALJ Decision JD-360-85, slip op. at 27, enforced, 862 F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1988); and
Center Street Mkt., 286 N.L.R.B. No. 73, slip op. at 4, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1212, 1213. See also
Montgomery Ward & Co., 288 N.L.R.B. No. 20 (1988); 40-41 Realty Assocs., 288 N.L.R.B. No. 23,
128 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1001 (1988); Baptist Medical Sys., 288 N.L.R.B. No. 27, 128 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1306 (1988).
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the property.333 In some of the cases involving threats of arrest, the po-
lice actually were called in and the pickets and handbillers were arrested,
charged, and in one case prosecuted to an acquittal.3 34 In only one case
did the property owner obtain a temporary restraining order from a state
court.335
The risk to these property owners from peaceful picketing was, in
fact, nothing other than the risk of economic harm they would suffer if
their store or business entrances were on public sidewalks. But the risks
to employees and union representatives for engaging in arguably pro-
tected activity were the "personal jeopardy or apprehension" of arrest
threats, actual arrests by police officers, and even criminal prosecutions,
including the permanent stigma of arrest or conviction records. 33 6 It is
thus through the employer's "pugnacious tactic" of using the "highly
coercive" criminal trespass laws that the property-based right to exclude
has taken on a new meaning in labor relations.337 Union representatives
and employees are excluded from private property in this manner not
because their behavior is actually "criminal," but because it is economi-
cally harmful. The Board and the courts cannot for long ignore the in-
consistency between the federal policy of protecting peaceful collective
labor activity as a means of imposing economic harm on employers and
the employers' use of state criminal trespass laws or injunctive relief to
prohibit that same activity.
B. Sears II and State Anti-Injunction Laws
In Sears the Supreme Court believed its new preemption rule solved
the problem of the "jurisdictional hiatus" that faced property owners
searching for a legal remedy for trespassory labor picketing.338 When the
Sears case was remanded to the California Supreme Court, however, the
injunction order of the lower court was reversed.339 The Sears corpora-
333. See Providence, 285 N.L.R.B. No. 52, slip op. at 4, 126 L.R.R.M. at 1146 (security director
of hospital); Emery, 286 N.L.R.B. No. 32, slip op. at 3, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1242 (security
guards); Homart, 286 N.L.R.B. No. 72, slip op. at 5, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1246 (security guard).
334. See United Supermarkets, 283 N.L.R.B. No. 130, ALJ Decision JD-(SF)-290-80, slip op. at
3 (prosecution of picketers to acquittal). But see L & L, 285 N.L.R.B. No. 122, ALJ Decision JD-
(MI)-375-81, slip op. at 5 (county prosecutor's office agreed with union not to prosecute picketers for
criminal trespass).
335. See Browning's, 284 N.L.R.B. No. 104, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1264. The Maryland county
court ultimately issued a permanent injunction enjoining picketing "at or in front of" the store's
"place of business" defined in the order as the store, its sidewalks, and its parking lot. Id., slip op. at
3, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1265.
336. United, 283 N.L.R.B. No. 130, ALJ Decision, JD-(SF)-290-80, slip op. at 9.
337. Id.
338. 436 U.S. at 203.
339. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters (Sears 11), 25 Cal.
3d 317, 599 P.2d 676, 158 Cal. Rptr. 370 (1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 935 (1980). See generally
Youngmun, The Sears End Run, 34 LAB. L.J. 618 (1983).
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tion, in the end, was denied an equitable remedy, not because of preemp-
tion, but because of California's Moscone Acta4--an anti-injunction
statute limiting the equity jurisdiction of California courts in labor
disputes.
The court in Sears H noted that earlier California decisions had "es-
tablished the legality of union picketing on private sidewalks outside a
store as a matter of state labor law."34' Since the "interest of the land-
owner was but a 'thin' and 'technical interest,' . . . an injunction against
such picketing could not be deemed essential to prevent a substantial
impairment of property rights." '342 Justice Tobriner summarized the ef-
fect and policy of the Moscone Act as they related to the Sears dispute:
[T]he sidewalk outside a retail store has become the traditional and ac-
cepted place where unions may, by peaceful picketing, present to the pub-
lic their views respecting a labor dispute with that store .... In such
context the location of the store whether it is on the main street of the
downtown section of the metropolitan area, in a suburban shopping
center or in a parking lot, does not make any difference. Peaceful picket-
ing outside the store, involving neither fraud, violence, breach of the
peace, nor interference with access or egress, is not subject to the injunc-
tion jurisdiction of the courts.
343
Thus, after Sears and Sears II, union access to private property for
purposes of peaceful picketing or handbilling will depend, in part, on
whether the state in which the access dispute occurs has an anti-injunc-
tion law designed, like California's Moscone Act, to limit state regulation
of peaceful labor activity. In effect, such statutes create a privilege of
access under state law that may be broader than access privileges avail-
able under the Board's Fairmont/Jean Country test. State labor laws
designed to limit equity jurisdiction of state courts may also be inter-
preted to limit application of state criminal trespass laws to labor
disputes. 34
340. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.3 (Deering Supp. 1988).
341. Sears HI, 25 Cal. 3d at 328, 599 P.2d at 684, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
342. Id. at 329, 599 P.2d at 684, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 378 (citations omitted).
343. Id. at 332-33, 599 P.2d at 687, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 381. In his dissent in Sears II, however,
Justice Richardson described the property owner's rights as far more than "thin" or "technical."
Rather, he wrote, "a private store owner enjoys a federal constitutional right to reasonable protec-
tion from such trespassory invasions." Id. at 336, 599 P.2d at 689, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 383 (emphasis
in original). This federal right had been confirmed in Sears when the Court asserted that trespassory
picketing "would be unprotected in most instances." Id. at 337, 599 P.2d at 689, 158 Cal. Rptr. at
383 (quoting Sears, 436 U.S. at 206) (emphasis by Richardson, J.). Justice Richardson reasoned that
the "federal principle" protecting property from trespass "is solidly founded upon the private prop-
erty rights of the store owner, which rights derive not from any capricious or evanescent state statute
or administrative ruling, but rather upon the rock solid footing of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the United States Constitution." Id. at 337, 599 P.2d at 690, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 383-84. This
substantive due process analysis was later rejected by the Supreme Court in PruneYard Shopping
Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), discussed infra Section III.C, pp. 220-23.
344. In a footnote in Sears II, the California Supreme Court asserted that "union activity which
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The diversity of limitations that state labor laws may impose on
both public and private remedies for peaceful trespassory labor activity
creates a confusing bundle of access privileges that vary from state to
state. Although most states have for many years had anti-injunction
statutes modeled after the federal Norris-LaGuardia Act,34 5 even states
with similar statutes will not necessarily interpret them in the same
way. 34 6 Nor should they be expected to, as the task of framing a uniform
body of federal labor rights and remedies is for Congress, the Board, and
the federal courts, not the states. Adding to the confusion is the possibil-
ity, in several jurisdictions, that rights of free speech arising under state
constitutions may protect union access to private property that is func-
tionally "public," such as shopping malls.
C. PruneYard and State Constitutional Rights
In the same year that the California Supreme Court, in Sears I,
denied property owners the use of state equitable remedies against peace-
ful trespassory picketing, it also decided the case of Robins v. PruneYard
Shopping Center.3 4 7 The court held in PruneYard that the California
constitution protects "speech and petitioning, reasonably exercised, in
shopping centers even when the centers are privately owned." '3 4 8 The
is authorized by state labor law constitutes an exception to the criminal trespass statutes." 25 Cal. 3d
at 330 n.9, 599 P.2d at 685 n.9, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 379 n.9. The Court argued that "[a]s a specific
statute regulating labor disputes, section 527.3 [the Moscone Act] would prevail over the earlier and
more general criminal trespass laws [Cal. Penal Code § 602]." Id. Moreover, the California court
extended this principle to conflicts between federal labor law and state penal law in its broad state-
ment that "indeed union activity protected by state or federal labor law clearly does not violate any
subdivision of Penal Code section 602." Id. The California Supreme Court affirmed this point in a
later case in which union representatives, engaged in safety inspections on a construction site, were
arrested, convicted, and imprisoned for criminal trespass. Justice Tobriner granted the defendants'
petitions for writs of habeas corpus on the grounds that their lawful union activity was not a viola-
tion of § 602 of the California Penal Code. In re Catalano, 29 Cal. 3d 1, 623 P.2d 228, 171 Cal.
Rptr. 667 (1981).
. 345. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1982). The Norris-LaGuardia Act, passed in 1932, limits the eq-
uity jurisdiction of the federal courts in peaceful labor disputes.
346. See, e.g., Recent Cases, The Court Adds Life to the Little Norris-LaGuardia Act, 27 Loy. L.
REV. 1215 (1981) (discussing Baton Rouge Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. General Truck Drivers Local
5, 403 So. 2d 633 (La. 1981), and other state anti-injunction cases and statutes).
347. 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
348. Id. at 910, 592 P.2d at 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 860. See generally Barnett, A Private Mall
Becomes a Public Hall, 26 Loy. L. REV. 739 (1980); Simon, Independent But Inadequate: State
Constitutions and Protection of Freedom of Expression, 33 U. KAN. L. REV. 305 (1985); Utter, The
Right to Speak, Write and Publish Freely: State Constitutional Protection Against Private Abridg-
ment, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 157 (1985); Wachs, Access to Private Fora and State Constitu-
tions: A Proposed Speech and Property Analysis, 46 ALB. L. REV. 1501 (1982); Note, Post-PruneYard
Access to Michigan Shopping Centers: The "Malling" of Constitutional Rights, 30 WAYNE L. REV.
93 (1983); Note, Private Abridgment of Speech and the State Constitutions, 90 YALE L.J. 165 (1980);
Developments in the Law, The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324
(1982); see also Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as
Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535 (1986).
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owner of the PruneYard had denied high school students access to his
twenty-one-acre shopping center for the purpose of soliciting signatures
to a petition opposing a United Nations resolution against "Zionism."
When the California Supreme Court held that the students had a state
constitutional right of access to his "private" shopping center, the owner
of the PruneYard appealed to the United States Supreme Court, chal-
lenging California's interpretation of its constitution on first, fifth, and
fourteenth amendment grounds.
In its argument before the Supreme Court, PruneYard asserted that
"a right to exclude others underlies the Fifth Amendment guarantee
against the taking of property without just compensation and the Four-
teenth Amendment guarantee against the deprivation of property with-
out due process of law." '34 9 Justice Rehnquist agreed that "the right to
exclude others" is "one of the essential sticks in the bundle of property
rights." ' Nevertheless, he continued, "not every destruction or injury
to property by governmental action has been held to be a 'taking' in the
constitutional sense."
35'
The constitutional question was whether California's expansive in-
terpretation of its constitution placed "public burdens" on the mall
owner which "in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as
a whole." '352 To answer this question required analysis of "such factors
as the character of the governmental action, its economic impact, and its
interference with reasonable investment backed expectations."'353 Under
the Prune Yard facts, the Court asserted, California's state constitutional
protection of free-speech rights in the shopping center "clearly does not
amount to an unconstitutional infringement of... property rights under
the Taking Clause."3 4 Justice Rehnquist observed that "[t]here is noth-
ing to suggest that preventing [PruneYard] from prohibiting this sort of
activity will unreasonably impair the value or use of their property as a
shopping center." '355 Noting that " '[neither] property rights nor con-
tract rights are absolute,' " the Court held that there was "little merit to
[PruneYard's] argument that they have been denied their property with-
out due process of law."
356
One commentator has aptly observed that Justice Rehnquist's
"opinion in PruneYard presages a reassertion of state power, with all of
its diversity, in an area [labor relations] previously viewed as exclusively
349. PruneYard v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82 (1980).
350. Id.
351. Id. (citations omitted).




356. Id. at 84 (citations omitted).
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federal." '357 Although it is true that Hudgens, Sears, Sears II, and
Prune Yard together seem to point toward expansion of state's rights "in
this clash between the federal and state governments for hegemony, "358
to conceive of the cases as being about state versus federal rights misses
the point. As another commentator, James Atleson, has noted, there are
"other interests at stake," which go "back to Justice Holmes."'359 Atle-
son was referring to the dissent in Vegelahn v. Guntner, in which Holmes
wrote, "[o]ne of the eternal conflicts out of which life is made up is that
between the effort of every man to get the most he can for his services,
and that of society, disguised under the name of capital, to get his serv-
ices for the least possible return." 3" In effect, it is a "battle" between the
rights of employers, supposedly protected by property rules under state
law, and the rights of employees, supposedly protected by federal law.3 6 '
The problem is that the battle lines have become blurred. The
NLRB-the federal agency created to protect employees' rights-has be-
come instead the protector of private property as an absolute right. And
some states, such as California, have shown a greater willingness to sacri-
fice "thin" and "technical" property rights to protect the substantive em-
ployment rights of its workers and the constitutional rights of its citizens.
But the overall trend seems quite clear. Unions, frustrated with the
Board's access decisions and the delays in Board processes, are unlikely
to turn to the Board for protection of section 7 activity on private prop-
erty. Nor can they expect much help from the states. Outside of Califor-
nia, the highest courts of only a handful of states have created limited
state constitutional rights of access to private shopping malls or univer-
sity campuses for purposes of speech or petitioning.362 Constitutional
rights of access to shopping malls for purposes of speech have been de-
nied by the highest courts of five states.36 3 It is not state's rights, or
357. French, The Views of Justice Rehnquist Concerning the Proper Role of the States in National
Labor Relations Policy, 17 TULSA L.J. 76, 90 (1981).
358. Id.
359. Lecture by Prof. James B. Atleson, Law School, State University of New York at Buffalo
(Apr. 30, 1986) (unpublished transcript on file with author).
360. 167 Mass. 92, 108, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (1896).
361. See Atleson, supra note 359.
362. See, e.g., Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int'l, Inc., 388 Mass. 83, 445 N.E.2d 590 (1983) (per-
mitting soliciting signatures in shopping malls); State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980)
(permitting free speech and assembly on a private university campus), appeal dismissed, 455 U.S. 100
(1982); Commonwealth v. Tate, 495 Pa. 158, 432 A.2d 1382 (1981) (permitting free speech, assem-
bly, and petitioning on a private university campus); Alderwood Assocs. v. Washington Envtl.
Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 635 P.2d 108 (1981) (permitting reasonable speech activities in shopping
centers); see also Lloyd Corp. v. Whiffen, 89 Or. App. 629, 750 P.2d 1157 (limiting injunction re-
garding soliciting of signatures on initiative petitions in a shopping mall to reasonable time, place,
and manner restrictions), review granted, 306 Or. 155, 758 P.2d 346 (1988).
363. Cologne v. Westfarms Assocs., 192 Conn. 48, 469 A.2d 1201 (1984); Woodland v. Michi-
gan Citizens Lobby, 423 Mich. 188, 378 N.W.2d 337 (1985); Shad Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall, 66
N.Y.2d 496, 498 N.Y.S.2d 99, 488 N.E.2d 1211 (1985); State v. Felmet, 302 N.C. 173, 273 S.E.2d
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federal rights, but employers' property rights that, with few exceptions,
have prevailed up to now.
IV
A "RIGHT TO EXCLUDE" VERSUS A "RIGHT OF ACCESS"
Fairmont Hotel and its progeny are important for the role they will
play as access disputes shift from the arena of Board jurisdiction to state
court jurisdiction. In applying the Sears preemption analysis to cases
involving arguably protected trespassory activity, state court judges are
unlikely to appreciate the ambiguities of the Board's Fairmont decisions,
even with the "clarification" provided by Jean Country. State judges
will, however, have a sense that the Board has denied access more often
than not, as the Sears Court predicted. This perception will in turn lead
state judges to the conclusion that there is little risk of conflict with fed-
eral labor law if the state court assumes jurisdiction over the trespassory
labor activity.
Employers will thus have strong legal incentives to use injunctions
or criminal trespass laws to exclude nonemployees engaged in labor pick-
eting and handbilling on their private property. The Sears preemption
analysis encourages state court jurisdiction. And, in the event of Board
jurisdiction, unions face an ambiguous body of Board law and onerous
procedural delays. As a result, the legal framework overwhelmingly fa-
vors the employer's interests in avoiding economic harm. It is foresee-
able that there will be hundreds of access disputes in the future unless
unions abandon attempts at face-to-face communication with employees
and consumers on private property, an unlikely scenario. Because long
Board delays and unfavorable substantive labor law make recourse to the
federal agency futile, unions may forego filing section 8(a)(1) charges,
even for interference with "clearly" protected section 7 activity. Regard-
less of whether 8(a)(1) charges are filed in the gray area of "arguably"
protected section 7 activity, unions may find that in a few jurisdictions,
such as California, they may have greater access rights under state law
than under federal law. Unions can certainly do no worse in the state
forum given the present framework of contradictory Board decisions and
lengthy decisionmaking processes.
Of course, access in any particular case may ultimately depend on
whether the Board or a state court resolves the dispute. If the state court
initially assumes jurisdiction, rights of access will depend on court treat-
708 (1981); Jacobs v. Major, 139 Wis. 2d 492, 407 N.W.2d 832 (1987); see also Western Pa. Socialist
Workers 1982 Campaign v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 485 A.2d 1 (Pa. Super. 1984) (denying
access to a shopping mall to disseminate campaign information and collect signatures, and distin-
guishing the shopping mall from the private university in Commonwealth v. Tate, 495 Pa. 158, 432
A.2d 1382, which was treated as a public forum).
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ment of the preemption question and of other state laws that affect labor
and property rights generally. 36 Since the practical effect of Sears and
Fairmont/Jean Country will be that many labor access disputes will be
under state court jurisdiction, inconsistent state laws will produce con-
flicting outcomes across the nation.
The prospect of conflicting rules of access is as clear as it is troub-
ling. At the very least, it may be time for the Supreme Court to recon-
sider Sears in light of the words written by Justice Harlan in his
concurrence to Garmon nearly thirty years ago:
The threshold question in every labor pre-emption case is whether the
conduct with respect to which a State has sought to act is, or may fairly
be regarded as, federally protected activity. Because conflict is the touch-
stone of pre-emption, such activity is obviously beyond the reach of all
state power.
365
For the moment, the Board must develop a more coherent body of
federal labor law dealing with the conflict between property rights and
statutory rights. Ultimately, this may mean that the Board and the
courts will have to reject the Babcock "accommodation" principles. The
Board's Fairmont decisions, and the Supreme Court cases such as Bab-
cock, Hudgens, and Sears, that have contributed to the analytical frame-
work of the Fairmont balancing test, have elevated the employer's "right
to exclude" over the employee's statutory "right of access."' 36 6  The
"puzzling" dictum in the Sears case 367 has been confirmed: the property
364. Compare Giant Food Stores v. UFCW Local 1347, 120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2024 (Pa. Ct.
Common Pleas 1985) (holding that federal labor law and the Pennsylvania Labor Anti-Injunction
Act of 1937 together preempt state jurisdiction and bar state court from issuing an injunction against
peaceful trespassory area standards labor activity in a store parking lot) with Commonwealth v.
Noflke, 376 Mass. 127, 379 N.E.2d 1086 (1978) (holding that neither federal preemption nor state
constitutional rights of free speech and assembly precluded trespass prosecution of a nonemployee
union organizer under the Massachusetts criminal trespass statute). One commentator believes that
"'preemption under either Garmon or Sears is unlikely to occur if the trespass is in violation of a state
criminal law." Note, Labor Law-Federal Preemption-the Aftermath of Sears, 27 WAYNE L. REV.
313, 346 (1980).
365. 359 U.S. at 250.
366. Although in Hohfeldian terms the "right" of access would be described as a "privilege" in
opposition to the property owner's "right" to exclude, I have purposefully rejected that terminology.
See Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Legal Reasoning, 23 YALE L. J. 16
(1913). Hohfeld's "right/privilege" distinction implies too much about whose interests are more
important and more worthy of legal protection. Assigning the labels-"right" or "privilege"--can
become a way of determining outcomes without examining the underlying contextual relationships
and social policies. This point becomes clearer if we ask whether unions, asserting statutory "rights"
of employees, have a "right" of access and the employer has a "privilege" to exclude. See generally
Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 WiS. L.
REV. 975; see also Klare, supra note 250, at 1366-71.
367. One AJ noted his puzzlement with the following dictum in Sears: "For while there are
unquestionably examples of trespassory union activity in which the question whether it is protected
is fairly debatable, experience under the Act teaches that such situations are rare and that a trespass
is far more likely to be unprotected than protected." See United Supermarkets, 283 N.L.R.B. No.
130, ALJ Decision JD-(SF)-290-80, slip op. at 7 n. 16 (quoting Sears, 436 U.S. at 205).
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owner nearly always "wins" in these access disputes, unless, perhaps,
state law limits the right to exclude through state labor laws or constitu-
tional protections of speech. The property owner wins because she can
quickly obtain injunctive relief, or threaten arrest, or call the police, or
have security guards remove the "trespassers." Unions have no mecha-
nism to, gain access in a timely fashion. Once excluded, the union either
needs a court order to reenter, which may take years, or individuals must
take the risk that the state will not prosecute them under criminal tres-
pass laws or hold them in contempt of court for violating an injunction.
The current Board law privileges property rights at the expense of
labor communication. The Fairmont test has "corollaries" which create
categories of privileged market relations that are dependent on wealth
and status. These corollaries create property "plus"-an enhanced
"right to exclude" labor activity for certain individual entrepreneurs and
enterprises that share land and facilities. Thus, the single employer can
acquire property plus by investing in sufficient physical land to insulate
the pedestrian entrances to her single facility from public byways. Em-
ployers who share facilities acquire property plus by investing in certain
forms of "goodwill"-in "luxury" surroundings, off-street parking, pri-
vate sidewalks, security guards, separate employee entrances, and rules
of exclusion.36 The corollaries also reveal class-based concerns that peo-
ple who are engaged in union activity on private property are potentially
more dangerous, more violent, more disruptive, and less trustworthy
than the consumers, suppliers, and employees who are "invited" on to
the property.
3 69
The Board, in effect, is using possessory interests in land, and the
civil and criminal laws of trespass, to protect the employer's investment
in an intangible form of property-her goodwill.37 ° The goodwill of a
business is certainly a valuable property right. Business goodwill is en-
368. Justice Marshall noted the dire consequences of protecting the use of wealth by excluding
unwanted speech from "private" property which is "open to the public" in his dissent in Lloyd:
Only the wealthy may find effective communication possible unless we adhere to Marsh v.
Alabama and continue to hold that "[t]he more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his
property for use by the public in general, the more do his fights become circumscribed by
the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it."
407 U.S. at 586 (quoting Marsh, 407 U.S. at 506).
369. The Board in Fairmont relied on the Supreme Court's property/§ 7 analysis in Sears which
was, in part, predicated on assumptions about the potential for violence in trespassory picketing. See
supra text accompanying notes 315-19. The Board also expressed concern that allowing union
handbillers in the "private area in front of the hotel's main entrance" would raise "the possibility of
theft of luggage," and also "disturb the hotel's guests ... and . . .disrupt the hotel's decorum."
Fairmont, 282 N.L.R.B. No. 27, slip op. at II, 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1260.
370. This extension of the concept of "trespass" in order to protect intangible business interests
is analogous to doctrinal developments in labor cases of the late nineteenth century. See Hurvitz,
American Labor Law and the Doctrine of Entrepreneurial Property Rights. Boycotts, Courts, and the
Juridical Reorientation of 1886-1895, 8 INDUS. REL. L.J. 307, 340-41 (1986) (discussing "trespass"
upon real estate as interference with the employer's operation and management of its business).
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hanced, in part, by investment in a luxurious, pleasant, exclusive environ-
ment. But the Board has made these particular kinds of investments in
goodwill even more valuable to some employers by including freedom
from union "disturbances" as one of the legally protectible incidents of
owning such property.. It is obvious, however, that many employers,
whose facilities happen to have entrances located on public sidewalks,
cannot likewise use civil and criminal trespass laws to enhance their
goodwill. This is true regardless of how luxurious, or exclusive, the inte-
rior space of the facility may be. The public sidewalk brings to the doors
of such employer's facility the "public," without distinction between the
union representative, the Jehovah's Witness, the customer, the bill collec-
tor, or the employee. Beyond the employer's control, the public sidewalk
becomes the only place where union representatives know, for a cer-
tainty, that they can legally picket and handbill. In effect, rights of un-
ions to communicate with employees, suppliers, and consumers are no
greater, and indeed, may be much less than the rights of the public at
large.371
It is irrelevant whether Board and court attitudes about wealth,
class, and status are based on genuinely held beliefs or cultural stereo-
types. The point is that these assumptions have become an integral part
of the legal analysis of conflicts between property. rights and section 7
rights. The result is a series of distinctions that benefit "desirable" prop-
erty owners and burden "undesired" types of collective labor activity.
The legal rules create incentives for employers to adopt and enforce
broad exclusive rules and to make certain types of investments in land,
capital, and operating expenses that create barriers to union communica-
tion with the audiences they need to reach and should be able to reach on
a "face-to-face" basis.37 2
The Board created a test of property rights in the Fairmont cases
which suggests that property rights inhere in the land, and in the owner
of the land, and not in a conception of the relationships between peo-
371. Compare NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (citizens' boycott of
white merchants, as peaceful political activity within the first amendment, cannot be prohibited
despite state's broad power to regulate commerce and award civil damages) with NLRB v. Retail
Store Employees Union Local 1001 (Safeco), 447 U.S. 607 (1980) (union's secondary picketing to
encourage customers not to patronize neutral employers who derived over 90% of gross income
from primary employer violates § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the NLRA); see also Harper, The Consumer's
Emerging Right to Boycott: NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware and Its Implications for American La-
bor Law, 93 YALE L.J. 409, 438-54 (1984).
372. In his dissent to SCNO Barge Lines, Member Johansen noted that "[b]oth the Board and
the courts have recognized face-to-face contact as an essential element of effective union organizing."
See 287 N.L.R.B. No. 29, slip op. at 17 n.6, 127 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1086 n.6; see also Johansen's
discussion of the importance of face-to-face confrontation for pickets during an economic strike. 40-
41 Realty Assocs., 288 N.L.R.B. No. 23, slip op. at 17, 128 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1006 (Johansen,
dissenting).
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pie.37 3 The Fairmont/Jean Country test assumes that a property right
can be measured, or weighed, assigned a value, and then compared to a
statutory right, which has been likewise measured, valued, and placed in
a "hierarchy" of statutory rights. What is missing in the Board's analysis
of access disputes is a conception of the complete social and economic
interaction which occurs when a property owner uses land in a produc-
tive, commercial capacity. Thus, Fairmont and its progeny reveal how
union access to private property for communicative labor activity has
failed to keep pace with the expanded protection of marketplaces
through property rules. In attempting to "balance" private property
rights with federal labor rights, the Board and the Supreme Court have
been reluctant to impose, uniformly, the burdens, risks, and potential
benefits of modem collective labor relations on employers engaged in in-
terstate commerce.
373. Jeremy Bentham wrote:
Property is nothing but a basis of expectation; the expectation of deriving certain advan-
tages from a thing, which we are said to possess, in consequence of the relation in which we
stand towards it. There is no image, no painting, no visible trait, which can express the
relation that constitutes property. It is not material, it is metaphysical; it is a mere concep-
tion of the mind.
J. BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION: PRINCIPLES OF THE CIVIL CODE 113 (Hildreth ed. 1931);
see also Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 652-63 (1988) (discussing
property as social relations).
1989]
